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Full text of "International law topics and discussions : 1913"

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 



INTERNATIONAL LAW 
TOPICS AND 
DISCUSSIONS 



1913 



0|3 



$ 



WASHINGTON 
1914 



PREFACE. 



The discussions of the international law topics of 
1913 were conducted as in previous years by Mr. George 
Grafton Wilson, professor of international law at Har- 
vard University, who also drew up the notes upon the 
topics which are now published for the information of 
the Navy. 

The usual form of the situations was somewhat altered 
this year owing to the approaching Third Hague Confer- 
ence, at which it is probable that a code of naA T al warfare 
will be proposed for adoption. 

In view of this probability, it seemed well this year 
for the conference of officers to draft regulations suitable 
for embodiment in the code. By following this course 
the views of naval officers upon certain of the more press- 
ing questions of this branch of international law are 
offered for the consideration of the naval service and of 
others who are interested in the subject. 

The notes upon the topics now presented serve to bring 
discussion and opinion upon them up to date and to con- 
sider certain subjects which previously have been dis- 
cussed little or not at all at the Naval War College. In 
this volume the presentation of topics which have been 
previously discussed is shortened and reference is to the 
earlier volumes. In the presentation of the topics which 
have received little attention at the Naval War College 
the discussion is correspondingly amplified. Many of 
these topics are under consideration throughout the world 
and opinion is changing. The opinions given in recent 
international conferences are shown so far as the limits 
of the work have permitted. 



4 PREFACE. 

The president of the Naval War College requests com- 
ment on the regulations and conclusions upon these topics, 
as well as suggestions for subjects to be considered at the 
college in the future, particularly such as relate to those 
likely to be brought before The Hague Conference affect- 
ing naval conduct. 

W. L. Rodgers-, 
Captain, United States Navy, 
President United States Naval War College. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



Page. 

Torre I. — Marginal sea and other waters 11 

Regulations 11 

Notes: 

Early ideas on marginal sea 12 

Early control 13 

Later ideas 15 

Great Britain 15 

United States, early opinion 16 

Bering Sea. 18 

Revenue regulations 18 

Treaty provisions 19 

Opinions on jurisdiction 20 

Waters of belligerents 21 

Neutral waters 21 

National regulations and claims 22 

Austria-Hungary 22 

Belgium 22 

Brazil , 23 

France 23 

Germany 24 

Italy 24 

Japan 24 

Norway and Sweden 25 

Russia 25 

Spain 26 

Special regulations 26 

Denmark 26 

Sweden and Norway 26 

Institute of International Law, 1894 27 

Position of the United States, 1896 29 

Institute of International Law, 1912 30 

General trend of coast 30 

Regulations of The Hague conventions 31 

Use of terms , 32 

Consideration of projects 33 

Summary 34 

Conclusion as to marginal sea 34 

Gulfs and bays 35 

5 



6 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Topic I — Continued. 

Notes — Continued. Page. 

Headland doctrine 37 

North Atlantic coast fisheries arbitration 37 

American contention 38 

Opinion of Dr. Drago 39 

Chesapeake Bay 39 

Opinion of Azuni 40 

Opinion of Prof. Westlake 40 

Bays before Institute of International Law, 1894 41 

Roadsteads 42 

Straits in general 42 

Straits connecting open seas 42 

Straits of Magellan 43 

Straits connecting inland waters 44 

Jurisdiction 44 

Straits before Institute of International Law, 1894 45 

Innocent passage 46 

Summary 46 

Conclusion on gulfs, bays, roadsteads, straits 47 

Canals 47 

General 47 

Interparliamentary Union, 1913 48 

Opinion of Prof. Holland '. 49 

Suez and Panama Canals 50 

Conclusion on canals 51 

General conclusions 51 

Regulations 52 

Topic II.— Commencement of hostilities 54 

Regulations 54 

Notes: 

Introduction 54 

The Hague Convention, 1907 55 

Recant declarations 56 

Spanish-American, 1898 56 

South African, 1899 60 

Russo-Japanese, 1 904 61 

Turco-Italian, 1911 62 

Limitation of rules 65 

Form of declaration as regards belligerents 65 

Commencement of hostilities 67 

Form of declaration as regards neutrals . 69 

Prof. Westlake 's opinion 70 

Reasons for The Hague rules 70 

Form of declaration. : 72 

Resume 74 

Regulations 74 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 7 

Page. 

Topic III. — Limitation of armaments 75 

Conclusion 75 

Notes: 

General 75 

First Conference at The Hague, 1899 78 

Technical opinions, 1899 80 

Opinions, 1907 84 

Great Britain 84 

United States 85 

France 85 

Spain 85 

Argentine and Chile 85 

Russia 85 

The Hague wish, 1907 86 

Convention of Argentine and Chile, 1902 87 

General view 87 

Conclusion 88 

Topic IV. — Enemy vessels and their personnel 89 

Conclusions . 89 

Notes: 

Definitions 90 

Classification of vessels 91 

Enemy public vessels 91 

Enemy private vessels . 91 

Consideration of exemptions 93 

Days of grace 96 

Mail vessels 98 

Consideration at Institute of International Law, 

1912-13 98 

Persons on enemy vessels 99 

Early French regulations 99 

French regulations, 1912 100 

Passengers and others 100 

Propositions in 1913 104 

Personnel of private vessels 105 

Exemption of persons from capture 107 

Prisoners of war 109 

Resume * 110 

Conclusions Ill 

Topic V. — Immunity of private property at sea 113 

Conclusion. . '. 113 

Notes: 

Introduction 113 

American proposition, 1899 113 

Discussion, 1905 114 

American proposition, 1907 116 



8 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Topic V — Continued. 

Notes — Continued. Page. 

Replies to American proposition, 1907 120 

Position of States, 1907 122 

Holland. . - 122 

Brazil 122 

Denmark 123 

Belgium 123 

France " 123 

Austria-Hungary 124 

Resume of The Hague propositions 124 

Vote at The Hague, 1907 126 

Conclusion as to The Hague discussion 127 

Enemy ships 127 

Prof. Westlake's opinion 129 

Resume 130 

Conclusion 131 

Topic VI. — Means of injuring the enemy 132 

Conclusion \ 132 

Notes: 

Restrictions on instruments of warfare 133 

Restrictions, The Hague Conference, 1899 135 

Torpedoes 138 

Mines 138 

The Hague Conference, 1907 138 

Germany 139 

Discussion, The Hague, 1907 140 

The Hague Convention on Mines 141 

Limitations of convention 142 

Institute of International Law, 1910-1913 143 

Resume 146 

Conclusions « '.. . 146 

Topic VII. — Conversion of private vessels into public vessels. . 148 

Conclusion 148 

Notes: 

Conversion in time of war 148 

Conversion from public to private vessels 150 

Reconversion 150 

Institute of International Law, 1912-13 150 

Summary 153 

Conclusion 153 

Topic VIII.— Transfer of flag 155 

Conclusion 155 

Notes: 

International law topics, 1906 and 1910 ' 156 

Declaration of London 156 

Resume 159 

Conclusion 159 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 9 

Page. 

Topic IX. — Methods of injuring the enemy 161 

Conclusions 161 

Notes: 

Treachery 161 

Denial of quarter and of flag of truce 161 

Institute of International Law, 1913 163 

Destruction of enemy vessels 163 

French regulations, 1912 163 

Resume 165 

Conclusions 165 

Appendix: 

Instructions for the application of international law in 

case of war, France, 1912 167 

Index 195 



INTERNATIONAL LAW TOPICS 
AND DISCUSSIONS. 



Topic I. 

MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

What regulations should be made in regard to the use 
in time of war of the marginal sea and other waters ? 

REGULATIONS. 

1. Acts of war are prohibited in neutral waters and 
in waters neutralized by convention. 

2. " Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign 
rights of neutral powers and to abstain in neutral waters 
from all acts which would constitute, on the part of the 
neutral powers, which knowingly permitted them, a 
nonfulfillment of their neutrality." 

3. The area of maritime war : 

(a) The sea outside of neutral jurisdiction. 
(h) Gulfs, bays, roadsteads, ports, and other waters 
of the belligerents. 

4. Limitations: 

(a) Marginal sea. — The jurisdiction of an adjacent 
state over the marginal sea extends to 6 miles (60 to a 
degree of latitude) from the low-water mark. 

(b) Roadsteads. — The jurisdiction over roadsteads is 
the same as over the sea. 

(c) Gulfs and bays. — The jurisdiction of an adjacent 
state over the sea extends outAvard 6 miles from a line 
drawn between the opposite shores of the entrance to the 
waters of gulfs or bays where the distance first narrows 
to 12 miles. 

(d) Straits. — (1) Straits not more than 12 miles in 
width are under the jurisdiction of the adjacent states. 
(2) Innocent passage through straits connecting open 
seas is permitted. 

(e) Canals. — (1) (a) Canals or artificial waterways 
within neutral jurisdiction are closed or open to vessels 
of war during hostilities, according to the regulations 

11 



12 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

which have been established prior to the declaration of 
war. ( b ) No act of hostility shall take place within these 
waters. (2) (a) Canals or artificial waterways within 
belligerent jurisdiction when national in character may 
be closed during war, but should, if possible, be open to 
innocent vessels of neutral powers, (b) Canals or artifi- 
cial waterways of mixed character which are not of grand 
importance to the commerce of the world may be simi- 
larly closed, (c) Canals or artificial waterways which 
are strictly international and form main highways of 
world commerce may be closed to all vessels of a power 
at war with the power which in time of peace is in control 
of the canal or artificial waterway. 

NOTES. 

Early ideas on marginal sea. — It is evident from the 
works of ancient writers that the sea was often regarded 
as susceptible of possession in the same manner as land. 
There were also early declarations, as among Roman 
jurists, that " the use of the sea is as free to all men as 
the air." The idea of maritime sovereignty was the pre- 
vailing one, however, during the Middle Ages. The 
prevalence of lawlessness at sea in the form of piracy 
and otherwise during the Middle Ages required a strong 
hand to suppress. It was natural that a state should pro- 
tect its neighboring trade routes, and its own traders, as 
well as foreign traders also, would gladly yield obedience 
in return for this protection. The commerce of the Ital- 
ian states was, during this period, very important. The 
marriage of the sea celebrated by the city of Venice from 
the latter part of the twelfth century was emblematic of 
the authority which that city had at the time over the 
Adriatic. Venice from time to time claimed and exer- 
cised the privilege of excluding others from the use of 
the Adriatic. The restrictive measures were usually 
taken with a view to protecting trade and commerce in 
these early days. 

Grotius sums up the best opinion of the early days of 
the seventeenth century, though not following Gentilis, 
saying: 

It would seem that dominion over a part of the sea is acquired 
in the same manner as other dominion; that is, as said above, 



EARLY IDEAS ON MARGINAL SEA. 13 

because it appertains to a person or to a territory — as appertain- 
ing to a person when he has a fleet, which is a sea army, in that 
part of the sea ; as appertaining to territory in so far as those 
who sail in the adjacent part of the sea can be commanded from 
the shore no less than if they were upon land. (De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis. Lib. II., c. 3, 13.) 

Bynkershoek in 1702 tried to make this more definite 
by stating that the dominion over the sea ceased with the 
limit of the range of cannon shot. (De Domino Maris, 
c. 2.) 

To the position of Grotius, Selden in 1635 had been bit- 
terly opposed. Molloy, writing later in the seventeenth 
century, says: 

After the writings of the illustrious Selden, certainly it is 
impossible to find any prince or republic or single person indued 
with reason or sense that doubts the dominion of the British sea 
to be entirely subject to that imperial diadem. (De Jure mari- 
timo, Bk. I, chap. 5, 1.) 

And as the sea is capable of protection and government, so is 
the same no less than the land subject to be divided amongst 
men, and appropriated to cities and potentates, which long since 
was ordained of God as the thing most natural. (Ibid., 4.) 

The point of view of those who claimed that the open 
sea was, as said in the Roman law, " by nature common 
to all," however, gradually prevailed, particularly in the 
eighteenth century, yet the line at which the open sea 
began in distinction from the line of the marginal sea 
continued to be a subject of controversy. 

Early control. — In ancient times the control of the sea 
was not considered a matter of much importance. Dur- 
ing the period of Roman power, that state exercised a 
considerable control for the protection of the different 
parts of its dominion. 

During the Middle Ages, with the development of 
maritime commerce and of competition, the Mediter- 
ranean and the waters about the coasts of western Europe 
became the subject of conflicting claims. The Venetians 
seemed to have maintained their control of the waters 
of the Adriatic till the seventeenth century, requiring 
that those who sailed its waters have permission, and in 
return they afforded a degree of protection. 



14 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

In the extreme and positive practice early followed by 
Great Britain can be found precedents for the claims to 
most absolute control of later days. King Edgar in 964 
seems to have assumed the title not merely of King of 
the land but of the circumjacent seas. Later, acts of 
Parliament were passed assuming sovereignty over the 
neighboring seas. The formula used by the English 
kings usually implied that while they assumed the do- 
minion, they proposed to exercise the authority and de- 
fend the seas. 

In the English seas, as elsewhere, the exercise of pro- 
tection was not a gratuitous function of the state. In 
some seas tolls had been collected for protecting the 
foreign vessels from pirates, etc. The requirement of a 
salute of the flag was common in the English seas. The 
sovereignty of the English seas was formally recognized 
to reside in the English crown by a memorial presented 
by the representatives of merchants of several states 
in the early part of the fourteenth century. These 
British claims and the exercise of control continued. 
Selden, in his book "Mare Clausum " (1635), gave ex- 
pression to the most extreme forms of these claims. 

What had been done by England was done by many 
other states, so that the movement of vessels upon the 
seas and in the waters near the coasts of many countries 
was often fraught with impediments and inconveniences. 
The extreme claims to control by Spain and by Portugal 
in the period of the sixteenth century to all the neighbor- 
ing waters to 100 miles' limit and even beyond if the 
waters were not under another sovereignty, and some 
claims to the whole Atlantic Ocean within certain lines, 
seem to have brought a reaction. From the beginning 
of the seventeenth century, particularly from the issue of 
Grotius's " Mare Liberum " in 1609, the doctrine of lim- 
ited control gained in influence. That this control should 
be effective was the principle advocated by Bynkershoek 
in 1702 in his " De Dominio Maris." That effective con- 
trol could be maintained to a limit of cannon shot from 
shore appealed to the minds of men as reasonable, and 
this is the form which was embodied in man}' treaties, 



LATER IDEAS ON MARGINAL SEA. 15 

and this doctrine became the basis of modern practice. 
The varying methods which had been resorted to in 
earlier times gradually assumed a degree of uniformity 
under the spread of the doctrine of Bynkershoek that 
the land dominion ended with the range of arms., " potes- 
tas terrae finitur ubi finitur armorum vis." The doctrine 
of the Koman law freedom of the sea was revived and 
amplified and brought to the support of the modern doc- 
trine of the exercise of control. 

Later ideas. — The ideas of the right to exercise juris- 
diction within the marginal sea became more definite as 
the limits of this area became better established. The 
questions most frequently arising related to fishing. It 
has gradually come to be recognized that in absence of 
treaties the exclusive right to regulate fishing in marginal 
seas is in the adjacent state and also that a state or states 
can make regulations for their own nationals beyond the 
marginal limits. The basis of later ideas changed some- 
what, and it was considered that the marginal sea should 
be under jurisdiction of the adjacent state, not merely 
because a shot could reach across the area, but because 
such jurisdiction was necessary for the well-being of the 
state, and even for its safe and convenient existence, and 
that the exercise of such jurisdiction within a limited 
area would not involve any disadvantage to other states 
which would be commensurate with the advantage to the 
adjacent state. 

The exercise of jurisdiction within this marginal area 
has now come to cover in time of peace the execution of 
municipal laws in regard to revenue, sanitary and fishery 
regulations in an exclusive manner, and the execution of 
somewhat less rigorous regulations in regard to naviga- 
tion and criminal oifenses, unless the criminal act takes 
effect outside the vessel. In time of war there is still 
much difference in the practice of states. Examples of 
varying domestic regulations may be found in the legis- 
lation of many states. During the eighteenth century 
maritime jurisdiction received much attention. 

Great Britain. — A statute of 9 George II, c. 35 (1736), 
assumes jurisdiction over any person or persons who 



16 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

" shall be lurking, waiting, or loitering within 5 miles 
from the seacoast or from any navigable river " and 
suspected of intended violation of the revenue laws. 
(Sec. 18.) In the same act jurisdiction is assumed 
" within 2 leagues of the shore " (sec. 22) arid transship- 
ment of goods without paj^ment of duties is prohibited 
" within the distance of 4 leagues from any of the coasts 
of this kingdom." The regulation relating to the juris- 
diction over 2 leagues was in 1763, by a statute of 4 Geo. 
Ill, Cap. 15, extended to the American colonies. 

Early opinion in United States. — A letter of Jefferson, 
Secretary of State, to the British minister, of November 
8, 1793, showed the attitude of the Government at that 
time : 

Sir: The President of the United States, thinking that, before 
it shall be finally decided to what distance from our seashores 
the territorial protection of the United States shall be exercised, 
it will be proper to enter into friendly conferences and explana- 
tions with the powers chiefly interested in the navigation of the 
seas on our coasts, and relying that convenient occasions may be 
taken for these hereafter, finds it necessary in the meantime to 
fix provisionally on some distance for the present government of 
these questions. You are sensible that very different opinions and 
claims have been heretofore advanced on this subject. The great- 
est distance to which any respectable assent among nations has 
been at any time given has been the extent of the human sight, 
estimated at upward of 20 miles, and the smallest distance, 1 
believe, claimed by any nation whatever is the utmost range of a 
cannon ball, usually stated at a sea league. Some intermediate 
distances have also been insisted on, and that of three sea leagues, 
has some authority in its favor. The character of our coast, 
remarkable in considerable parts of it for admitting no vessels 
of size to pass near the shores, would entitle us, in reason, to as 
broad a margin of protected navigation as any nation whatever. 
Reserving, however, the ultimate extent of this for future delib- 
eration, the President gives instructions to the officers acting 
under his authority to consider those heretofore given them as 
restrained for the present to the distance of one sea league, or 
three 4 geographical miles, from the seashores. This distance can 
ndmit of no opposition, as it is recognized by treaties between 
some of the powers with whom we are connected in commerce and 
navigation and is as little, or less, than is claimed by any of them 
on their own coasts. 



EARLY OPINION IN UNITED STATES. 17 

The law of June 5, 1794, the Neutrality Act, declares: 

Sec. 6. And be it further enacted and declared, That the district 
courts shall take cognizance of complaints by whomsoever insti- 
tuted in cases of capture made within the waters of the United 
States or within a marine league of the coasts or shores thereof. 

It is possible that the limits of the marginal sea may 
be extended by pushing out from land the line from 
which the marine league is to be measured. Such a 
method is mentioned in a letter of President Jefferson to 
the Secretary of the Treasury in 1804. 

Dear Sir : As we shall have to lay before Congress the pro- 
ceedings of the British vessels at New York, it will be necessary 
for us to say to them with certainty which specific aggressions 
were committed within the common law, which within the ad- 
miralty jurisdiction, and which on the high seas. The rule of 
the common law is that wherever you can see from land to land 
all the water within the line of sight is in the body of the adja- 
cent country and within common-law jurisdiction. Thus, if in 
this curvature ,a/^\b y you can see from a to &. all the water 

within the line of sight is within common-law jurisdiction, and 
a murder committed at c is to be tried as at common law. Our 
coast is generally visible, I believe, by the time you get within 
about 25 miles. I suppose thab at New York you must be some 
miles out of the Hook before the opposite shores recede 25 miles 
from each other. The 3 miles of maritime jurisdiction is always 
to be counted from this line of sight. 

The United States has made other extreme claims at 
various times. The Gulf Stream has seemed to some the 
natural and proper limit of maritime jurisdiction. John 
Quincy Adams relates in his Memoirs that in 1805, on 
November 30, he paid a visit to President Jefferson. 

The President mentioned a late act of hostility committed by 
a French privateer near Charleston, S. C, and said that we 
ought to assume as a principle that the neutrality of our terri- 
tory should extend to the Gulf Stream, which was a natural 
boundary, and within which we ought not to suffer any hostility 
to be committed. M. Gaillard observed that on a former occa- 
sion, in Mr. Jefferson's correspondence with Genet, and by an act 
of Congress at that period, we had seemed only to claim the usual 
distance of 3 miles from the coast; but the President replied 
that he had then assumed that principle because Genet by his 
intemperance forced us to fix on some point, and we were not 
then prepared to assert the claim of jurisdiction to the extent 
19148—14 2 



18 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

we are in reason entitled to; but lie had then taken care ex- 
pressly to reserve the subject for future consideration, with a 
view to this same doctrine for which he now contends. I ob- 
served that it might be well, before we ventured to assume a 
claim so broad, to wait for a time when we should have a force 
competent to maintain it. But in the meantime, he said, it was 
advisable to squint at it, and to accustom the nations of Europe 
to the idea that we should claim it in future. (Memoirs, J. Q. 
Adams, p. 375.) 

Bering Sea. — After the acquisition of Alaska by pur- 
chase from Eussia in 1867 the United States came into 
possession, according to the terms of the convention with 
the Czar, of " all the territory and dominion now pos- 
sessed by his said Majesty on the continent of America 
and in the adjacent islands " within the specified limits of 
the Russo-British treaty of February 28/16, 1825. Under 
this convention the United States advanced some of the 
claims that Russia had previously advanced. In 1890 Mr. 
Blaine, Secretary of State, maintained that the irregular 
taking of seals in the Bering Sea was contra bonos mores, 
and that the United States had jurisdiction sufficient to 
prevent such acts. Great Britain maintained that fur 
seals in the high seas were res nullius. The matter of 
jurisdiction of the United States in Bering Sea was re- 
ferred in 1892 to a tribunal of arbitration. This tribunal 
decided that the United States had no exclusive jurisdic- 
tion outside the ordinary 3-mile limit. 

Revenue purposes. — The act of March 2, 1797, provided 
that the United States would assume jurisdiction for rev- 
enue purposes 4 leagues from the coast. 

Sec. 2760. The officers of the revenue cutters shall respectively 
be deemed officers of the customs and shall be subject to the 
direction of such collectors of the revenue or other officers thereof, 
as from time to time shall be designated for that purpose. They 
shall go on board all vessels which arrive within the United 
States or within 4 leagues of the coast thereof, if bound for the 
United States, and search and examine the same, and every part 
thereof, and shall demand, receive, and certify the manifests 
required to be on board certain vessels, shall affix and put proper 
fastenings on the hatches and other communications -with the hold 
of any vessel, and shall remain on board such vessels until they 
arrive at the port or place of their destination. 



AMEBICAN TREATY PROVISIONS. 19 

This practice for the enforcement of revenue laws seems 
to meet with little objection, and is also observed by other 
states. 

American treaty provisions. — In the treaty between the 
United States and Great Britain in 1794, Article XXV, 
it is provided that — 

Neither of the said parties shall permit the ships or goods 
belonging to the subjects or citizens of the other to be taken 
within cannon shot of the coast, nor in any of the bays, ports, or 
rivers of their territories, by ships of war or others having com- 
mission from any prince, republic, or state whatever. But in case 
it should so happen, the party whose territorial rights shall thus 
have been violated shall use his utmost endeavors to obtain from 
the offending party full and ample satisfaction for the vessels so 
taken, whether the same be vessels of war or merchant vessels. 

This article expired in 1807. 

The treaty of Gaudalupe-Hidalgo of 1848 between the 
United States and Mexico states : 

Art. V. The boundary line between the two Republics shall 
commence in the Gulf of Mexico, 3 leagues from land, opposite 
tbe mouth of the Rio Grande. 

This portion of the treaty was reaffirmed in the Gads- 
den treaty of 1853. To a complaint of the British min- 
ister in regard to this clause in 1848, Mr. Buchanan, Sec- 
retary of State, replied : 

I have had the honor to receive your note of the 30th April last 
objecting, on behalf of the British Government, to that clause in 
the fifth article of the late treaty between Mexico and the United 
States by which it is declared that " the boundary line between 
the two Republics shall commence in the Gulf of Mexico 3 leagues 
from land " instead of 1 league from land, which you observe 
" is acknowledged by international law and practice as the ex- 
tent of territorial jurisdiction over the sea that washes the coasts 
■of states." 

In answer I have to state that the stipulation in the treaty 
can only affect the rights of Mexico and the United Sates. If 
for their mutual convenience it has been deemed proper to enter 
into such an arrangement, third parties can have no just cause 
of complaint. The Government of the United States never in- 
tended by this stipulation to question the rights which Great 
Britain or any other power may possess under the law of na- 
tions. (1 Moore, Digest Int. Law, p. 730.) 



20 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

Opinions. — Pradier-Fodere, summing up various doc- 
trines, says : 

La prolongation de la souverainete et de la jurisdiction de l'etat 
snr la portion de mer qui, touchant innnediateinent ses cotes, 
fcrme en quelque sorte la ligne defensive de son territoire et peut 
etre consideree cornrne une continuation de sa frontiere, est 
fondee sur le droit de l'etat d'assurer sa securite et la protection 
des interets commerciaux et fiscaux du pays. (Cours de Droit 
Int. Pub. II, ch. 5.) 

Wheaton, speaking of the " marine league, or as far as 
a cannon shot will reach from the shore," says: 

Within these limits its (the state's) rights of property and 
territorial jurisdiction are absolute, and exclude those of every 
other nation. (International Law, Pt. II, sec. 177.) 

British territorial waters jurisdiction act of 1878 says: 

Any part of the open sea within 1 marine league of the coast 
measured from low-water mark shall be deemed to be open sea 
within the territorial waters of Her Majesty's dominions. 

The British Manual of Naval Prize Law, prepared by 
Prof. Holland and issued in 1888, declares, in regard to 
war powers, that — 

2. These powers may be exercised in any waters except the ter- 
ritorial waters of a neutral state. The territorial waters of a 
state are those within 3 miles from low-water mark of any part of 
the territory of that state, or forming bays within such territory; 
at any rate, in the case of bays the entrance to which is not more 
than 6 miles wide. 

Hautefeuille shows that the early publicists fixed vary- 
ing limits to maritime domain. Casaregis gives 100 
miles; Baldus and others, 60 miles; Loccenius, two days' 
journey; many treaties indicate 2 leagues; some writers 
think the extent and power of the state should determine. 
(I Droits et Devoirs de Nations Neutres, Titre I, chap. 3, 
sec. 1.) He finally concludes: "La plus grande portee 
du cannon monte a terre est done reellement la limite de 
la mer territoriale." (Ibid.) He argues for this, as 
many since have argued, that this area, being within 
range of cannon, is under effective control of the adjacent 
state and should belong to that state. 



BELLIGERENT AND NEUTRAL WATERS. 21 

The proposition that hostilities in time of war be re- 
stricted to the area within the jurisdiction of the two bel- 
ligerents, and that the high seas be free from conflict, 
has been made. Neutral and belligerent commerce would 
under this plan be exempt on the high sea and belligerent 
Avar vessels would be liable only in belligerent waters. 
Under such a regulation it would seem necessary to ex- 
tend the jurisdiction in the marginal sea in order to per- 
mit hostilities with the long-range guns of the present 
day. 

It should be said of all declarations by states, or by 
rulers fixing or claiming maritime jurisdiction of an 
exceptional character or to an exceptional extent, that 
such declarations do not create rights as against other 
states. The citizens of the states making the declarations 
may be under obligations to observe their provisions, but 
the rights appertaining to the citizens of other states by 
the law of nations are not abridged by domestic acts of 
adjacent states. 

Waters of belligerents. — In time of war the marginal 
sea or other waters may be within the jurisdiction of a 
belligerent or within the jurisdiction of a neutral. The 
marginal seas or other waters within the jurisdiction of 
the belligerent, unless exempt by special treaty agree- 
ment, are within the legitimate area of hostilities. 

Neutral waters. — The neutral has the right of jurisdic- 
tion of waters which appertain to neutral territory. In 
early times the belligerent paid little attention to neutral 
claims. From the days of the armed neutrality of 1780 
neutral rights have gradually received more considera- 
tion. For a considerable period the obligation rested 
upon the neutral to protect its neutrality. The authori- 
ties upon international law enumerated degrees and kinds 
of neutrality, and the belligerents took advantage of any 
special privileges which would be of service to them. 
Treaties were often made in times of peace which would 
give to one state special privileges not enjoyed by other 
states in time of war. Later even the idea of impartiality 



22 MARGINAL SEA A^sD OTHER WATERS. 

was considered as insufficient evidence of a spirit of neu- 
trality because the operation of impartial rules might 
easily be favorable to one state while unfavorable to an- 
other; e. g., the grant of unlimited loans to each belliger- 
ent might be of great service to a belligerent which had 
no resources, and of no service to a belligerent which had 
abundant resources. 

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, particularly 
after the Alabama award, the doctrine of neutrality be- 
came more and more denned, and the idea that a neutral 
should refrain from all connection with the hostilities be- 
came general. Certain burdens were placed on the neu- 
tral by the expansion of the " due-diligence " clause. The 
idea that there were certain duties of abstention, preven- 
tion, toleration, and regulation was gradually recognized. 
as in state loans, use of territory as base, visit and search, 
sojourn of vessels in neutral ports, etc. 

National regulations and claims. — The regulations en- 
acted by domestic legislation show considerable variation, 
and the claims are sometimes even more divergent. 

Austria-Hungary . — The Austro-Hungarian regula- 
tions seem generally to recognize a cannon shot and a 
marine league as interchangeable expressions, but have 
special regulations extending revenue jurisdiction to 12 
miles, and special regulations for fisheries and in time of 
war. 

Belgium. — The Belgian regulations of 1901 contain 
very detailed and specific provisions in regard to the use 
of territorial waters. These regulations provided for the 
duration of sojourn of foreign ships of war even in time 
of peace. In time of war the regulations are very 
stringent; e. g., the commander of any belligerent vessel 
may be invited " to furnish accurate information touch- 
ing the flag, the name, the tonnage, the engine power, the 
crew of his vessel, her armament, the port of departure, 
the destination, as well as other information necessary to 
determine, if need be, the repairs or supplies -of provi- 
sions and coal that may be necessanv' (Art. XII.) 



NATIONAL REGULATIONS AND CLAIMS. 23 

Brazil. — The regulations in regard to the use of Bra- 
zilian waters, issued at the time of the Spanish- Ameri- 
can war in 1898, were definite in form, though not de- 
scribing exactly what area is included in territorial 
waters. 

xx. Neither of the belligerents may take prizes in the territorial 
waters of Brazil, place themselves in ambuscade in the ports or 
anchorages, islands, or capes situated in those waters to watch for 
hostile ships coming in or going out ; try to get information in re- 
gard to those which are expected, or are to go out; or, finally, to 
make sail to chase a hostile ship sighted or signaled. 

All necessary means, including force, will be employed to pre- 
vent prize taking in territorial waters. 

xxi. If prizes brought to the ports of the Republic shall have 
been taken in territorial waters, the things coming out of them 
shall be taken possession of by the competent authorities, in or- 
der to restore them to their lawful owners, the sale of such things 
being always taken and considered as void. 

xxii. Ships which shall try to violate neutrality shall be im- 
mediately warned to leave the maritime jurisdiction of Brazil, 
and nothing shall be furnished them. 

The belligerent who shall infringe the requirements of this cir- 
cular shall be no more admitted into the ports of Brazil. 

France. — The Instructions issued by France on Decem- 
ber 19, 1912, provide : 

Aeticle V. — Respect cles droits des Etats neutres. — 22. Vous 
vous conformerez strietement aux interdictions imposees aux 
belligerants par la Convention XIII de La Haye, du 18 octobre 
1907, concernant les droits et devoirs des Puissances neutres en 
cas de guerre maritime. 

23. Pour l'application de cette Convention, vous considererez 
les eaux territoriales comme ne s'§tendant jamais a moins de 
trois milles des cotes, des iles ou des bancs decouvrant qui en 
dependent, a compter de la laisse de basse mer, et jamais au dela 
de la portee de canon. 

Vous trouverez dans l'annexe II le tableau des Puissances qui, 
soit dans un texte legal ou reglementaire, soit dans une declara- 
tion de neutralite, ont fixe la limite de leurs eaux territoriales, 
quant au droit de la guerre, a une distance de la cote superieure 
a trois milles. 

Vous respecterez toute limite de cette nature qui se trouverait 
ainsi regulierement fixee avant l'ouverture des hostilites. (See 
Appendix. ) 



24 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

The Annexe II referred to above is as follows : 

Tableau des Etats qui ont fixe une 6tendue cle leurs eauco terri- 
toriales superieure d trots milles, quant au droit de la guerre. 



Etats. 


Etendue des eaux territo- 
riales. 


Observations. 


Russie 


Portee de canon. 


Pour la mer Blanche 


Suede 

Norvege : 


i milles, et, pres d'une forte- 
resse, la portee des canons 
de cette forteresse. 

4 milles 


limite s'etend a 3 milles, 
au large de la ligne joignant 
les caps Sviatoi Noss et 
Kaninn Noss. 

A partir dc Pilot non sub- 
merge le plus eloigne de la 
cote. 

A partir de Pilot non si >■ 
merge le plus eloigne de la 
cote. 


Danemark 

France 

Espagne 

Portugal 

Italie 


4 milles. 
6 milles. 
6 milies. 
6 milles. 
Portee de canon. 



Germany. — Germany has usually claimed a cannon shot 
as the limit of jurisdiction seaward. Some German au- 
thorities, realizing that the range of cannon would prob- 
ably increase, have proposed that the powers meet to re- 
adjust the limits of marginal sea from time to time and 
at intervals of 10 years. 

Italy. — A law of June 16, 1912, regulates the passage 
and stay of merchant vessels upon Italian coasts : 

Akticle l er . Le transit et le sejour des navires marchands 
nationaux ou etrangers peuvent etre defendus, en quel que temps 
que ce soit et dans un lieu determine quelconque, interieur ou 
exterieur des mers de l'Etat, quand cela sera reconnu necessaire 
a l'interet de la defense nationale. Aux seuls effets de la presente 
loi, par " mers de l'Etat " on entend la zone cle la mer comprise 
entre dix milles marins du rivage. En ce qui concerne les golfes 
et, les baies, la zone des dix milles est mesuree a partir d'une 
ligne droite tiree en travers de la sinuosite dans la partie la plus 
exterieure ou l'ouevrture n'a pas une largeur superieure a vingt 
milles. (Gazzetta ufficiale du 27 juin, 1912, n° 151.) 

Japan. — The Japanese regulations governing captures 
at sea, of March 15, 1904, contain a provision similar to 
the Russian regulations. 

Art. II. No visit, search, or capture shall be made in neutral 
waters, nor in waters clearly placed by treaty stipulations outside 
the zone of hostile operations. 



NATIONAL REGULATIONS A2\D CLAIMS. 25 

X ortra?/ and Sweden. — Both Norway and Sweden, be- 
fore, during, and since their union, have maintained 4 
miles as the limit of maritime jurisdiction. Even their 
early laws specify that this distance shall be measured 
from the most remote islet which is exposed at low tide. 
Scandinavian writers argue that as many continental 
states maintain the extent of jurisdiction as the range of a 
cannon shot from shore, their contention for 4 miles is 
really a moderate one, as the range of cannon shot is 
much greater. 

For control of fishing, the Norwegian claim in the 
seventeenth century (1636) extended even to 4 or 6 
leagues. 

The Swedish jurisdiction for revenue purposes has been 
fixed ordinarily at 6 miles. 

The above jurisdiction becomes of special importance 
because practically uniform rules of neutrality were pro- 
claimed for the waters of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
by concurrent agreement on December 21, 1912, and pub- 
lished on December 24. No change in the rules were to be 
made by one state without consulting the others. 

Russia. — A Russian ukase of September 7, 1821, relat- 
ing to the Bering Sea, forbade all foreign vessels, except 
in case of distress, " not only to land on the coasts and 
islands belonging to Russia, as stated above, but also to 
approach them within less than a hundred Italian miles." 
Both the United States and Great Britain protested 
against this position of Russia. 

In 1911 a bill was before the Russian Duma proposing 
to restrict fishing within 12 miles along the coast of the 
White Sea. This proposed law raised protests from sev- 
eral states and became a matter of inquiry in the British 
Parliament, where the sentiment of the Government was 
opposed to the elimination of the 3-mile limit of juris- 
diction. 

The Russian Regulations on Maritime Prizes, approved 
by the admirality board September 20, 1900, and made 



26 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

operative for the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, provide 
in article 16 that — 

Tlie stoppage, examination, and detention of hostile or sus- 
picious vessels and cargoes is permitted throughout the extent of 
the ocean and other waters, with the exception of those under the 
dominion of a neutral power or those excluded from military op- 
erations by special international agreements. (Foreign Relations, 
U. S. 1904 p. 737.) 

Spain. — The Spanish claims to jurisdiction seem to ex- 
tend in ordinary cases to 6 marine miles. 

Special regulations. — During the Eusso-Japanese war 
of 1901-5 several states made known in their neutrality 
proclamation that they proposed to restrict the use of cer- 
tain waters in special respects. 

Denmark. — " If warlike operations should extend to the vicinity 
of Denmark, the inner waters south of Sealand limited by the 
meridians of Oino and Stege shall be closed by means of stationary 
submarine mines; and ships of war belonging to either belligerent 
shall not be permitted to enter these waters nor the roadstead and 
harbor of Copenhagen, except in evident stress of weather, in 
which case such entrance shall be made public." (Foreign Rela- 
tions. U. S., 1904, p. 21.)' 

Sweden and Norway. — The King has decided — 

1. To interdict to war vessels of the belligerents entry to the 
territorial waters within the fixed submarine defenses, as well as 
to the following ports : 

(a) In Sweden : 

Stockholm, comprising the waters within a line commencing at 
Spillersboda, on the Swedish Continent, and passing Furusund, 
Sandhamn. and Fiversatrao, to Dalaro and another line, 
Herrhamra-Landsort-Ledskar. 

Karlskrona, within the fixed submarine defenses; 

Farosund, the entrance from the north, comprising the waters 
within a line connecting Yialmsudde with Hallergrundsudde, and 
the entrance from the south, comprising the waters within a line 
Ryssniis — boundary of Buugeor-Bungnas ; and 

Slite. comprising the waters within the true north and west 
lines connecting the boundary of Mago with the mainland of the 
island of Gottland. 

(b) In Norway : 

The port of Fredrikshald ; 
The fjord of Kristiania inside of Basto ; 

The fjord of Tonsberg inside of Natholmen and of the light- 
houses of Ostre Vakerholmen, of Mogerotangen, and of Vallo; 



VIEW OF INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 27 

The port of Kristlanssand with the waters inside of Fredriks- 
holm and of the lighthouses of Oxo, of Gronningen, and of Torso; 

The port of Bergen with its entrances (a) Byfjorden inside of 
Hjelteskjaer-Stangen, (b) The entrance from the north inside of 
Herlo-Agno-Bogno ; 

The fjord of Trondhjem inside of the fortifications of Agdenes ; 
and 

The port of Vardo. (Ibid, p. 31.) 

Institute of International Law, 1894- — The question of 
the limit of jurisdiction over the marginal sea has re- 
ceived much attention from the Institute of International 
Law. The report of Sir Thomas Barclay, in 1894, showed 
that there had been such lack of unanimity as to the limit 
of jurisdiction that he had deemed it expedient to leave 
the number of miles in the proposed rules to be filled in 
by the Institute. 

The report of 1894 showed a tendency to make a dis- 
tinction between the limit to be prescribed for the exer- 
cise of jurisdiction in time of war and the limit which 
should be prescribed for the exercise of control of fishing 
and similar purposes. Some authorities of great weight 
stood firmly for an extension of the maritime jurisdiction 
to the limit of the range of cannon shot. M. de Martens, 
of Russia, held that this range was the real basis upon 
which the limit of jurisdiction should be determined, and 
that accordingly the limit would vary as the range of can- 
non increased. To M. de Martens the 3-mile limit seemed 
obsolete and illogical. He proposed 10 miles as a conven- 
ient conventional limit. If the doctrine of Bynkershoek 
is to be followed to its logical conclusion, and " the land 
dominion is to be' limited by the range of cannon," then 
there is reason for extending the marginal jurisdiction. 
If the question is one of the distance to which the ad- 
jacent state can in fact control the marginal waters, then 
the limit may be extended. This was frequently shown 
to be the attitude in the eighteenth century claims and 
writings. 

The ideas expressed by the Institute of International 
Law in 1894 indicate that there is a common belief that 
the adjacent state has not merely jurisdiction, but also 



28 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

sovereignty, over the marginal sea. The rule proposed 
by the Institute was : 

Article premier. L'Etat a im droit de souverainite sur ime zone 
de la mer qui baigne la cote sauf le droit de passage inoffensif 
reserve a Particle 5. (XIII Aunuaire, 1894-95, p. 329.) 

Aet. 5. Tous les navires sans distinction ont le droit de passage 
inoffensif par la mer territorial, sauf le droit des belligerants de 
reglementer et, dans un but de defense, de barrer le passage dans 
ladite mer pour tout navire, et sauf le droit des neutres de regle- 
menter le passage dans ladite mer pour les navires de guerre de 
toutes nationalites. 

The Institute was basing its action upon a marginal 
limit of 6 miles instead of the generally recognized 3 
milts. The Institute by another regulation had proposed 
to give the neutral state a right to extend the zone of con- 
trol in time of war even to the range of a cannon shot. 

It may be said that Sir Thomas Barclay, in 1894, after 
considering all the propositions which had been made to 
him as the reporter of the committee, judged G miles to be 
the limit which would be most in accord with general 
opinion, though in special cases this limit might be ex- 
tended. The investigations and discussions resulted in 
the formulation of the proposed regulation in the follow- 
ing form: 

Art. 2. La mer territoriale s'etend a 6 milles marins (60 au 
degre cle latitude) de la laisse de basse maree sur toute l'etendue 
des cotes. (13 Annuaire de 1' Institut de Droit International, p. 

329.) 

The same regulation was presented to the Institute in 
1912. 

The Institute in 1894 also proposed to give the neutral 
state a right in time of war to extend its zone of neutral- 
ity to the range of a cannon. 

Aet. 4, En cas de guerre, l'Etat riverain neutre a le droit de 
fixer, par la declaration de neutralite ou par notification speciale, 
sa zone neutre au dela de 6 milles, jusqu'a portee du canon des 

cotes. (XIII Annuaire, p. 329.) 

The extent of marginal waters would, under this regu- 
lation if adopted, be very much enlarged, and the area 
of possible hostile action by belligerents would be cor- 



POSITION OF UNITED STATES, 189 6. 29 

respondingly decreased as regards neutral waters, but 
increased as regards the area which might be regarded as 
within belligerent jurisdiction. It would not be reason- 
able to grant that the neutral marginal sea could be ex- 
tended in time of war unless the belligerent marginal sea 
might be similarly extended. The liability for cutting 
cables on the high sea, for example, would under this 
regulation be reduced, as nearly all cables if cut at all 
must be cut within range of cannon shot though perhaps 
not within 3 miles. If the neutral may thus extend the 
zone of neutrality to the range of a cannon, violations of 
neutrality will be more liable to occur, and the neutral 
will, under recent conventions, be under great obligations 
to prevent these violations. These and other possible 
consequences seem to have led to the suggestion in the re- 
port of 1912 that this article be eliminated from the pro- 
posed regulations. 

Position of United States, 1896. — The proposition of 
the Institute of International Law in 1894 for a 6-mile 
limit of marginal sea was brought to the attention of the 
United States by the Netherlands minister, and a reply 
was made by Secretary Olney in 1896 : 

In conformity with your recent oral request. I have now the 
honor to make further response to your unofficial note of Novem- 
ber 5 last, which was acknowledged on the 9th of the same month, 
by informing you that careful consideration would be given to the 
important inquiry therein made as to the views of the United 
States Government touching the expediency of settling by treaty 
among the interested powers the question of the extent of ter- 
ritorial jurisdiction over maritime waters. 

This Government would not be indisposed, should a sufficient 
number of maritime powers concur in the proposition, to take 
part in an endeavor to reach an accord having the force and ef- 
fect of international law as well as of conventional regulation, by 
which the territorial jurisdiction of a state, bounded by the high 
seas, should henceforth extend 6 nautical miles from low- water 
mark, and at the same time providing that this 6-mile limit shall 
also be that of the neutral maritime zone. 

I am unable, however, to express the views of this Government 
upon the subject more precisely at the present time, in view of the 
important consideration to be given to the question of the effect 
of such a modification of existing international and conventional 



30 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

law upon the jurisdictional boundaries of adjacent states and the 
application of existing treaties in respect to the doctrine of head- 
lands and bays. 

I need scarcely observe to yon that an extension of the head- 
land doctrine, by making territorial all bays situated within 
promontories, 12 miles apart instead of 6, would affect bodies of 
water now deemed to be high seas and whose use is the subject of 
existing conventional stipulations. (Quoted in Moore, Inter- 
national Law Digest, Vol. I, p. 734.) 

Institute of International Law, 1912. — A report to the 
Institute of International Law in 1912 by Sir Thomas 
Barclay retained the provision recommending 6 miles as 
the limit of jurisdiction over marginal sea, but it was 
proposed to strike out the regulation giving to a neutral 
state the right to extend its zone of marginal neutral 
waters in time of war to the range of a cannon shot, thus 
leaving the zone in peace, as in war, at the 6-mile line. 

Conclusion. — The report presented to the Institute of 
International Law in 1912, to be more particularly con- 
sidered at a later session, makes the following provision 
in regard to the area of hostilities. 

Aet. 1. Theatre cles hostilites. — Le theatre de la guerre mari- 
time comprend : 1° la mer ouverte ; 2° les golfes, les baies, les 
rades, les ports et les eaux territoriales des belligerants, y com- 
pris leurs detroits et leurs canaux maritimes; 3° leurs eaux con- 
tinentales servant a la navigation maritime, autant que des na vires 
de guerre ennemis y penetrent de la mer. 

Des actes d'hostilite" ne peuvent avoir lieu ni dans les eaux des 
iStats neutres, ni dans les parties de la mer, les detroits et les 
canaux conventionnellement neutralised. 

This does not, however, determine what are the limits 
of the respective waters. 

General trend of the coast. — In measuring the limits 
of marginal sea the opinion seems to be that it may not 
be wise to follow all the minor sinuosities of the coast. 
These small indentations can not easily be discovered 
from the sea and may vary. The reasonable position has 
been held to be that in establishing the lines of limitation 
of the marginal sea, the general trend of the coast shall 
be followed in cases where questions arise. (Hague Arbi- 
tration, Norway v. Sweden, 1909.) 



HAGUE REGULATIONS. 31 

Regulations of The Hague conventions.— The regula- 
tions of the conventions agreed upon at The Hague in 
certain respects recognized a somewhat modern idea, viz, 
that the burden of the war should, so far as possible, fall 
exclusively upon the belligerents, and that neutrals should 
be freed from its consequences. 

The first article of The Hague convention concerning 
the rights and duties of neutral powers in maritime war, 
which was signed in 1907 and proclaimed in 1910 by the 
United States, provides — 

Aeticle 1. Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign 
rights of neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or 
neutral waters, from all acts which would constitute, on the part 
of the neutral powers which knowingly permitted them, a non- 
fulfillment of their neutrality. 

This article, which was adopted by the representatives 
at The Hague, was emphatically declared by the British 
delegate who presented it to be a formal recognition that 
the belligerents are bound to respect the rights of neu- 
trals. (Deuxieme Conference, vol. 3, p. 572.) 

In a general way ■" all acts of hostility " are forbidden 
in neutral waters. Some of the specific acts which are 
forbidden to belligerents are enumerated in this same 
convention; such are the setting up of prize courts in 
neutral jurisdiction, the use of neutral waters as a base, 
sojourn by belligerent ships in neutral waters for more 
than 24 hours, the bringing in of prize, etc. Under 
articles 25 and 26 the neutral state is bound to " exercise 
such surveillance as the means at its disposal allow to 
prevent " violations of its neutrality, and the exercise of 
its rights " can not be considered as an unfriendly act." 

The report accompanying this convention, which is an 
official commentary upon its meaning, says: 

Le principe qu'il convient d'affirmer tout d'abord c'est l'obliga- 
tion pour les belligerants de respecter les droits souverains des 
Etats neutres. Cette obligation ne resulte pas de la guerre, pas 
plus que le droit d'un Etat a l'inviolabilite de son territoire ne 
resulte de sa neutrality. C'est une obligation et c'est un droit qui 
sont inherents a l'existence ineme des Etats, mais qu'il est bon de 
rappeler expressement dans des circonstances ou ils sont plus 
exposes k §tre m£connus. Suivant une parole de Sir Ernest Satow, 



32 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

comnientant un article de la proposition britannique auquel a 
ete emprunte presque textuelleinent l'article 1 de notre projet, il 
y a la " Pexpression de la pensee maitresse de cette partie du 
droit international." (Seance du 27 juillet.) 

Le principe est applicable a la guerre continental conime a la 
guerre maritime, et il ne faut pas s'etonner que le reglement 
elabore par le Deuxieme Commission au sujet des droits et des 
devoirs des Etats neutres sui' terre commence par cette disposition: 
u Le territoire des Etats neutres est inviolable." 

D'une maniere generale, les belligerants doivent s'abstenir dans 
les eaux neutres de tout acte qui, s'il etait toler6 par l'Etat 
neutre, constituerait un manquement a la neutralite. II importe 
de remarquer. des k present, qu'un devoir du neutre ne correspond 
pas necessairement a un devoir du belligerant et cela est con- 
forme a la nature des cboses. On peut imposer au belligerant 
l'obligation absolue de s'abstenir de certains actes dans les eaux 
de l'Etat neutre; il lui est aise\ et, dans tous les cas, possible 
cle satisfaire a cette obligation, qu'il s'agisse des ports ou des 
eaux territoriales. On ne peut, au contraire, imposer a l'Etat 
neutre l'obligation de prevenir ou de reprimer tous les actes que 
voudrait faire ou f era it un belligerant, parce que tr§s souvent 
l'Etat neutre ne sera pas en situation de remplir une pareille 
obligation. II peut ne pas savoir tout ce qui se passe dans ses 
enux et il peut n'etre pas en etat de l'empecher. Le devoir 
n'existe que dans la mesure ou on peut le connaitre et le remplir. 
Cette observation ree. it son application dans un certain nombre 
de cas. (Deuxieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Vol. I, 
p. 297. ) 

Use of terms in The Hague conventions. — In different 
articles of The Hague conventions different expressions 
are used. Sometimes the general terms " neutral waters " 
or " territorial waters " are used; sometimes more special 
terms, as ,; neutral ports and waters," " ports, road- 
steads, or territorial waters," " neutral ports," " ports or 
roadsteads." 

While the variation in the use of terms may not in 
some instances be entirely consistent with the plan of 
the conventions, in the convention concerning the rights 
and duties of neutral powers in maritime war, the use was 
recognized as giving rise to some difference of obligation 
as regarded the neutral power, but not as regard bellig- 
erents. 

On a parfois a se demander s'il y a lieu de distinguer entre 
les ports et les eaux territoriales: la distinction se comprend en 



CONSIDERATION OF PROJECTS. 33 

ce qui concern e les devoirs du neutre, qui ue pent etre au meme 
degre responsable de ce qui se passe dans les ports soumis k 
Taction directe de ses autorites ou dans ses eaux territoriales sur 
lesquelles il n'a souvent qu'un faible controle ; la distinction ne 
se comprend pas pour le devoir du belligerant, qui est le meme 
partout. (Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Vol. I, p. 298.; 

If the limits of jurisdiction in marginal waters should 
be extended to 6 or more miles, there would be an in- 
creased difficulty in maintaining these rules. 

Consideration of projects. — The admission of the claim 
of the right to exercise jurisdiction over the marginal sea 
would carry the corresponding obligation to exercise this 
jurisdiction. There would therefore be an increase in the 
extent of right together with that of duty. 

The proposed assumption of a jurisdiction by the 
United States to the Gulf Stream in the Atlantic Ocean 
would involve obligations which the Government would 
probably be reluctant to assume. The claims to 100 miles, 
60 miles, 20 miles, etc., would likewise involve large obli- 
gations. It should therefore be emphasized that the pos- 
session of jurisdiction, if granted, carries obligations as 
well as rights. 

The extension of jurisdiction in the marginal seas is a 
corresponding reduction of the area which has formerly 
been considered as the high seas, an area generally recog- 
nized by all the states of the world as being outside the 
limits of possible appropriation or exclusive jurisdiction. 
Any change from the 3-mile limit which may be regarded 
as properly accepted should therefore be by general 
agreement of the maritime states. 

The rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals 
would be materially modified by such a change. 

The exercise of jurisdiction over area beyond the 3-mile 
limit has been generally admitted for purpose of enforce- 
ment of revenue laws and granted by convention for fish- 
ing and other purposes. There would accordingly be 
little difficulty in introducing more uniformity in these 
practices. Several states have signified willingness to 
make changes in their domestic regulations. 

19148—14 3 



34 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

Summary. — A review of opinions, practice, treaties, 
and decisions shows that for fishing and neutrality the 
3-mile limit has been generally recognized. For revenue, 
sanitary, and certain police purposes a wider jurisdic- 
tion has been admitted. Certain states in early times 
claimed very wide sovereignty over the sea. Some states 
at present claim more than 3 miles as the range of their 
jurisdiction. The present tendency as shown in inter- 
national conferences is to extend the limits of maritime 
jurisdiction. Many states have shown a tendency to 
adopt 6 miles as the limit of maritime jurisdiction. 
Many treaties still exist which provide that the range 
of cannon shot determines the limit. It would seem, 
therefore, that indefiniteness has been and is common in 
the fixing of the limits of the jurisdiction of marginal 
seas. A definite limit is particularly to be desired. The 
development of guns and their increased and increasing 
range makes the doctrine of the limit of cannon shot un- 
certain. An uncertain and varying standard of measure- 
ment must lead to misunderstandings and often produce 
difficulties which should be avoided. Admittedly the 
present range of cannon shot would be an extreme limit 
of claim of jurisdiction. The 3-mile limit would be a 
most conservative claim. Many states have under differ- 
ing conditions supported a claim to a limit between 
these. Such a limit should be within reasonable control 
of the adjacent state and should not be an undue im- 
pairment of the acknowledged freedom of the seas. It 
should be a limit which has received a reasonable sup- 
port. Such requirements seem to be met in the follow- 
ing provisions: 

Conclusion. — a (1) The jurisdiction over the marginal 
sea extends to 6 miles (60 to a degree of latitude). (2) 
The adjacent state has the right to exercise such jurisdic- 
tion over the marginal sea as is necessary for its well- 
being and for the maintenance of its obligations. (3) 
" Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights 
of neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral waters, from 
all acts which would constitute, on the part of the neutral 



GULFS AND BAYS. 35 

powers which knowingly permitted them, a nonfulfill- 
ment of their neutrality." 

Gulfs and hays. — Geographically a gulf is sometimes 
defined as a large bay, and a bay is defined as an expanse 
of water between two headlands. The headlands may be 
relatively near, and the definition is clear ; but headlands 
may be very remote, and questions as to the nature of 
the expanse may arise. The Gulf of Mexico, the Bay of 
Biscay, the Gulf of Guinea, the Bay of Bengal, show 
the possible range of the terminology. Such areas as 
these may in most respects at the present time be treated 
in the same manner as open seas. 

There are, however, smaller gulfs and bays as to the 
jurisdiction of which there are controversies. When the 
mouth of the gulf or bay is not more than 6 miles wide, 
the jurisdiction is admittedly within the adjacent state 
or states. If one state is sovereign over all the coast of 
such a bay, its jurisdiction is exclusive. 

In the North Atlantic fisheries arbitration the British 
contention was that the word " bays " in the treaty of 
1818 meant " all those waters which, at the time, every- 
one knew as bays," while the United -States maintained 
that it was confined " to coast indentations whose head- 
lands are not more than 6 miles apart." 

The United States has, however, maintained a wider 
limit for gulfs, from time to time, since the founding of 
the Republic. In 1793 an opinion of the Attorney Gen- 
eral, in regard to the capture of the British ship Grange 
by the French frigate L'Emhuscade, claimed " that the 
Grange was arrested in the Delaware, within the capes, 
before she had reached the sea," and that " to attack an 
enemy in a neutral territory is absolutely unlawful." 
The question then arises as to whether the attack within 
the Capes Henlopen and May was within neutral juris- 
diction, and the question of jurisdiction on the sea was 
by specific statement excluded. In support of the claim 
that the bay was within the jurisdiction of the United 
States, the Attorney General, Edmund Eandolph, fur- 
ther says of Delaware Bay : 



36 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

It communicates with no foreign dominion; no foreign nation 
has ever before exacted a community of right in it, as if it were 
a main sea ; under the former and present Governments the ex- 
clusive jurisdiction has been asserted; by the very first collection 
law of the United States, passed in 1789, the county of Cape May, 
which includes Cape May itself and all the waters thereof, there- 
tofore within the jurisdiction of the State of New Jersey, are 
comprehended in the district of Bridgetown ; the whole of the 
State of Delaware, reaching to Cape Henlopen, is made one dis- 
trict. Nay, unless these positions can be maintained, the Bay 
of Chesapeake, which, in the same law, is so fully assumed to 
be within the United States, and which, for the length of the 
Virginia territory, is subject to the process of several counties to 
any extent, will become a rendezvous to all the world, without any 
possible control from the United States. Nor will the evil stop 
here. It will require but another short link in the process of 
reasoning to disappropriate the mouths of some of our most 
important rivers. 

Such a statement implies that neutral jurisdiction may- 
be claimed in bays where the headlands are more than 6 
miles apart. The demand for the restoration of the ship 
Grange was granted by France, thus giving a provisional 
recognition of the exclusive jurisdiction of the United 
States in the Delaware Bay. 

A somewhat more definite provision in regard to the 
method of measurement of the line of jurisdiction was 
proposed in a letter of Secretary of State Madison, May 
17, 1800, to Messrs. Monroe and Pinckney, who were rep- 
resenting the United States in London. Madison sug- 
gested that an article be negotiated as follows : 

It is agreed that all armed vessels belonging to either of the 
parties engaged in war, shall be effectually restrained by positive 
orders, and penal provisions, from seizing, searching, or other- 
wise interrupting or disturbing vessels to whomsoever belonging, 
whether outward or inward bound, within the harbours or the 
chambers formed by headlands, or anywhere at sea, within the 
distance of four leagues from the shore, or from a right line from 
one headland to another; it is further agreed, that, by like orders - 
and provisions, all armed vessels shall be effectually restrained 
by the party to which they respectively belong, from stationing 
themselves, or from roving or hovering so near the entry of any 
of the harbours' or coasts of the other, as that merchantmen shall 
apprehend their passage to be unsafe, or in danger of being set 
upon and surprised; and that in all cases where death shall be 



HEADLAND D0CTKINE. 37 

occasioned by any proceeding contrary to these stipulations, and 
the offender cannot conveniently be brought to trial and punish- 
ment under the laws of the party offended, he shall, on demand 

made within months, be delivered up for that purpose. 

If the distance of four leagues cannot be obtained, any distance 
not less than one sea league may be substituted in the article. 
It will occur to you that the stipulation against the roving and 
hovering of armed ships on our coasts so as to endanger or alarm 
trading vessels, will acquire importance as the space entitled to 
immunity shall be narrowed. 

The discussion in regard to this matter led to the # draw- 
ing up of a convention which named 5 marine miles as 
the limit of maritime jurisdiction, but this convention 
was never ratified. 

There was a long period of discussion over what con- 
stituted a bay, particularly in the claims as to fishing 
rights. 

Headland doctrine.— -The Netherlands declared in the 
neutrality proclamation during the Russo-Japanese war 
of 1904-5 for the 10-mile limit of bays : 

Akt. VIII. Under the territory of the Kingdom is also included 
the seacoast to within a distance of 3 nautical miles of 60 degrees 
latitude at low-water mark. In regard to bays, that distance of 
3 nautical miles shall be measured from a straight line athwart 
the bay as close as possible to the entrance at the first point at 
which the entrance to the bay exceeds 10 miles of 60 degrees 
latitude. (Foreign Relations U. S., 1904, p. 27.) 

North Atlantic coast fisheries arbitration, 1909. — Ques- 
tion 5, submitted to arbitration at The Hague in the con- 
tention between the United States and Great Britain in 
regard to the North Atlantic coast fisheries under the 
treaty of 1818, raised the following point: 

From where must be measured the " three marine miles of any 
of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbours " referred to in the said 
article? 

The British contention in regard to bays was summa- 
rized in the British case, as follows, in a statement as to 
" Eights over inclosed waters : " 

It is also undoubted law that a state can exercise sovereignty 
over certain portions of the sea inclosed within its territory by 
headlands or promontories. 



38 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

But different considerations apply in the case of inclosed waters 
from those which affect the open sea. The possession of head- 
lands gives a greater power of control over waters contained 
within them than there can be over the open sea, and the safety 
of a state necessitates more extended dominion over the bays and 
gulfs inclosed by its territories than over open waters. Moreover, 
the interest of other nations in bays and gulfs is not so direct if, 
as is commonly the case, they lie off the ocean highways. For 
these reasons the 3-mile rule has never been applied to inclosed 
waters, nor has any defined limit been generally accepted in regard 
to them. It is true that the understanding of nations has im- 
posed some restrictions on the exercise of sovereignty over these 
waters, and that states do not now assert claims, such as were 
common in former times, over waters which from their size or 
configuration can not be effectively controlled or which from 
their situation can not be fairly held to be the exclusive property 
of any one state. But these restrictions must depend on the par- 
ticular circumstances of each case; they have never become formu- 
lated in any rule of general application. There was therefore no 
definite meaning which could have been assigned in 1S18 to the 
term " bays in His Majesty's dominions " unless it were the 
meaning which His Majesty's Government contends should be put 
upon it ; and there was no principle of the law of nations under 
which the meaning could be limited to bays of a certain extent 
only. (North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration, British Case, 
p, 108, Vol. IV, U. S. Sen. Doc. 870, 61st Cong., 3d sess., p. 96.) 

Attempts have been made, it is true, by some writers to sug- 
gest a general principle capable of application to all inclosed 
waters. But these suggestions have led to no practical result. 
The difference in the considerations which affect particular cases 
has made it difficult, if not impossible, to formulate any general 
rule, and the difference in the considerations which affect the 
open sea on the one hand and inclosed waters on the other hand 
has made it impossible to apply the same general rule to both. 

It is submitted, therefore, that the opinions of jurists establish 
that there is not any definite limit, whether 6 miles miles or more, 
beyond which inclosed waters, such as bays t may not be claimed as 
territorial waters by the state within whose shores they are in- 
closed, and that a fortiori there was no such limit in 1818. It 
follows that the word " bay " as used in the treaty was usel in 
its ordinary sense and included all those tracts of water known 
at the time as bays. (North Atlantic Coast Fisheries, British 
Case, p. 121, Vol. IV, U. S. Sen. Doc. 870, 61st Cong., 3d sess, 
p. 108.) 

American contention, 1909. — The contention of the 
United States in the North Atlantic coast fisheries arbi- 
tration was to restrict, under the treaty of 1818, the 



DR. DRAGO^ OPINION. 39 

opening of bays to the G-mile limit. The conclusion 
was stated as follows : 

5. The position of the United States with reference to question 
5 is that the distance of " 3 marine miles of any of the coasts, 
bays, creeks, or harbors " referred to in the said article, must be 
measured from low-water mark, following the indentations of the 
coast; and the United States requests the tribunal to answer 
and decide this question accordingly. (Case of the United States, 
Ibid., vol. 1, p. 248.) 

Opinion of Dr. Drago. — Dr. Drago, in a dissenting 
opinion, refers to the award which states that the line 
from which the 3-mile limit shall extend shall be drawn 
" across the body of water at the place where it ceases 
to have the configuration characteristic of a bay. At all 
other places the 3 miles are to be measured following the 
sinuosities of the coast." In criticizing this, he justly 
says: 

But no rule is laid, out or general principle evolved for the 
parties to know what the nature of such configuration is or by 
what methods the points should be ascertained from which the 
bay should lose the characteristics of such. (Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 
102-112.) 

Chesapeake Bay. — In the case of the Alleganean, con- 
sidered by the Alabama Claims Commission, it was said 
(Stetson v. The United States) of the Chesapeake Bay: 

Considering, therefore, the importance of the question, the con- 
figuration cf Chesapeake Bay, the fact that its headlands are well 
marked and but 12 miles apart; that it and its tributaries are 
wholly within our own territory ; that the boundary lines of ad- 
jacent States encompass it, that from the earliest history of the 
country it las been claimed to be territorial waters and that the 
claim has never been questioned ; that it can not become the path- 
way from one nation to another ; and remembering the doctrines 
of the recognized authorities upon international law, as well as 
the holdings of the English courts as to the Bristol Channel and 
Conception Bay, and bearing in mind the matter of the brig 
Grange and the position taken by the Government as to Delaware 
Bay, we are forced to the conclusion that Chesapeake Bay must 
be held to be wholly within the territorial jurisdiction and author- 
ity of the Government of the United States and no part of the 
"high seas" within the meaning of the term as used in section 5 
of the act of June 5, 1872. (Moore. International Arbitrations, 
Vol. IV, p. 4341.) 



40 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

Opinion of Azuni. — Azuni, whose work had great au- 
thority in the early nineteenth century, showed clearly 
the opinion at that time : 

It is already established among polished nations that in places 
where the land by its curve forms a bay or a gulf we must 
suppose a line to be drawn from one point of the inclosing land 
to the other or along the small islands which extend beyond the 
headlands of the bay, and that the whole of this bay or gulf is 
to be considered as territorial sea, even though the center may be 
in some places at a greater distince than 3 miles from either 
shore. (Maritime Law. of Europe, ed. 1806, vol. 1, p. 206.) 

This opinion of Azuni was an expression of the ideas 
which had been developing since the conception of any 
limits had arisen, generally following Grotius and 
Bynkershoek, to the effect that a state should have juris- 
diction over such bodies of water, because it could exer- 
cise dominion over them from the shore. 

Far as the s:vereign can defend his sway, 
Extends his empire o'er the wat'ry way ; 
The shot sent thundering to the liquid plain 
Assigns the limits of his just domain. 

— (Azuni, Maritime Law, vol. 1, p. 194.) 

Opinion of Prof. Westlake. — Prof. Westlake, who died 
in 1913, one of the leading English authorities, said: 

As to bays, if the entrance to one of them is not more than 
twice the width of the littoral sea enjoyed by the country in 
question — that is, not more than 6 sea miles in the ordinary case, 
8 in that of Norway, etc. — there is no access from the open sea 
to the bay except through the territorial water of that country, 
and the inner part of the bay will belong to that country, no 
matter how widely it may expand. The line drawn from shore 
to shore at the part where, in approaching from the open sea, the 
width first contracts to that mentioned, will take the place of the 
line of low water, and the littoral sea belonging to the state 
will be measured outward from that line to the distance, 3 miles 
or more, proper to the state. But although this is the general 
rule, it often meets with an exception in the case of bays which 
penetrate deep into the land and are called gulfs. Many of these 
are recognized by immemorial usage as territorial sea of the 
states into which they penetrate, notwithstanding that their en- 
trance is wider than the general rule for bays would give as a 
limit to such appropriation. Examples are the Bay of Concep- 
tion in Newfoundland, penetrating 40 miles into the land and 
being 15 miles in average breadth, which is wholly British ; 



VIEW OF INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 41 

Chesapeake and Delaware Bays, which belong to the United 
States; and the Bay of Cancale, 17 miles wide, which belongs to 
France. Similar exceptions to those admitted for gulfs were 
formerly claimed for many comparatively shallow bays of great 
width — for example, those on the coast of England from Orford- 
ness to the North Foreland and from Beachy Head to Dunnose, 
which, together with the whole of the Bristol Channel and various 
other stretches of sea bordering on the British Isles, were claimed 
under the name of the King's Chambers. But it is only in the 
case of a true gulf that the possibility of occupation can be so 
real as to furnish a valid ground for the assumption of sover- 
eignty, and even in that case the geographical features which 
many warrant the assumption are too incapable of exact defini- 
tion to allow of the claim being brought to any other test than 
that of accepted usage. It is sometimes said and may be historic- 
ally true that all sovereignty now enjoyed over the littoral sea 
or certain gulfs is the remnant of the vast claims which, as we 
have seen, were once made to sovereignty over the open sea, 
and which it is held have been gradually reduced to a tolerable 
measure through such intermediate stages as that of the King's 
Chambers ; and the impossibility of putting the claim to gulfs 
in a definite general form may be thought favorable to that view. 
None the less, however, the rights which are now admitted stand 
on a basis clear and solid enough to distinguish and support 
them. (International Law, Vol. I, p. 187.) 

Institute of International Law, 189Jf. — At the session 
of the Institute of International Law in 1894, the re- 
porter of the commission having in charge the matter 
of regulations for maritime jurisdiction favored a 10- 
mile limit for distance between headlands of closed bays. 
The institute, however, by a large vote adopted 12 miles 
as the proposed limit, the argument being that if 6 miles 
was the limit for marginal sea, that logically twice this 
distance would be the proper limit between headlands 
of bays. 

The proposed regulation of 1894 took the following 
form: 

Akt. 3. Pour les bales, la mer territoriale suit les sinuosites 
de la cote, sauf qu'elle est mesuree a partir d'une ligne droite 
Urge en travers de la baie dans la partie la plus rapprochee de 
Touverture vers la mer, ou l'ecart entre les deux cotes de la baie 
est de douze milles marins de largeur, a moins qu'un usage continu 
et seculaire n'ait consacre une largeur plus grande. (XIII An- 
miaire, 1894-5, p. 329.) 



42 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

It was clear that there was no consensus of opinion 
upon the subject in 1894, either among authors or among 
the governmental officials. 

Roadstead. — The idea of a roadstead seems to have 
been clear, even in early times. It was well understood 
in the early part of the nineteenth century : 

Quand l'ordonuance parle de rade, elle entend parler de tous 
les lieux d'ancrage qui sont a quelque distance de la cote ou les 
vaisseaux trouvent food, pour pouvoir y demeurer a l'ancrage; et 
ou ils mouillent ordinairement, en attendant le vent ou la maree, 
pour entrer dans le port, ou pour faire voile; la rade, comme dit 
la loi 1, § 13, ff., de fluminibus, est locus minime portuosus, sed 
in quo naves in salo esse et commorari queunt. Mais on doit 
observer les formalites prescrites a ce sujet, tant aux Francais 
qu'aux etrangers: de sorte que s'ils y manquoient, ils ne pour- 
roient pas se plaindre des poursuites qui pourroient elre faites 
contre eux, comme d'un trouble et d'un empechement. (Boucher, 
Institution au droit maritime, 1803, p. 707.) 

Straits. — The extension of maritime jurisdiction to 6 
or more miles would have a decided bearing upon the 
jurisdiction over straits. Some of the most important 
straits of the world are not twice 6 miles wide, but are 
more tljan twice 3 miles wide. It is recognized that 
straits not more than twice 3 miles in width are under 
the jurisdiction of the adjacent states, but that free pas- 
sage between open seas may not be impaired under ordi- 
nary circumstances. In time of war it may be doubted 
whether a state if under stress may not temporarily bar 
a strait not more than 6 miles wide if it has jurisdiction 
of both shores. If the limit is extended to 12 miles the 
conditions are. changed in a ratio which does not seem 
similar to that in case of extension of jurisdiction in the 
open sea. For this reason some who have favored exten- 
sion of marginal sea jurisdiction have not favored it for 
straits. A strait is, however, an extension of the sea in 
most instances and no plan seems to have been suggested 
for determining when the marginal sea jurisdiction shall 
be reduced to the limits of the proposed jurisdiction for 
straits. 

Straits connecting open seas. — As in claims of jurisdic- 
tion over the marginal sea, so in claims of jurisdiction 



STRAITS CONNECTING OPEN SEAS. 43 

over straits, there has been a relaxation of extreme pre- 
tensions. The English claim to exclusive jurisdiction 
over the North, Bristol, and St. Georges Channels would 
probably no longer be maintained. While claims to ex- 
clusive jurisdiction over wide channels and straits were 
gradually waived or allowed to lapse, claims over narrow 
straits were maintained. 

Straits which connected open seas, even though nar- 
row, were gradually opened, and a general right of inno- 
cent passage was recognized. One of the longest contro- 
versies was in regard to the passage of the Danish 
Sounds. The so-called " sound dues " were levied for 
many years upon vessels passing through these waters. 
The United States maintained that such a tax upon pas- 
sage between open seas was contrary to the principles of 
freedom of navigation. The powers of Europe were op- 
posed to the continued payment o<f such a tax, and finally 
an indemnity was paid to Denmark, in 1857, for relin- 
quishing its claim to collect these dues. The United 
States, not recognizing the right of Denmark, made a 
treaty in 1858 by which, in consideration of the payment 
of a lump sum, the Sounds and Belts should be made free 
to American vessels, and the means of convenient naviga- 
tion should be maintained at the cost of Denmark. The 
United States had maintained the contention of many 
writers that the freedom of the sea would be a fiction if 
the passage between the different seas was closed. 

Strait of Magellan. — In a letter of the American min- 
ister to Argentine to the Secretary of State of June 12, 
1879, it was stated that a convention was pending which 
provided that " the Strait of Magellan is to be considered 
neutral and open to the flags of all nations, and neither 
Government is to exercise jurisdiction in its waters, which 
are to be considered an open or free sea." (Foreign 
Relations U. S., 1879, p. 23.) 

The treaty of July 23, 1881, between the Argentine 
Republic and Chile, in article 5 provided : 

The Strait of Magellan is neutralized, and free navigation thereon 
insured to the flags of all nations. With a view to guaranteeing 



44 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

this freedom and neutrality, no fortification or military defenses 
will be raised that may clash with that object. (Foreign Relations 
TJ. S., 1881, p. 12.) 

The United States had, in 1879, said that the Strait of 
Magellan could not be claimed as under the exclusive con- 
trol of any state or states. 

Straits connecting with inland waters. — The idea that 
restrictions could be placed upon straits which led to 
closed seas has received considerable support, both in the- 
ory and practice. 

The Bosphorus and Dardanelles were regarded as un- 
der the sole control of Turkey as long as Turkey held con- 
trol of all of the Black Sea. After Russia obtained a 
footing on the Black Sea freedom of passage was granted 
by treaty to merchant vessels. However, in the conven- 
tion of 1841 the European powers recognized the right of 
Turkey to exclude ships of war. The same principle was 
included in the treaties of 1856 and 1871. The United 
States has never admitted the binding force of this pro- 
vision, though always asking permission to pass. Ques- 
tions were raised when, in 1902, Russian torpedo destroy- 
ers passed through on condition that they be transformed 
and placed under the commercial flag, and again, in 1904, 
at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, when under the 
commercial flag vessels of the volunteer fleet passed 
through and were subsequently transformed into ships 
of war. 

Such examples show the nature of the questions which 
may arise. 

Extent of jurisdiction. — It would be admitted that a 
strait not wider than 6 miles would be under the jurisdic- 
tion of the adjacent state or states. According to cir- 
cumstances, in absence of conventional agreement, if 
two or more states had territory along the shores the 
jurisdiction would be to the middle of the strait or to the 
middle of the navigable channel, but innocent passage 
could not be denied between open seas. 

The claims for jurisdiction over straits more than 6 
miles wide have been variously supported. The range 



VIEW OF INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 45 

of cannon shot has been the common basis of measure- 
ment and for straits has naturally been reckoned from 
each shore. Just what area would thus be covered by 
twice the range of cannon shot has not been determined. 
An arbitrary limit of 10 miles width for straits which 
should be under the control of the coast states has often 
been proposed. The Institute of International Law pro- 
posed 12 miles. Certain writers have suggested 24 
miles. 

An extension beyond 6 miles necessarily carries with 
it the obligations to submit to jurisdiction which may 
not have been exercised in certain areas up to the present 
time. 

When it is considered that such straits as Gibraltar, 
Bab el Mandeb, and others might be under coast juris- 
diction if the limits are much extended beyond 6 miles, 
it is evident that there may be objections. Of course, 
war-like operations must not be carried on within neu- 
tral jurisdiction, and an increase in neutral jurisdiction 
is a decrease in area for war-like operations in that region. 

Institute of International Law, 1894. — The Institute 
of International Law, in 1894, gave attention to the sub- 
ject of straits in considering maritime jurisdiction. 
After prescribing rules for the use of territorial waters 
in general, the institute, after discussion, continues: 

Aet. 10. Les dispositions des articles precedents s'appliquent 
aux detroits dont l'ecart n'excede pas douze milles, sauf les modi- 
fications et distinctions snivantes: 

1° Les detroits dont les cotes appartiennent a des Etats, diffe- 
rents font partie de la mer territoriale des Etats riverains, qui y 
exerceront leur souverainete jusqu'a la ligne mediane. 

2° Les detroits dont les cotes appartiennent au meme Etat et 
qui sont indispensables aux communications maritimes entre deux 
on plnsieurs Etats autres que l'Etat riverain font toujours partie 
de la mer territoriale du riverain, quel que soit le rapprochement 
des cotes. 

3° Les detroits qui servent de passage d'une mer libre k une 
autre mer libre ne peuvent jamais etre fermes. 

Art. 11. Le regime des detroits actuellement soumis k des con- 
ventions ou usages speciaux demeure reserve. (Annuaire, vol. 
13, p. 330.) 



46 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

This extent is, however, greater than that accepted 
even at the present time. 

The International Law Association in 1895 proposed 
that straits mentioned under the second paragraph 
should never be closed, and also as a new regulation- 
Dans les detroits dont les cotes appartiennent au mgme Etat, la 
mer est territoriale bien que l'ecarteinent des cotes depasse 
douze milles, si a chaque entree du detroit cette distance n'est pas 
depassee. 

These same modifications were proposed by Sir Thomas 
Barclay to the Institute of International Law in 1912. 

The idea of various regulations seems to be to make a 
distinction between straits connecting what may be called 
open seas and those connecting seas wholly within the 
jurisdiction of a single state or a sea not regarded as 
generally open to the ships of the world. 

Innocent passage. — As the adjacent state has jurisdic- 
tion over its marginal sea according to the above discus- 
sion, the general principle has been developed that " bel- 
ligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of 
neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or 
neutral waters, from all acts which would constitute, 
on the part of the neutral powers which knowingly per- 
mitted them, a nonfulfillment of their neutrality." 
(Hague Convention, Eights and Duties of Neutral Pow- 
ers in Maritime War, Art. I.) 

On the other side, " the neutrality of a power is not 
affected by the mere passage through its territorial waters 
of ships of war or prizes belonging to belligerents." Also 
a certain number of belligerent ships of war may be per- 
mitted to remain for a specified period within neutral 
waters, and to take on provisions or fuel and to make cer- 
tain repairs. 

Summary. — While there may be arguments for differ- 
ent regulations for gulfs, bays, straits, roadsteads, etc., 
it is difficult to adjust these so as to reconcile the prin- 
ciples of maritime jurisdiction unless the same limits as 
for marginal seas are assumed. Accordingly, if a limit 
of 6 miles is accepted for marginal seas, the same should 
be used for other waters. 



CANALS. 47 

Conclusion. — o (1) (a) The limits of gulfs or bays 
shall be the line where the distance between the opposite 
shores of the entrance to the waters first narrows to 12 
miles and the marginal sea extends 6 miles from this 
line, (b) Roadsteads according to their situation are 
regarded as subject to jurisdiction corresponding to that 
over marginal sea or over gulfs and bays, (c) Straits, 
when not more than 12 miles in width, are under the ju- 
risdiction of the adjacent state or states. 

Canals. — Canals may be national, constructed purely 
for national purposes and within national jurisdiction. 
The canal connecting the waters of Lake Michigan with 
the Mississippi River would unquestionably be such a 
canal. Some of the other canals along the Great Lakes 
have a mixed character, The Suez Canal is regarded 
us international. 

General. — It is admitted that there are routes along 
which commerce between certain points would pass if 
left free. The diversion of commerce to other routes 
would be an additional burden to those engaged in such 
enterprises. 

There are also certain routes which have been or are 
closed to commerce by natural obstructions. If these 
obstructions are removed and commerce is allowed to fol- 
low a direct route, it will tend to take such a course. 

Sometimes on land the obstruction may be a river, a 
mountain, a valley, or other obstruction. If the river or 
valley is bridged or the mountain is tunneled, the party 
performing this service is usually recompensed by the 
privilege of regulating the use of the means by which 
the new route has been made possible. 

Sometimes the obstruction to maritime commerce may 
be a shallow channel, a rock, or the entire absence of a 
waterway. If the channel is deepened or if the rock is 
removed it often happens that the cost of such work is 
recompensed by charges upon commerce using such routes. 

If a waterway is made where previously none existed, 
the use of such a route is usually under control of the 
party which bears the cost of the construction. 



48 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER AVATERS. 

When the general principles and conditions under 
which an artificial waterway may be used have been es- 
tablished, and the use of the waterway under these con- 
ditions has become customary, there is reason for protest 
if sudden or unjust restrictions are placed upon the future 
use. Contracts may have been made based upon the ex- 
pectation of the continuation of the status quo. Boats 
of special design or for the special service may have been 
constructed, etc. Conditions should not therefore be 
suddenly changed. 

Interparliamentary Union, 1913. — A set of rules upon 
the subject of the regulation of the use of canals is 
contained in a report of the committee of the Interparlia- 
mentary Union, approved March 18, 1913. It was as 
follows : 

CONCLUSIONS DU RAPPORT DE LA COMMISSION DES DETROITS ET DES 

CANAUX. 

L'application clu regime integral des conventions du 23 juillet 
1881 pour le detroit de Magellan, du 29 octobre 1SS8 pour le 
canal de Suez, et du 18 novenibre 1901 pour le canal de Panama, a 
tous les detroits et canaux interoceaniques presente trop de diffi- 
cultes pour qu'on puisse d'ores et deja la proner comme une solu- 
tion possible. 

II. II y a pourtant certains principes dans ce domaine qu'on 
peut considerer ccmme etant susceptibles d'etre adoptes des a 
present par la generalite des fitats civilises dans l'interet des 
communications internationales et de la paix mondiale. 

Ces principes seraient : 

(a) La reconnaissance expresse du droit de libre passage des 
navires de commerce sans distinction de pavilion en temps de paix 
et de guerre dans tous les detroits reliant deux mers non inte- 
rieures et dans les canaux interoceaniques proprement dits; 

(&) La stricte prohibition du blocus de ces detroits et canaux; 

(c) L'interdiction de placer des mines ou des torpilles pouvant 
barrer total ement le passage de ces detroits et canaux et l'obliga- 
tion de donner avis a la navigation quant au placement des mines 
et des torpilles dans les eaux territoriales avoisinantes ; 

(d) L'interdiction d'eteindre, meme en temps de guerre, les 
phares qui balisent le passage de ces detroits et canaux ; 

(e) La reconnaissance dans les traites sur les detroits et 
canaux, de l'emploi de l'arbitrage, ou d'autres moyens amiables 
ou judiciaires, pour la solution des litiges relatifs a l'application 
ou a rinterpretatiori de ces traites. 



OPINION OF PROFESSOR HOLLAND. 49 

Les ruoyens d'obtenir la consecration de ces principes par ie 
droit international conventionnel doivent etre soigneusement 
studies au point de vue de Taction de l'Union interparlementaire. 

HI. Certains cas particnliers, qui par leur caractere exception- 
nel constituent un serieux empechenient a l'adoption de regies 
generates plus completes, ont besoin, par leur complexity, d'une 
etude plus longue et de nouvelles discussions. 

La c operation des groupes nationaux dans l'etude de ces 
questions servira beaucoup a les eclairer et aidera puissamment 
la Commission. 

Opinion of Prof. Holland. — Prof. Holland, of Oxford 
University, writing* of the international position of the 
Suez Canal, and referring to canals in general, said : 

In time of peace the territorial power is, according to modern 
usage, obliged to allow " innocent passage," under reasonable 
conditions as to tolls and the like, to the vessels of other powers. 
Whether the passage of ships of war would be " innocent " is a 
question of some doubt, but should probably be answered in the 
affirmative. 

In time of war the territorial power, if belligerent, may of 
course deal with the ships of the enemy as it pleases. It will 
endeavor to capture them, be they public or private, within the 
straits as elsewhere. The enemy will similarly exercise his 
belligerent rights within the straits as well as outside of them. 
Should the territorial power be neutral, the channel, as neutral 
territorial water, will probably be open, as in time of peace, for 
the innocent passage of all ships, public as well as private, al- 
though it has been suggested that the territorial power, if neutral, 
might be called upon, as such, by either belligerent to close the 
channel to the warships of the other. The straits will be, of 
course, closed to belligerent operations, the occurrence of which 
within them the territorial power is not only entitled, but obliged, 
to prevent (Studies in International Law, p., 278.) 

These words are from a lecture delivered in 1883, but 
Prof. Holland had apparently found no reason to modify 
these statements when the lecture was added to and pub- 
lished in 1898. 

The Suez Canal was, according to Article I of the con- 
vention of 1888, to be free and open : 

The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time 
of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of 
war, without distinction of flag. 

19148—14 4 



50 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

Consequently, the high contracting parties agree not in any- 
way to interfere with the free use of the canal, in time of war as 
in time of peace. 

The canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right 
of blockade. 

Great Britain made a reservation which caused the con- 
vention to be regarded as not in " practical operation " as 
regards Great Britain till April 8, 1904, by the declara- 
tion of Great Britain and France respecting Egypt and 
Morocco. 

Suez and Panama Canal. — By many the Suez and Pan- 
ama Canals are regarded as in a class by themselves. The 
reason for this is that they unite great bodies of water in 
such manner as to materially change the course of the 
commerce of the world, and in such manner as to create 
a dependence upon their use similar to that of the open sea. 
Some have used the argument that so far as these canals 
are filled with the waters of the sea, the rights of other 
states in the open sea flow in with the waters. This argu- 
ment can easily be shown to have little weight. The fact 
is that the areas through which these two great canals 
pass are practically under the jurisdiction of the two 
great English-speaking states, and the jurisdiction of the 
states earlier in nominal control of these areas is at an 
end. The regulation of the use of these canals has, there- 
fore, become the subject of conventional agreement. 

In a general way the attitude of the United States 
toward the Panama Canal seems to have changed from 
time to time and may be divided into three periods. Dur- 
ing the period of the nineteenth century before 1850 
the idea of internationalization of the canal was com- 
mon. From 1850 to 1880 the doctrine of neutralization 
received approval. Since 1880 there has been a growing 
sentiment in favor of nationalization. In certain re- 
spects there are similarities between the Panama and 
Suez Canals. 

The Suez Canal is an artificial waterway, the use of 
which has been regulated by conventional agreement to 
which a considerable number of states are parties, and 
the United States is not of this number. The use of the 



CONCLUSION. 51 

Panama Canal is regulated by an agreement to which 
the United States and Great Britain are parties and to 
which other states are not parties. 

In other respects there are many and striking paral- 
lels in the physical and historical aspects of the two 
waterways. These have often been pointed out and have 
received much discussion. Both canals are practically 
under control of English-speaking powers; they are 
within the area of comparatively weak states; they have 
been constructed by foreign enterprise and capital ; they 
are of great stragetic importance; they have great im- 
portance for the world commerce; they both form means 
of communication with great seas and shorten by many 
miles the route between these seas. 

The conventional rules for the regulation of the use 
of the two waterways are also similar in many respects. 

Conclusion. — 1. (a) Canals or artificial waterways 
within neutral jurisdiction are closed or open to vessels 
of war during hostilities according to the regulations 
which have been established prior to the declaration of 
war. (b) No act of hostility shall take place within 
these waters. 

2. (a) Canals or artificial waterways within belliger- 
ent jurisdiction when national in character may be closed 
during war, but should if possible be open to innocent 
vessels of neutral powers, (b) Canals or artificial water- 
ways of mixed character which are not of grand im- 
portance to the commerce of the world may be similarly 
closed, (c) Canals or artificial waterways which are 
strictly international and form main highways of world 
commerce may be closed to all vessels of a power at war 
with the power which in time of peace is in control of 
the canal or artificial waterway. 

General conclusion.- — It is evident that there is wide 
diversity in the ideas as to maritime jurisdiction. This 
diversity had led to an increasing number of complica- 
tions in recent years because of the development of closer 
international relations and the more general use of the 
area under maritime jurisdiction. The ancient rules do 



52 MARGINAL SEA AND OTHER WATERS. 

not seem adapted to modern conditions. The policies 
and practices of the leading maritime states have often 
been inconsistent. The maritime states are beginning to 
seek for a sound basis for exercise of jurisdiction over 
neighboring waters. This basis may be limited in some 
degree by the changing range of cannon, but ultimately 
must have a more substantial basis in the reciprocal well 
being of the shore state and of the states which use the 
waters. This latter idea has more and more entered into 
the recent propositions in regard to defining maritime 
jurisdiction. While belligerents have rights upon the 
open sea and in their own waters, these rights are condi- 
tioned by the rights of neutrals, and the reverse may be 
equally true. It is necessary that regulations recognize 
this reciprocity of rights as well as the practice and pre- 
cedents. The following regulations seem to embody the 
broad principles coming to be generally recognized in 
regard to maritime jurisdiction in time of war. 

REGULATIONS. 

1. Acts of war are prohibited in neutral waters and in 
waters neutralized by convention. 

2. " Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign 
rights of neutral powers and to abstain in neutral waters 
from all acts which would constitute, on the part of the 
neutral powers which knowingly permitted by them, a 
nonfulfillment of their neutrality." 

3. The area of maritime war: 

(a) The sea outside of neutral jurisdiction. 

(b) Gulfs, bays, roadsteads, ports, and other waters of 
the belligerents. 

4. Limitations: 

(a) Marginal sea. — The jurisdiction of an adjacent 
state over the marginal sea extends to 6 miles (60 to a 
degree of latitude) from the low- water mark. 

(b) Roadsteads. — The jurisdiction over roadsteads is 
the same as over the sea. 

(c) Gulfs and bays. — The jurisdiction of an adjacent 
state over the sea extends outward 6 miles from a line 



REGULATIONS. 53 

drawn between the opposite shores of the entrance to the 
waters of gulfs or bays where the distance first narrows 
to 12 miles. 

(d) Straits. — (1) Straits not more than 12 miles in 
width are under the jurisdiction of the adjacent states. 
(2) Innocent passage through straits connecting upon 
seas is permitted. 

(e) Canals. — (1) (a) Canals or artificial waterways 
within neutral jurisdiction are closed or open to vessels 
of war during hostilities according to the regulations 
which have been established prior to the declaration of 
war. (b) No act of hostility shall take place within these 
waters. (2) (a) Canals or artificial waterways within bel- 
ligerent jurisdiction when national in character may be 
closed during war, but should if possible be open to inno- 
cent vessels of neutral powers, (b) Canals or artificial 
waterways of mixed character which are not of grand im- 
portance to the commerce of the world may be similarly 
closed, (c) Canals or artificial waterways which are 
strictly international and form main highways of world 
commerce may be closed to all vessels of a power at war 
with the power which in time of peace is in control of the 
canal or artificial waterway. 



Topic II. 

COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

What regulations should be made in regard to the 
commencement of hostilities ? 

REGULATIONS. 

Article 1. Hostilities between the contracting powers 
must not commence without previous and explicit warn- 
ing, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war 
or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. 

Art. 2. The state of war must be notified to the neutral 
powers without delay, and shall not take effect in regard 
to them until after the receipt of a notification, which 
may even be given by telegraph. Neutral powers, never- 
theless, can not plead the absence of notification if it is 
established beyond doubt that they were in fact aware 
of the state of war. 

Art. 3. Article 1 of the present convention shall take 
effect in case of war between two or more of the contract- 
ing powers. Article 2 is binding as between a belligerent 
power which is a party to the convention and neutral 
powers which are also parties to the convention. 

NOTES. 

Introduction, — Certain aspects of the subject of decla- 
ration of war were considered in the International Law 
Situations of this Naval War College in the conference 
of 1910, and appear in the publication of that year as 
Situation II, pages 45 to 65. It was then shown that no 
uniformity of practice had prevailed in regard to time, 
method, or form of declaration, that there were reasons 
why some regulation should prevail for the declaration, 
and that The Hague conference of 1907 had tried to meet 
this need in the convention relative to the opening of 
hostilities. 
54 



HAGUE CONVENTION, 190 7. 55 



Hague convention 1907, opening of hostilities. — The 
Hague conference of 1907 considered the question of the 
opening of hostilities, both from the point of view of the 
belligerent and of the neutral. The result of the long 
and careful discussion was a convention, of which the fol- 
lowing are the essential articles : 

Article 1. The contracting powers recognize that hostilities 
between themselves must not commence without previous and 
explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, 
giving reasons, or of an ultimatum, with a conditional declaration 
of war. 

This convention has now been adopted by most of 
the larger states of the world. 

The understanding of its significance as presented to 
the Secretary of State by the American delegates is shown 
in the following statement from their official report : 

The convention is very short, and is based upon the principle 
that neither belligerent should be taken by surprise, and that the 
neutral shall not be bound to the performance of neutral duties 
until it has received notification, even if only by telegram, of the 
outbreak of war. The means of notification is considered unim- 
portant, for if the neutral knows, through whatever means or 
whatever channels, of the existence of war, it can not claim a 
formal notification from the belligerents before being taxed with 
neutral obligations. While the importance of the convention to 
prospective belligerents may be open to doubt, it is clear that it 
does safeguard in a very high degree the rights of neutrals, and 
specifies authoritatively the exact moment when the duty of neu- 
trality begins. It is for this reason that the American delegation 
supported the project and signed the convention. (60th Cong., 
1st sess., S. Doc. 444, p. 34.) 

It is to be observed that this convention establishes the 
principle that the declaration shall be previous to the 
opening of hostilities, but does not state how long before 
the opening of hostilities the declaration should be made. 
The propositions made for fixing a specified time between 
the declaration of war and the opening of hostilities did 
not receive sufficient support in the conference to secure 
adoption. The committee concerned particularly with 
the formulation of the rules for the opening of hostilities 
called attention to the fact that the Institute of Inter- 
national Law in 1906 had not been able to agree upon a 



56 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

period for delay between declaration and opening of hos- 
tilities, even when sitting in an unofficial capacity. The 
essential point is that the declaration shall be previous to 
the opening of hostilities. 

Recent declarations. — Recent declarations of war show 
the necessity for definite regulations. The date of the 
commencement of the Spanish-American War of 1898 
gave rise to man}^ questions, some of which were taken 
to the Supreme Court of the United States. 

Spanish- American War declaration, April 25, 1898. — 
According to the Constitution of the United States (Art. 
I, sec. 8, n.) Congress has power " to declare war." 

On April 19, 1898, Congress passed the following: 

Joint resolution for the recognition of the independence of the 
people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain re- 
lmquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and 
to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban 
waters, and directing the President of the United States to use 
the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these 
resolutions into effect. 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, First, That the 
people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free 
and independent. 

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, 
and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, 
that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority 
and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land 
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters. 

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he 
hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual 
service of the United States the militia of the several States, 
to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions 
into effect. 

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposi- 
tion or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control 
over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts 
its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the gov- 
ernment and control of the island to its people. 

Approved April 20, 1898. (Foreign Relations U. S., 1898, p. 
765.) 

This resolution was immediately dispatched to the 
American minister to Spain, with an ultimatum. 



SPANISH-AMERICAN AVAR, 1898. 57 

Mr. Sherman to Mr. Woodford. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 

Washington, April 20, 1898. 

You have been furnished with the text of a joint resolution 
voted by the Congress of the United States on the 19th instant 
(approved to-day) in relation to the pacification of the island of 
Cuba. In obedience to that act, the President directs you to 
immediately communicate to the Government of Spain said reso- 
lution, with the formal demand of the Government of the United 
States that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its au- 
thority and government in the island of Cuba and Cuban waters. 
In taking this step the United States hereby disclaims any dispo- 
sition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or con- 
trol over said island except for the pacification thereof, and 
asserts its determination when that is accomplished to leave the 
government and control of the island to its people under such 
free and independent government as they may establish. 

If, by the hour of noon on Saturday next, the 23rd day of April, 
instant, there be not communicated to this Government by that 
of Spain a full and satisfactory response to this demand and 
resolution, whereby the ends of peace in Cuba shall be assured, 
the President' will proceed without further notice to use the 
power and authority enjoined and conferred upon him by the 
said joint resolution to such extent as may be necessary to carry 
the same into effect. 

Sherman. 

(Ibid, p. 764.) 

Before Mr. Woodford had delivered the communica- 
tion to the Spanish Government, the Spanish minister 
of state sent to Mr. Woodford the following note : 

In compliance with a painful duty, I have the honor to inform 
your excellency that, the President having approved a resolution 
of both Chambers cf the United ^States which, in denying the 
legitimate sovereignty of Spain and in threatening armed inter- 
vention in Cuba, is equivalent to an evident declaration of war, 
the Government of His Majesty has ordered its minister in Wash- 
ington to withdraw without loss cf time from the North American 
territory with all the personnel of the legation. By this act the 
diplomatic relations which previously existed between the two 
countries are broken off, all official communication between their 
respective representatives ceasing; and I hasten to communicate 
this to your excellency in order that on your part you may make 
such dispositions as seem suitable. (Ibid, p. 767.) 



58 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

Mr. Woodford then (Apr. 21, 1898) requested his pass- 
ports and withdrew from Spain. 

Spain on April 21, 1898, at 7.30 a. m. had stated that 
the threat of intervention in Cuba " is equivalent to an 
evident declaration of war." 

The Spanish minister at Washington had requested his 
passports on April 20 at about noon. Mr. Woodford 
had been instructed on April 20 to remain near the Span- 
ish Court in his capacity of minister till noon of the 23d 
of April unless previously handed his passports; and he 
did remain, and diplomatic relations were continued till 
the morning of April 21. 

A blockade of Cuban ports was proclaimed on April 22. 

On April 23, 1898, the Queen Kegent of Spain issued 
a decree announcing the existence of war and declaring 
the termination of the treaties " and all other agree- 
ments, compacts, and conventions that have been in force 
up to the present between the two countries.'' 

On April 25, 1898, Congress, exercising its constitu- 
tional authority, passed the following act: 

First. That war be. and the same is hereby, declared to exist, 
aud that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April, anno 
Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day, 
between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain. 

Second. That the President of the United States be. and he 
hereby is. directed and empowered to use the entire land and 
naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual 
service of the United States the militia of the several States, to 
such extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect. 
(30 Stat. 364.) 

By this act of April 25 war existed during the day of 
April 21 and from that time. By the Spanish decree 
treaty relations were superseded by war on April 23 ; in 
fact, diplomatic exchanges had taken place on April 21. 

The Supreme Court of the United States acknowl- 
edged that war had existed since and including April 21, 
and that captures subsequent to that day were valid. 
This was two days prior to the Spanish decree and four 
days prior to the American declaration. 

On the 25th of April President McKinley, recognizing 
that the position of the United States was not well de- 



SPAN ISH-A M ER I (A N WA R, 1 ^ 9 8 . 59 

fined, said in a communication to Congress, referring to 
the position of the Spanish Government as stated in the 
note to the American minister at Madrid : 

It will be perceived therefrom that the Government of Spain, 
having cognizance of the joint resolution of the United States 
Congress, and in view of the things which the President is thereby 
required and authorized to do, responds by treating the reasonable 
demands of this Government as measures of hostility, following 
with that instant and complete severance of relations by its action 
which by the usage of nations accompanies an existent state of 
war between sovereign powers. 

The position of Spain being thus made known and the demands 
of the United States being denied with a complete rupture of 
intercourse by the act of Spain, I have been constrained, in exer- 
cise of the power and authority conferred upon me by the joint 
resolution aforesaid, to proclaim under date of April 22, 1898, a 
blockade of certain ports of the north coast of Cuba, lying be- 
tween Cardenas and Bahia Honda and of the port of Cienfuegos 
on the south coast of Cuba ; and further, in exercise of my con- 
stitutional powers and using the authority conferred upon me by 
the act of Congress approved April 22, 1898, to issue my proclama- 
tion, dated April 23, 1898, calling forth volunteers in order to 
carry into effect the said resolution of April 20, 1898. Copies of 
these proclamations are hereto appended. 

In view of the measures so taken, and with a view to the adop- 
tion of such other measures as may be necessary to enable me to 
carry out the expressed will of the Congress of the United States 
in the premises, I now recommend to your honorable body the 
adoption of a joint resolution declaring that a state of war exists 
between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, 
"and I urge speedy action thereon, to the end that the definition 
of the international status of the United States as a belligerent 
power may be made known, and the assertion of all its rights 
and the maintenance of all its duties in the conduct of a public 
war may be assured. (Foreign Relations U. S., 1898, p. 771.) 

From this it is plain that the status was not defined 
and assured until after the declaration, though the decla- 
ration issued on the 25th of April was held to define the 
status existing as regards the belligerent rights of the 
United States subsequent to the 20th of April. Under 
such conditions complications naturally arise not only as 
regards relations of belligerents but also as regards 
neutrals. 

Under the provisions of The Hague convention there 
is required before commencement of hostilities a " pre- 



60 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

vious and explicit warning, in the form either of a decla- 
ration of war giving reasons or of an ultimatum with 
a conditional declaration of war." 

In 1898 Congress did not formally declare war until 
after the opening of hostilities, for a blockade was de- 
clared on April 22, 1898. This act of Congress was un- 
questionably legal under the Constitution of the United 
States, though it would not now be regarded as in accord 
with the convention relative to the opening of hostilities. 
Even if Congress had not declared war at all, it would 
certainly have existed after the Spanish decree of April 
23. Whether without declaration war would have existed 
on April 21 is open to question. Whether the signing 
of the convention relative to the opening of hostilities 
has in any way limited the powers of Congress under 
the Constitution is a question that might be raised. How- 
ever, as the United States has become a party to this con- 
vention, it is, as regards foreign states signatories to the 
convention, bound by its provisions. A failure to observe 
the provisions of the convention would render the United 
States liable. 

Further, it is sufficient to say that in a change so far 
reaching in its effects as a change from state of peace 
to a state of war, it is only reasonable that the time of 
the change should be unequivocally known both to the 
opposing belligerent and to neutrals. 

The ultimatum of the South African Republic, 1899. — 
At the time of the strained relations between the South 
African Republic and Great Britain, in 1899, the Re- 
public issued an ultimatum showing that it regarded 
concentration of forces near its borders as an act of war. 
After relating many grounds for action, the ultimatum 
says: 

Her Majesty's unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of 
this Republic in conflict with the convention of London, 1884, 
caused by the extraordinary strengthening of troops in the neigh- 
borhood of the borders of this Republic, has thus caused an in- 
tolerable condition of things to arise whereto this Government 
feels itself obliged, in the interest not only of this Republic, but 
also of all South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and 
feels itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with 



SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 18 99. 61 

emphasis for an immediate termination of this state of things 
and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the assur- 
ance — 

(a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by 
the friendly course of arbitration or by whatever amicable way 
may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's 
Government. 

(&) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be 
instantly withdrawn. 

(c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in 
South Africa since the 1st June, 1899, shall be removed from 
South Africa within a reasonable time, to be agreed upon with 
this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee 
on the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities 
against any portion of the possessions of the British Government 
shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within 
a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the 
Governments, and this Government will, on compliance there- 
with, -be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Re- 
public from the borders. 

(d) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas 
shall not be landed in any port of South Africa. 

This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative 
answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her Maj- 
esty's Government to return such an answer before or upon Wed- 
nesday, the 11th October, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock p. m., and 
it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no 
satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval it 
will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her 
Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will 
not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that 
in the event of any . further movements of troops taking place 
within the above-mentioned time in the nearer directions of our 
borders this Government will be compelled to regard that also as 
a formal declaration of war. 

The reply of Great Britain was short and war was held 
to exist at once : 

Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the 
peremptory demands of the Government of the South African 
Republic conveyed in your telegram of 9th October, No. 3. You 
will inform the Government of the South African Republic, in re- 
ply, that the conditions demanded by the Government of the South 
African Republic are such as Her Majesty's Government deem it 
impossible to discuss. 

Russo-Japanese War, 190%,. — The Japanese declaration 
of war against Russia was published on February 10, 



62 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

1904. The Russian reply was published on the same 
date. The Ekaterinoslav and Mukden, Russian steam- 
ships, were captured with their cargoes on February 6. 
Other steamships were captured on February 7. On Feb- 
ruary 8 the Japanese torpedo boats attacked the Russian 
fleet at Port Arthur. On the 9th other engagements took 
place and captures were made. Therefore the war was in 
full progress before any declaration was issued by either 
Japan or Russia. A decision of the Japanese court in 
the case of the Ekaterinoslav was to the effect that war 
existed from the time of the sailing of the Japanese fleet 
from Sasebo at 7 a. m. on February 6. Thus the Russo- 
Japanese war began about four days before the declara- 
tion was made, and it was legal war from that time. 
" The war commenced when the Japanese fleet left Sasebo 
with an intention of attacking the Russian fleet." 

There was much discussion of these acts, and Russia 
entered a strong protest, and the Japanese Government 
replied. It is certain that it was not generally known 
that war had commenced when the fleet sailed on Feb- 
ruary 6, and it was not even known that the fleet had 
sailed. An element of uncertainty therefore existed. 

Turco-Italian War, 1911. — It was announced in Rome 
late in September, 1911, that the Italian charge d'affaires 
at Constantinople had been authorized to present an ulti- 
matum to the Turkish Government, stating the griev- 
ances and demands of Italy. This communication was 
of the nature of an ultimatum with a conditional declara- 
tion of war. As both Italy and Turkey had participated 
in the conference at The Hague in 1907, these States were 
naturally familiar with the convention relative to the 
opening of hostilities. There was, therefore, an attempt 
on the part of Italy to conform to the provisions of the 
convention. This is shown in the ultimatum : 

During a long series of years the Government of Italy never 
ceased to make representations to the Porte upon the absolute 
necessity of correcting the state of disorder to which the Govern- 
ment of Turkey had abandoned Tripoli and Cyrene. These re- 
gions should be admitted to the benefits of the progress realized 
by other parts of the Mediterranean and Africa. 



TTJRCO-ITALIAN WAR, 1911. v 63 

This transformation which is imposed by the general exigencies 
of civilization constitutes for Italy a vital interest of the first 
order by reason of the slight distance separating these countries 
from the coasts of Italy. Notwithstanding the attitude taken by 
the Government of Italy, which has always accorded its loyal 
support to the Imperial Government in the different political 
questions of recent times; notwithstanding the moderation and 
patience shown by the Government of Italy ; its views concern- 
ing Tripoli have been badly received by the Imperial Government, 
but more than that, all enterprises on the part of Italians in the 
regions mentioned have been systematically opposed and unjusti- 
fiably crushed. 

The Imperial Government, which to the present time has shown 
constant hostility toward all legitimate Italian activity in Tripoli 
and Cyrene, quite recently, at the eleventh hour, proposes to the 
Royal Government to come to an understanding, declaring itself 
disposed to grant any economic concession compatible with 
treaties in force and with the higher dignity and interests of 
Turks; but the Royal Government does not now feel itself in a 
position to enter such negotiations, the uselessness of which has 
been demonstrated by past experience and which far from con- 
stituting a guarantee for the future, would be themselves per- 
manent causes of disagreement and conflict. 

The Royal Government has received from its consular agents in 
Tripoli and Cyrene information that the situation is extremely 
grave because of the agitation prevailing against Italian subjects, 
and which is evidently incited by officers and other functionaries 
of authority. 

This agitation constitutes an imminent danger, not only to 
Italian subjects, but to foreigners of all nationalities, which re- 
quires them, for their own security, to embark and leave Tripoli 
without delay. 

The arrival at Tripoli of Ottoman military transports, which 
the Royal Government has not failed to observe, appears prelimi- 
nary to serious events, aggravates the situation, and imposes on . 
the Royal Government the obligation absolutely to prepare for the 
dangers which will result. 

The Italian Government, having the intention henceforth to pro- 
tect its interests and its dignity, has decided to proceed to the 
military occupation of Tripoli and Cyrene. 

This solution is the only one that will give Italy power to itself 
decide and itself attend to that which the Imperial Government 
does not do. 

The Royal Government demands that the Imperial Government 
shall give order that the actual Ottoman representative shall not 
oppose the measure which will, in consequence, be necessary to 
effect this solution without difficulty. An ultimate agreement will 



64 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

be requested between the two Governments to regulate tbe definite 
siuation which will arise. 

The royal embassy at Constantinople is ordered to demand a 
decisive response on this subject from the Ottoman Government 
within 24 hours of the presentation to the Porte of the present 
document, in default of which the Italian Government will con- 
sider itself as being obliged to proceed immediately with measures 
destined to assure the occupation. Ask, in addition, that the 
response of the Porte within the period of 24 hours shall be com- 
municated also through Turkish embassy at Rome. 

The reply of Turkey to the Italian ultimatum, though 
conciliatory, was not regarded by Italy as satisfactory. 

The following is the text of the declaration handed to 
the Porte by the Italian embassy : 

Carrying out the orders of the King, the charge d'affaires of 
Italy has the honor to notify that the period accorded by the 
Royal Government to the Porte with a view to the realization of 
certain necessary measures has expired without a satisfactory 
reply reaching the Italian Government. 

The lack of this reply only confirms the bad will or want of 
power of which the Turkish Government and authorities have 
given such frequent proof, especially with regard to the rights 
and interests of Italians in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. 

The Royal Government is consequently obliged to attend itself 
to the safeguarding of its rights and interests as well as its 
honor and dignity by all means at its disposal. 

The events which will follow can only be regarded as the 
necessary consequences of the conduct followed for so long by the 
Turkish authorities. 

The relations of friendship and peace being therefore inter- 
rupted between the two countries, Italy considers herself from 
this mcment in a state of war with Turkey. 

The undersigned consequently has the honor to make known 
to your highness that passports will be placed at the disposal of 
the charge d'affaires in Rome, and to beg your highness to hand 
him his own passports. 

The Royal Government has likewise commissioned the under- 
signed to declare that Ottoman subjects may continue to reside 
in Italy without fear of an attack on their persons, property, or 
affairs. 

De Maetino. 

September 29, 1911. 

As Italy considered a state of war as existing, a definite 
hour from which this should date was announced, viz, 
2.30 p. m., September 29, 1911. 



LIMITATION OF RULES: 65 

Rome. September 29, 1911. 

It is officially announced that, the Ottoman Government hav- 
ing failed to meet the demands contained in the Italian ultimatum, 
Italy and Turkey '"are in a state of war from half-past two 
in the afternoon of to-day, September 29." 

.The Italian Government will provide for the safety alike of 
Italians and foreigners of all nationalities in Tripoli and Cyre- 
naica by all mens at its disposal. 

A blockade of the entire coast of Tripoli and Cyrenaica will 
be immediately notified to the neutral powers. 

Limitation of rides. — While the rules of the convention 
of 1907 make the previous and explicit declaration of war 
obligatory upon the contracting states, there are circum- 
stances under which war may arise without declaration. 
Under such circumstances the early principles will pre- 
vail, and a subsequent declaration ma}^ determine when 
war legally begins or the beginning may be inferred from 
the first act of hostilities. When one of the parties to the 
war is not a party to The Hague convention such a condi- 
tion might arise. In case of civil Avar the ordinary condi- 
tions would be such as to render a declaration if not un- 
necessary at least unusual. The early rules will there- 
fore still be applicable to certain cases, even if those of 
1907 are generally adopted. 

Form of declaration of war as regards belligerents. — - 
That war should not commence without a formal decla- 
ration was recognized practice among the ancients. In 
the Middle Ages three days' notice was sometimes re- 
quired. Heralds were sent in advance ever after the 
days of Grotius. during the early part of the seventeenth 
century. From the beginning of the eighteenth century 
the practice was varied, by far the larger number of wars 
having been begun without previous declaration. 

The recall of diplomatic agents has been the usual pre- 
liminary act of the government, indicating that relations 
are strained to such an extent that war may soon follow. . 
but war does not necessarily follow, as the difference be- 
tween the states may be adjusted. The nature of the 
diplomatic negotiations or of discussions in the parlia- 
ments may indicate that war is threatening, but none of 
these evidences constitutes a declaration of war. 

19148—14 5 



66 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

An ultimatum may be issued containing a demand for 
satisfaction. Such an ultimatum is usually formulated 
in diplomatic terms, which would not make it too difficult 
for the state to which it is dispatched to find a way to 
adjust the difficulties. The ultimatum usually fixes the 
time within which an answer must be made. The United 
States required that Spain reply to its demand for with- 
drawal of Spanish forces from Cuba within three days; 
i. e., by April 23. War was declared on April 25. An 
ultimatum in itself does not necessarily involve a declara- 
tion of war unless the failure to comply with the demands 
carries with it a conditional declaration of war. 

The British demands upon Venezuela in 1902 required 
an immediate satisfaction of certain claims, and con- 
cluded : " This communication must be regarded in the 
light of ultimatum." The failure of Venezuela to satisfy 
these claims did not lead to an immediate war, but to an 
attempt to establish a pacific blockade which subsequently 
took the form of a true blockade. 

Whatever the preliminary negotiations or evidences of 
strained relations which might have received considera- 
tion prior to 1907, among those states now parties to the 
convention relative to the opening of hostilities, it is now 
necessary that there be a previous and explicit warning. 

This previous and explicit warning may take the form 
of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with 
a conditional declaration of war. 

The reasoned declaration of war was regarded by many 
as necessary or at least very desirable because the oppos- 
ing belligerent should be given a formal statement of the 
grounds of the war and the neutrals should not suffer 
such great changes in their ordinary rights and obliga- 
tions without knowledge of the reasons. 

If instead of the reasoned declaration of war, the ulti- 
matum with conditional declaration was employed, the 
reasons for the breaking off of peaceful relations would 
be stated in the ultimatum. 

The exact wording of the declaration or ultimatum 
would naturally vary according to circumstances, but 



PREVIOUS DECLARATION. 67 

should be previous and explicit. That the beginning of 
a status which changes the legal and other relations of 
states and individuals and introduces risks and obliga- 
tions where none had previously existed should be clearly- 
defined scarcely needs argument. The possibility of in- 
justice to innocent parties has been very great under the 
old system of uncertainty which prevailed under the 
doctrine that war commenced with the first act of hostil- 
ity when there was no way of defining what constituted 
an act of hostility. 

Col. Tinge, of the Chinese delegation at the Second 
Hague Conference, 1907, said that it would be serviceable 
to define the term war, for under the name of expedi- 
tions there had been numerous examples of invasions of 
his country. 

Commencement of hostilities. — The Hague convention 
provides " the contracting powers recognize that hostili- 
ties between themselves must not commence without pre- 
vious and explicit warning." 

The discussions at The Hague in 1907 show that " pre- 
vious " simply means before in time, but does not imply 
that any specified period of priority is involved. 

There is in the convention no definition as to what con- 
stitutes the commencement of hostilities before which ex- 
plicit warning must be given. 

Dr. J. M. Spaight, writing in 1910, says : 

It is, of course, the aggressor who is bound to make the formal 
declaration of war. Every nation has the right to defend itself 
from attack. Continental jurists, while requiring a declaration 
from the belligerent who takes offensive action, admit that it is 
not required from the party repelling a hostile enterprise. Blunt- 
schli adds that a defensive war may necessarily have, for military 
reasons, to take the form of offense. " From the point of view 
of law the difference between the offensive and defensive war lies 
not in the fact of being the first to cross the frontiers or invade 
the hostile territory, but in the difference of the respective rights 
of the parties." Hence he would dispense with a declaration 
where the threatened belligerent forestalls his adversary in self- 
defense. The doctrine is a dangerous one ; aggressors are usually 
<able to satisfy themselves that they are acting on the defensive. 
IBluntschli's view has no warranty in the convention of 1907. The 



68 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

belligerent who strikes first, whether he is really acting on the 
defensive and his aggression is merely a tactical mode of self-pro- 
tection or not, is bound to give notice, as laid down in the first 
article. (War Rights on Land, p. 24.) 

A state whose frontier adjoined a state with which it 
had had or might have difficulties might double the num- 
ber of troops along this frontier. It might assemble all 
its troops along this frontier. Would this be the coui- 
mencement of hostilities? Would the other state be jus- 
tified in regarding this as an act of war? If both states 
are parties to the convention and war follows, would 
the state placed at a disadvantage by the assembling of 
its opponent troops on the frontier have a right to main- 
tain that the convention had been violated ? 

If the naval forces of a state had been similarly as- 
sembled in an advantageous position, would this be the 
commencement of hostilities? The assembling of the 
vessels may be of vastly more weight than the firing of 
guns in the determination of the issue if war arises. 

Such being the case in regard to many acts on land 
and sea which may be in the nature of veiled threats, 
there always remains the right of the state against which 
the threat is directed to demand in an ultima tion given 
reasons, the withdrawal of the threatening force, or even 
to demand that the forces be not assembled in such a 
manner as to be a threat. Of such action each state 
must be judge. There is nothing in the principles of 
international law which would forbid the placing of its 
troops in any part of its own territory or the movements 
of fleets in any direction on the seas. 

As was shown in the International Law Situations in 
1910, pages 45 to 65, there may be conditions under which 
the principles recognized previous to 1907 Avould pre- 
vail as in civil war, when the first act involving the use 
of military force may be regarded as the commence- 
ment of hostilities and the opening of war. In case of 
strained relations between states the performance or 
failure to perform an act specified in an ultimatum or in 
a conditional declaration of war may be regarded as the 
beginning of a state of war. 



FORM OF DECLARATION. 69 

Form of declaration as regards neutrals. — The rule of 
The Hague convention relative to the opening of hostili- 
ties provides: 

The existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral 
powers without delay. 

That the belligerent may not be negligent in making 
this notification, it is further provided that the obliga- 
tion of neutrality consequent upon the existence of a 
state of war " shall not take effect in regard to them 
until after the receipt of a notification, which may, how- 
ever, be given by telegraph." 

Certain possibilities of complications are introduced 
by the added clause : 

Neutral powers, nevertheless, can not rely on the absence of 
notification if it is clearly established that they were in fact 
aware of the existence of a state of war. 

It is presumed that the burden of proof of the notifi- 
cation of the existence of a state of war would be upon 
the belligerent, and such proof might be difficult to 
establish. 

There were at The Hague conference in 1907 several 
propositions looking to the establishing of a period of 
time after notification to the neutral during which period 
the obligations of neutrality should not be operative. 
The Belgian delegate suggested that the obligations of 
neutrality should become operative 48 hours after the 
receipt of the notification of the existence of war. It was 
pointed out that this might give occasion to the idea 
that neutrals might during this period act with impunity 
in a manner contrary to the obligations of neutrality. 
It might further be said that if the neutral is to be al- 
lowed a period after the notification in which neutral 
obligations shall not be binding, the aim of the bellig- 
erent on the offensive would be to have this period at 
such a time as would be of least advantage to his oppo- 
nent. This question would, therefore, become one enter- 
ing into the belligerent's considerations in determining 
the time of the declaration of war. As the belligerent 
would ordinarily wish to engage his opponent before he 



70 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

had had time to prepare, and as a period of free com- 
merce with a neutral would add to the opportunity to 
prepare, the belligerent on the offensive would often be 
influenced to declare war suddenly or in advance of a 
period which might otherwise elapse. 

Prof. Westlake's opinion. — -Prof. J. Westlake said 
concerning the Second Hague Convention relative to 
the opening of hostilities : 

This regulation coincides with the doctrine which we have laid 
down above. Only two remarks are needed in order to put the 
matter in a clear light. One is that the declaration of war is now 
expressly required to be inotivee, which the declarants have al- 
ways made it for their own justification. The other is that the 
commencement of hostilities without a preceding declaration, in 
such peculiar cases as are contemplated above, is left possible 
by the fact that the parties are not made to contract that they 
will not commence hostilities against one another otherwise than 
as described, but recognize that hostilities ought not (ne doivent 
pas) to be otherwise commenced. 

Nothing can more clearly show the impossibility of insisting 
on an interval of notice between a declaration of war and a com- 
mencement of hostilities under it than the fact that the very 
moderate proposal of a 24 hours' interval, made by the delega- 
tion of the Netherlands, was not accepted. The conference has 
therefore rather confirmed than weakened the necessity that, in 
order not to be taken unprepared, every nation must rely on its 
own vigilance and on no formal rule. (Westlake's Int. Law, 
Part II, War, p. 267.) 

Reasons for Hague rules. — The discussion at The 
Hague in 1907 centered about the regulations in regard 
to the opening of hostilities which had been proposed 
and which followed closely those of the Institute of In- 
ternational Law at its season of 1906. As these were in 
their essential principles the same as those finally adopted, 
it is well to set forth the reasons for the French proposi- 
tion. The reasons for their presentation were set forth 
by Gen. Amourel, one of the French delegates : 

En commengant la discussion du Projet de Reglement sur 
l'ouverture des hcstilites que la Delegation frangaise a eu l'hon- 
neur de soumettre a vos deliberations, il n'est sans doute pas 
inutile qu'elle vous fournisse quelques explications de nature a\ 
jnstifier les termes de sa proposition. 

Elie estime tout d'abord qu'il faut ecarter la supposition d'une 
guerre faite sans raison serieuse etappa rente, ou sans qu'il se soil 



REASONS FOR HAGUE RULES. 71 

produit au moins mi incident susceptible, de donner lieu a\ une 
discussion. Une agression en pleine paix, sans motif plausible, 
n'est plus compatible avec le sentiment public des Etats du monde 
civilise que nous representons ici. 

La guerre aura done pour origine au moins un fait, ayant une 
certaine gravite, et pouvant m^tiver une echange d'explications. 
Alors commencera liabituellement la periode de negociations 
diplomatiques, au cours desquelles cliaque Puissance cherchera ^ 
obtenir de l'autre des conditions propres a satisfaire ses interets. 
Si l'accord ne se realise pas, l'une des Puissances peut avoir 
recours a la menace de guerre en fixant, par voie d'ultimatum, les 
concessions qu'elle exige. Elle fixe aussi, en general, un delai 
de rdponse, apres lequel elle se reserve de faire appel aux armes. 

Quand les evenements se produisent sous cette forme, au debut 
d'un conflit entre deux nations, il est bien certain que l'6tat de 
guerre se trouve declare d'une fagon suffisante : l'ultimatum porte 
en lui-mgme l'avertissement prealable et non equivoque ; il indique 
la concession exigee, et par consequent la cause de la guerre en 
cas de refus ; enfin, il limite merne la guerre dans le temps, selon 
Fheureuse expression de notre excellent colleague de la Delegation 
de Russie, puisque l'£tat de guerre commence a la limite du delai 
de reponse. 

Mais il se peut que le fait, origine du conflit, ne soit pas tou- 
jo'urs suivi d'une conversation diplomatique. Dans certains cas, 
le dommage materiel ou moral cause a un Etat lui paraltra assez 
grave pour qu'il ne juge pas possible de n'en pas chercber repara- 
tion par les armes. II en est ainsi parfois dans les conflits entre 
deux individus, lorsque les temoins de l'un regoivent mission de 
reclamer uniquement une rencontre. 

II se peut aussi que, au cours des negociations diplomatiques, 
celles-ci prennent une tournure telle que le reclamant perde tout 
espoir d'obtenir par cette voie des conditions suffisantes. II pourra 
fort bien alors rompre brusquement l'entretien, et avoir recours a 
la force pour s'assurer la satisfaction qu'il juge necessaire. 

Dans ces deux cas, que la guerre delate immediatement ou 
pendant les pourparlers, elle commencera par la manifestation 
inopinee de la volonte expresse de l'une des Parties en presence. 
Mais il semble que. meme alors, l'ouverture des nostilites doit se 
faire avec les memes garanties que lorsque la guerre eclate a la 
suite d'un ultimatum. 

L'avertissement prealable et non equivoque et les motifs de la 
guerre se trouvent donne dans l'ultimatum lorsqu'il en est fait 
usage ; nous demandons qn'ils soient compris dans une notifica- 
tion a l'adversaire. lorsque l'une des Parties prend la resolution 
de combattre^sans avoir commence, on epuise, la discussion dip- 
lomatique. 

II n'est pas necessaire de justifier la condition que l'avertisse- 
ment doit etre non equivoque. II devra aussi etre prealable. 



72 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

Nous entendous par la, qu'il doit precMer les nostilites. Mais 
celles-ci peuvent commencer d§s que l'avertissement sera parvenu 
k l'adversaire. La limitation de la guerre dans le temps sera 
ainsi moins nettement determinee que dans le cas de l'ultimatum. 
Nous estimons, en effet, que les necessites de la guerre moderne ne 
permettent pas de demander, a celui qui a la volonte d'attaquer, 
d'autres delais que ceux qui sont absolument indispensables pour 
que son adversaire sache que la force va §tre employed contre lui. 

Nous pensons aussi que la declaration de guerre doit etre 
/notivee ; cette condition nous semble pouvoir etre facilement ac- 
cepted, parce que les Puissances, ne se d£cidant k combattre que 
lorsqu'elles sont bien coirvaincues de leur droit, ne peuvent 
besiter a le proclamer publiquement. En outre, il est particu- 
lierement utile que les motifs de la gueire soient portes a la 
connaissance des Etats non meles an conflit mais qui vont eu 
souffrir, et qui ont le droit de savoir pourquoi ils souffrent. Enfin, 
ces monies Etats, s'ils sont an courant ties causes de la guerre, 
seront peut-etre rnieux disposes a offrir leurs bons offices, tout en 
respectant les interets en presence. 

Ainsi se trouvent expliques les termes de Particle I er de notre 
Projet de Iiegleinent. Quant a Particle 2, il vous paraitra sans 
doute necessaire que l'etat de guerre, qui n'interesse pas seule- 
ment les belligerants, mais qui apporte aussi un grand trouble 
dans les affaires des pays neutres, soit notifie le plus tot possible 
a ceux-ci. 

Cela n'est-il pas d'ailleurs necessaire si Ton veut mettre les 
neutres en mesure de remplir le role que leur reservent les articles 
6 et 27 de la Convention du 28 juillet 1899? 

Tels sont, Messieurs, les motifs que la Delegation franchise avait 
& vous exposer a Pappui de sa proposition, et elle serait beureuse 
que celle-ci put recevoir votre assentiment. (Deuxieme Confe- 
rence Internationale, Tome III, p. 168.) 

The general report, presented after the committee had 
fully considered the question of commencement of hos- 
tilities and formulated the regulations, does not add 
much to the reasons stated by the representative of the 
French delegation. (Deuxieme Conference Interna- 
tionale, Tome I, pp. 131-136.) 

Form of declaration of war. — A review of the forms 
of statement of declarations of war shows that no one 
form has been folloAved. Certain requisites are evident. 

The declaration having the effect of changing the rela- 
tions of the states in such a far-reaching manner must 
be made by a competent authority and to a competent 
authority. The competent authority may be determined 



FORM OF DECLARATION. 73 

by the domestic law of a state as in the United States 
" Congress has power to declare war." 

The declaration should be unequivocal. The change 
of relations from peace to war should not be a matter 
of uncertainty. All parties who may be affected by the 
existence of war have a right to know the fact. 

A notice prior to the commencement of hostilities 
should be given as the date at which acts of hostility 
become valid should be established before rather than 
after the act or by the act. 

As war is in itself so serious it is generally held that 
there should be a reason for war and that the state enter- 
ing upon hostilities should announce the reason. Of 
course, it is well understood that the apparent may not 
always be the real reason, and sometimes it might be best 
for all parties that the reason be not too fully stated lest 
if. make return to peace more difficult. 

The declaration should of course be public and formal, 
as the conduct of foreign states is also influenced by the 
state of war. These essentials of the form of a declara- 
tion of war are simple and necessary in order that it 
may be valid and fully operative, viz, the declaration of 
war should be from the competent authority, in an un- 
equivocal form, and published prior to the commence- 
ment of hostilities, and should give a reason for the war. 
Suggestions as to other requirements for a valid declara- 
tion have been made, such as that the causes should be 
stated in full, 2-i hours or some minimum of time should 
elapse between the publication of the declaration and 
its operation, etc. These have not j^et received sufficient 
support to be regarded as essential. 

The declaration should therefore be : 

1. From the competent authority. 

2. To the competent authority. 

3. Previous to the opening of hostilities. 

4. Explicit and unequivocal. 

5. Reasoned. 

The method of notifying a neutral in order that there 
may be as little difference in interpretation as possible 



74 COMMENCEMENT OF HOSTILITIES. 

should be a simple transmission to the proper neutral 
authority of a copy of the declaration made to the enemy. 
Resume. — The survey of practice and opinion indicates 
that the rules proposed in 1907 at the conference at The 
Hague reflected general opinion. Any wide departure 
from these rules would not at present receive much sanc- 
tion. Most authorities contend that the main aim is to 
know definitely when war begins, if war is to be under- 
taken, and to know something of the reason for the war. 
Considering this condition of affairs the folloAving Hague 
rules are thought sufficient : 

REGULATIONS. 

Article 1. Hostilities between the contracting powers must not 
commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form 
either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with 
conditional declaration of war. 

Art. 2. The state of war must be notified to the neutral powers 
without delay, and shall not take effect in regard to them until 
after the receipt of a notification, which may even be given by 
telegraph. Neutral powers, nevertheless, can not plead the ab- 
sence of notification if it is established beyond doubt that they 
were in fact aware of the state of war. 

Art. 3. Article 1 of the present convention shall take effect in 
case of war between two or more of the contracting powers. 
Article 2 is binding as between a belligerent power, which is a 
party to the convention, and neutral powers, which are also 
parties to the convention. 



Topic III. 

LIMITATION OP AKMAMENTS. 

What attitude should be assumed in regard to the limi- 
tation of armaments? 

CONCLUSION. 

In view of the evident differences of opinion and diffi- 
culties the wish expressed at The Hague in 1907 may be 
reaffirmed, viz, that the Governments " examine the pos- 
sibility of an agreement as to the limitation of armed 
forces by land and sea and of war budgets." 

NOTES. 

General. — From the days of the saying that " all things 
are fair in war " there has developed in modern times 
a very decided opinion to the contrary. Restrictions upon 
the means and methods of injuring the enemy have been 
imposed. Many plans for doing away with the evils of 
war have been proposed. 

On August 24, 1898, the Russian Czar caused his 
minister to hand to the diplomatic representatives at St. 
Petersburg a rescript which set forth the dangers of in- 
creasing armaments, and stated that — 

To put an end to these incessant armaments and to seek the 
means of warding off the calamities which are threatening the 
whole world — such is the supreme duty which is to-day imposed 
on all states. 

Filled with this idea, His Majesty has been pleased to order 
me to propose to all the Governments, whose representatives are 
accredited to the Imperial Court, the meeting of a conference 
which would have to occupy itself with this grave problem. 

This conference should be, by the help of God. a happy presage 
for the century which is about to open. It would converge in 
one powerful focus the efforts of all states which are sincerely 
seeking to make the great idea of universal peace triumph over 
the elements of trouble and discord. 

75 



76 LIMITATON OF ARMAMENTS. 

It would, at the same time, confirm their agreement by the 
solemn establishment of the principles of justice and right, upon 
which repose the security of states and the welfare of peoples. 

On January 1, 1899, in a circular the Czar proposes a 
rjrogram for the conference of the states of the world, 
placing before the conference as the first object that — 

Of seeking without delay means for putting a limit to the pro- 
gressive increase of military and naval armaments, a question 
the solution of which becomes evidently more and more urgent 
in view of the fresh extension given to these armaments ; and 

Of preparing the way for a discussion of the questions relating 
to the possibility of preventing armed conflicts by the pacific 
means at the disposal of international diplomacy. 

Toward the realization of the objects he submitted the 
following subjects for discussion : 

1. An understanding not to increase for a fixed period the 
present effective armed military and naval forces, and at the 
same time not to increase the budgets pertaining thereto ; and 
a preliminary examination of the means by which a reduction 
might even be effected in future in the forces and budgets above 
mentioned. 

2. To prohibit the use in the armies and fleets of any new kind 
of firearms whatever, and of new explosives, or any powders 
more powerful than those now in use, either for rifles or cannon. 

3. To restrict the use in military warfare of the formidable 
explosives already existing, and to prohibit the throwing of pro- 
jectiles or explosives of any kind from balloons or by any similar 
means. 

4. To prohibit the use in naval warfare of submarine torpedo 
boats or plungers or other similar engines of destruction; to give 
an undertaking not to construct in the future vessels with rams. 

5. To apply to naval warfare the stipulations of the Geneva 
Convention of 1864 on the basis of the additional articles of 1868.. 

6. To neutralize ships and boats employed in saving those over- 
board during or after an engagement. 

7. To revise the declaration concerning the laws and customs 
of war elaborated in 1874 by the conference of Brussels, which 
has remained unratified to the present day. 

8. To accept in principle the employment < f good offices, of 
mediation and facultative arbitration in cases lending themselves 
thereto, with the object of preventing armed conflicts between 
nations, to come to an understanding with respect to the mode 
of applying these g ocl offices, and to establish a uniform practice 
in using them. 



RUSSIAN PROPOSAL, 189U. 77 



The result of the discussion of the subject of limitation 
of armaments at the First Hague Conference, in which 
26 states participated, was the passage of the following 
resolution : 

That tlie restriction of military budgets which are at present a 
heavy burden on the world is extremely desirable for the increase 
ot the material and moral welfare of mankind, 

And a wish — 

That the Governments taking into consideration the proposals 
made at the conference might examine the possibility of an agree- 
ment as to the limitation of armed forces by land and sea and of 
war budgets. 

During the Conference of 1899 various propositions in 
regard to limitation of military budgets and of mili- 
tary forces were considered and argued. The subcom- 
mittee having the investigation within its field reported : 

1. That it would be very difficult to fix, even for a period of 
five years, the number of effective forces, without at the same time 
regulating other elements of the nati nal defense. 

2. That it would be no less difficult to regulate by an inter- 
national convention the elements of that national defense whicb 
was organized in each country according to very different views. 
(Conference Internationale de la Paix, 1899, Pt. I, p. 84.) 

The Russian proposal to maintain the status quo of 
armaments of 1899 could not be adopted. Indeed, the 
difference of opinion on this matter at one time threat- 
ened the continued existence of the Conference itself. 

There was a general agreement that the limitation of 
armament should be the subject of a profound study on 
the part of the states of the world. 

Between the Conference of 1899 and that of 1907 there 
was much discussion of the problems of increasing arma- 
ments. The matter received attention in the parliaments 
of many states. 

The subject was again brought up at the Conference 
of 1907, but not by Eussia, whose delegate in the course 
of an extended address, and referring to the Czar's propo- 
sition for limitation of armament of 1899, said that " the 
contact with reality quickly disclosed that the noble 
thought of the Czar had concealed practical difficulties 



78 LIMITATON OF ARMAMENTS. 

when it was tested in practice." (Deuxieme Conference 
de la Paix, Tome I, p. 94.) 

The Conference of 1907 confirmed the resolution of the 
Conference of 1899 and recommended that the Govern- 
ments resume the serious examination of the question of 
limitation of military expenditures. 

First Conference at Hague, 1899. — The Russian propo- 
sition of 1898 for the limitation of armaments by conven- 
tional agreements was not the first Russian proposition 
to this effect. After the Napoleonic war Alexander I 
had indorsed the idea of a limitation of the forces of 
European States. The Hague Conference of 1899 was 
sitting at a fortunate time to consider disarmament, as 
was pointed out by the chairman of the first commission 
which was entrusted with the consideration of the ques- 
tion of disarmament, limitation of budgets, etc. 

Questions arose in regard to the basis of limitation. 
Should the basis be the number of the forces, the budgets 
or a combination of these elements? How should the 
figures be determined and verified? Should the status 
of the armed forces at the time serve as a basis? Ques- 
tions of valuation of naval and land forces might be dif- 
ficult. Colonial forces and defense might add to the 
complications. 

After some of the more special items of the program 
of the Czar had been discussed the commission entered 
upon the consideration of the questions relating to limita- 
tion of armaments. 

At this time M. Staal. the Russian delegate, who was 
president of the First Hague Conference, explaining 
Russia's attitude, said in addressing the president of the 
committee : 

Monsieur le President, je tiendrais k ajouter quelques mots aux 
paroles si eloquentes que vous venez de prononcer ; je voudrais 
preciser la pensee dont s'est inspire le Gouvernement russe et 
indiquer en meme temps les Stapes par lesquelles a passe" la ques- 
tion qui nous occupe. 

D§s le mois d'aout 1898, le Gouvernement russe a invite les 
Puissances a rechercher, dans la voie de la discussion interna- 
tionale, les moyens les plus efficaces de mettre un terme au deve- 
loppement progressif des armements actuels. 



EXPLANATION OF RUSSIAN PROPOSAL. 79 

Un accueil empresse et sympathique fut fait a la demande du 
Gouvernement imperial par toutes les Puissances qui sont repre- 
sentees ici. Toutefois, malgre l'enthousiasme qui avait salue 
cette proposition, le Gouvernement russe a juge necessaire de se 
renseigner anpres des Cabinets pour savoir si le moment actuel 
semblait favorable & la convocation d'une Conference dont le 
premier but serait justement cette restriction des armements. 

Les reponses qui nous ont ete donnees, l'acceptation du pro- 
gramme esquisse dans la Circulaire du 30 decembre 1898, et dont 
le premier point vise la non-augmentation ponr un terme a fixer 
des effectifs militaires actuels, nous ont decides a prendre l'initia- 
tive de la Conference de la Paix. C'est ainsi, Messieurs, que nous 
nous trouvons reunis a La Haye, animee d'un esprit de, concilia- 
tion, et que nos bonnes volontes se rencontrent en vue d'une 
ceuvre commune a accomplir. 

Nos deux Sous-Commissions ont pris pour cadres les points 2, 3 
et 4 de la Circulaire du 30 decembre. Ce sont, sans doute, des 
clifficultes techniques et speciales, dont je ne suis pas en mesure 
d'apprecier la portee, qui ont empeche de prendre toutes les de- 
cisions desirees. La Commission d'ailleurs a exprime le voeu de 
renvoyer quelques unes de ces questions a une conference 
ulterieure. 

Mais nous avotfs encore a examiner un point essentiel qui est 
du ressort de la Commission : c'est la question de la limitation 
des budgets et des effectifs militaires. II me parait d'antant plus 
necessaire d'insister pour que cette importante question fasse 
l'objet de l'etude la plus approfondie, qu'elle renferme, je le repute, 
I'idee premiere qui nous a reunis, celle d'alleger le plus possible 
le fardeau effroyable qui p§se sur les peuples et qui entrave leur 
developpement material et ineme moral. Les fruits de l'activite 
bumaine sont absorbes dans une proportion croissante par les 
depenses des budgets de la guerre et de la marine. Ainsi que l'a 
fort eloquemment dit l'bonorable General Den Beer Poortugael, il 
est d'importantes fonctions des nations civilisees qui souft'rent de 
cet Mat de choses et qui sont releguees au second plan. 

La paix armee entraine aujourd'hui des depenses plus conside- 
rables que les guerres les plus onereuses d'autrefois. Si une 
autre Commission a regu le mandat d'alleger, de mitiger les hor- 
reurs de la guerre, a vous Messieurs incombe la mission tout 
aussi grande d'alleger les charges de la paix, telles qu'elles r#- 
sultent de cette concurrence incessante dans la voie des arme- 
ments. 

II me sera permis d'esperer que, sur ce point tout au moins, 
l'attente des populations anxieuses qui suivent avec un interet 
sontenu nos travaux, ne sera pas trompe. Le deception serait 
cruelle. 

C'est pour cette raison que je vous prie de porter toute votre 
attention sur les propositions que Messieurs les delegues tech- 



80 LIMITATON OF ARMAMENTS. 

niques de Russie vont developper devant voiis; vous verrez que 
ces propositions constituent veritableinent nn minimum. 

Ai-je besoin de dire qu'il ne s'agit point d'utopies ni de mesures 
cbimeriques. II ne s'agit pas de proceder a un desarmement. Ce 
que nous soubaitons, c'est d'arriver a une limitation, a un temps 
d'arret dans la marcbe ascendante des armements et des depenses. 
Nous le proposons dans la conviction que, si l'accord s'6tablit, on 
verra un mouyement en sens contraire s'accentuer peu a peu : 
l'immobilite n'est point du domaine de l'bistoire et, si pendant 
quelques annees nous aurons pu garder une certaine stability 
tout porte a croire que la tendance bienfaisante a la diminution 
des cbarges militaires pourra s'affirmer et se developper. Ce 
mouyement repondra entierement aux idees qui out inspire les 
circulaires russes. 

Mais nous n'en sommes pas encore la. Pour le moment, nous 
ne tendons qu'a la stabilisation, pour un terme a fixer, des effectifs 
et des budgets militaires. (Conference Internationale de la Paix, 
1899. Pt. II, p. 28.) 

This full statement of the importance attributed to this 
part of the program of the conference caused the mem- 
bers to give the subject of limitation of armaments care- 
ful attention. 

Technical ojnnions, 1899. — The technical delegate, Col. 
Gilinskv, of Russia, said : 

Le programme du Gouvernernent russe vise deux objets : 

Le premier est bumanitaire, c'est d'eloigner la possibilite meine 
de la guerre et d'en diminuer autant que possible les maux et les 
ca la mites. 

Le second est fonde sur des considerations ecommiques: 
diminuer autant que possible le poids enorme des cbarges pecuni- 
aires, que toutes les nations se trouvent obligees de supporter 
pour l'eiitretien des armees en temps de paix. 

A la premiere tacbe travaillent les Commissions destinees a. 
elaborer les lois de l'arbitrage, des bons offices, les lois et usages 
de la guerre de terre, l'adaptation des principes de la Convention 
de Geneve a la guerre maritime. 

J'espere que leurs travaux seront couronnes d'un bon succes, 
mais il est permis de demander, Messieurs : les peuples representes 
a la Conference, seront-ils entierement satisfaits si, en sortant 
d'ici, nous leur apportons l'arbitrage et les lois pour la guerre 
et rieu pour le temps de paix, de cette paix armee, qui pese si 
lourdement sur les nations, qui les §crase au point qu'on entend 
dire parfo-is qu'une francbe guerre vaudrait peut-etre -mieux que 
cet etat de guerre sourde, cette concurrence continuelle ou tout 



TECHNICAL OPINIONS, 1S99. . 81 

le monde met en avant de norabreuses armees, plue nombreuses 
maintenant en temps de paix qu'elles n'etaient autrefois au 
moment des plus grandes guerres. (Ibid., p. 30.) 

Col. Gilinsky proposed for the realization of a plan 
for the limitation of military armaments the following 
means : 

1. Establissement d'une entente mternationale pour un terme 
de cinq ans, stipulant la non-augumentation du chiffre actuel 
des effectifs de paix des troupes entretenues dans les metropoles. 

2. Fixation, en cas de cette entente, s'il est possible, du chiffre 
des effectifs de paix des armees de toutes les Puissances, non 
compris les troupes coloniales. 

3. Maintien, pour le meme terme, de cinq ans du montant du 
budget militaire actuellement en vigueur. (Ibid., p., 33.) 

Later Col. Gilinsky explained the intention of these 
propositions as follows: 

Apres la seance du vendredi 23 juin, on m'a adresse plusieurs 
questions concernant les propositions russes que j'ai eu l'honneur 
de soumettre a la discussion de la premiere Commission et je 
demande a present la permission de donner quelques explications. 

On m'a fait observer que les deux premieres propositions 
traitent la meme question : pourquoi done la partager en deux 
parties? II y a pourtant une difference entre ces deux proposi- 
tions; c'est-fl-dire que la seconde est la suite de la premiere. La 
premiere traite la question en general : la question de principe. 
La Russie vous propose d'etablir une entente stipulant la non- 
augmentation du chiffre actuel des effectifs de paix entretenus 
dans les metropoles. Si nous arrivons a une pareille entente, 
e'est alors que parait la seconde proposition, la question des 
chiffres. Chaque pays devra declarer, si nous le trouvons neces- 
saire, le total en chiffres ronds ou en chiffres precis — e'est encore 
selon notre decision — de ses troupes entretenues en temps de 
paix. II est a definir s'il est question du nombre des soldats 
seulement sans compter les officiers et les sous-officiers. Notre 
proposition vise seulement le nombre total des soldats. 

II fandra declarer ensuite le nombre total des recrues pour 
chaque annee et qui ne pourra pas etre depasse pendant la duree 
de l'entente. Enfin, il faudra fixer le nombre d'annees que le 
soldat reste sous les drapeaux, car vous savez bien, Messieurs, 
que le changement de ce terme influe sur le total de l'armee 
territoriale. 

VoilS, de quoi il s'agit dans le second paragraphe de la proposi- 
tion russe. 

19148 — 14 6 



82 LIMITATON OF ARMAMENTS. 

Dans les deux propositions il s'agit des troupes entretenues dans 
les inetropoles ; les troupes coloniales sont excludes ; car les 
colonies se trouvant toujours en danger ou rneine en etat de 
guerre, il ne parait done pas possible d'interdire raugmentation 
des troupes coloniales. La Russie n'a pas de colonies proprement 
dites, des possessions absoluinent separees par la iner. Mais, nous 
avons des territoires qui. sous le point de vue de leur defense, se 
trouvent dans les inenies conditions que les colonies, car ils sont 
separes du pays sinon par la rner, du moins par des distances 
enorines et la difficulte des communications : c"est l'Asie Centrale 
et la circonscription militaire de 1' Amour. Les deux sont ex- 
tremement eloignees du centre de l'empire; dans les deux les 
troupes sont peu nombreuses et se trouvent en face d'armees tr£s 
considerables qui sont plus pres de nos troupes que les renforts que 
nous pouvons envoyer de Russie. II n'y a done pas moyen de 
mettre ces territoires eloignes dans les memes conditions que le 
centre du paj^s et de s'interdire la possibilite d'augmenter ces 
troupes en cas de necessite ; par consequent, ces territoires doivent 
etre consideres comme des colonies. 

Le troisieme point vise le budget ordinaire, e'est-a-dire le budget 
n§cessaire pour l'entretien des troupes existantes; la fabrication 
des arines et les constructions qui ne sortent pas de l'ordinaire. 
Mais quand il s'agit du changement complet de canons ou de 
fusils ainsi que de la reconstruction des places fortes exigee par 
1'effet du nouveau canon de siege, la fabrication de la nouvelle 
arnie demande des sommes enorines qui ne peuvent etre trouvees 
dans les limites du budget ordinaire. Ces sommes la sont de- 
mandees par les Gouvernements de tous les pays en debors du 
budget ordinaire; e'est le budget extraordinaire qui ne peut §tre 
ni prevu ni fixe. La baute Assemblee ayant sactionne le cbange- 
ment des armements, a sanctionne d'avance aussi le budget 
extraordinaire. (Ibid., p. 36.) 

Capt. Scheme, technical delegate from Russia, pro- 
posed the following regulations in regard to naval arma- 
ments : 

Accepter le principe de fixer, pour un terme de trois ans, le 
montant des budgets de la marine avec l'engagement de ne pas 
en augmenter le total pendant cette periode triennale et l'obliga- 
tion de faire connaitre a l'avance pour la dite periode : 

1. Le total des tonnes des vaisseaux de guerre, qu'on se pro- 
pose de construire, sans preciser les types memes des batiments; 

2. Le nombre des officiers et des equipages de la marine; 

3. Les depenses pour les travaux des ports tels que forts, bassins 
et arsenaux, etc. (Ibid., p. 34.) 

These proposed regulations were submitted to a sub- 
committee for examination and report. The subcom- 



REPORT OF COMMITTEE, 1899. 83 

mittee was unable to reach any satisfactory conclusion. 
No practical method of arriving at a basis for reduction 
was found. The report of the committee was frankly 
admitted to be unsatisfactory. The essential parts were 
as follows: 

Le Capitaine Scheme, apres avoir constate que le budget de la 
marine, vise dans les propositions russes, comprend le budget 
extraordinaire aussi bien que le budget ordinaire, a fait cette 
communication importante, qu'il est bien entendu que cbaque 
Puissance garde une liberte entirere relativement au montant de 
la somme qu'elle s'engage, eventuellement pour un terme de trois 
ans, a. ne pas depasser. La Russie elle-meme se propose prealable- 
ment de fixer le montant a 10 pour cent de plus que son budget 
actuel, mais chaque Puissance pourrait choisir comme base de 
l'engagement un budget augmente dans la mesure qui lui parait 
necessaire, en allant jusqu'au maximum des augmentations anno- 
cees par les Puissances. 

De l'echange de vues qui a eu lieu dans la Sous-Commission, 
11 ressort : 

1. Que quelques delegu6s entrevoient, en effet, une possibilite 
d'accepter, en principe, les propositions russes, mais doivent at- 
tendre pour se prononcer definitivement les instructions de leurs 
Gouvernements. 

2. Que la majorite des delegues de la Sous-Commission n'a pas 
voulu se prononcer dans ce sens, attendu que, de prime abord, 
des difficultes constitutionnelles s'opposeraient, dans les pays 
parlementaires, & lier d'avance le vote budgetaire des assemblies 
legislatives. 

Lorsqu'enfin, apres une discussion prolongee, il a paru impos- 
sible d'arriver & un accord ou de trouver un expedient autre que 
celui de laisser la question ouverte, le President, M. Van Karne- 
beek, a propose que les delegues recoinmanderaient a leurs Gouver- 
nements une etude des propositions russes qui leur permettrait 
d'en decider dans une conference ulterieure. 

Cette proposition n'ayant pas obtenu la sanction de la Sous- 
Commission (5 voix pour, 5 voix contre et 5 voix s'abstenant), 
celle-ci a du passer au vote sur une motion du Capitaine Scheme, 
ayant pour but d'inviter les delegues a obtenir, dans le plus court 
delai possible, des instructions leur permettant de se prononcer 
avant la fin de la Conference, d'une maniere definitive, sur les 
propositions du Gouvernement russe. Sept voix ayant vote pour, 
nne voix contre et sept s'abstenant, cette proposition du Capitaine 
Scheme a dfi etre regardee comme adoptee ; et la Sous-Commis- 
sion, ayant ensuite charge quatre de ses membres de rapporter le 
resultat de ses deliberations a la premiere Commission, les sous- 
$ign£s, formant ce comite de redaction, ont done l'honneur de 



84 LIMITATON OF ARMAMENTS. 

constater que l'opinion qui a prevalu dans la Sous-Cominission, 
tout en n'impliquant pas l'acceptation des propositions russes, 
n'exclut pas l'espoir que Ton reussira a trouver la voie inenant 
au but d'introduire "un temps d'arret : ' dans les budgets de la 
marine. 

II reste avec la premiere Commission de confirmer ou d'mfirmer 
par son vote, la proposition susmentionnee du Capitaine Scbeine. 

(s.) Bille. 

( S. ) SOLTYK. 

(s. ) Scheine. 

(S.) CORRAGIONI D'ORELLI. 

(Ibid., p. 46.) 

Opinions in 1907. — The opinions expressed upon the 
subject of limitation of armaments at The Hague con- 
ference in 1907 may be regarded as deliberate because re- 
sulting from the study and examination of the subject 
by various states in accord with the recommendations 
of the conference of 1899. » 

Great Britain. — The British delegate expressed the 
opinion of his Government in a somewhat long statement. 
After reviewing the action of the Czar in inserting the 
question of limitation of armaments in the call for the 
conference in 1899, lie showed that the expenditure for 
armaments had steadily increased between 1899 and 1907 
on the part of most states. He asserted that Great Brit- 
ain was decidedly in favor of the limitation of arma- 
ments if such a course was practicable. The British dele- 
gate said, in closing his remarks : 

Mon Gouvemement recommit qu'il est du devoir de cbaque pays 
de se proteger contre ses ennemis et contre les dangers qui peuvent 
le menacer. II reconnait de meme que cbaque Gouvemement a le 
droit et le devoir de decider ce qu'il convient a son pays de faire 
dans ce but. C'est done seulement par la bonne volonte, la libre 
volont£ de cbaque G uvernement agissant de son propre cbef pour 
le bonbeur de son pays, que l'objet de nos desirs peut se realiser. 

Le Gouvemement de Sa Majesty Britannique, reconnaissant que 
plusieurs Puissances desirent restreindre leurs depenses mili- 
taires et que, par Taction independante de cbaque Puissance, ce 
bur. peut etre realise, a cru de son devoir de recbercber s'il y 
aurait des moyens de donner satisfaction a ces aspirations. Aussi 
nous a-t-il auto rise a faire la declaration suivante : - 

Le Gouvemement de la Grande-Bretagiie serat pret a com- 
muniquer annuellement aux Puissances qui en agiraient de meme 
le projet de construction de nouveaux batimeuts de guerre et les 



OPINIONS OF STATES. 85 

expenses que ce pro jet entrainerait. Cet ^change de renseigne- 
ments faciliterait un echange de vues entre les Gouverneinents 
sur les reductions que, de cominun accord, on pourrait effectuer. 

Le Gouvernement Britanniqne croit que, de cette fagon, on 
pourait arriver a une entente sur la question des sommes que 
les Etats pourraient allouer a ce chapitre de leur budget. 

Finalement, Monsieur le President, j'ai l'honneur de proposer 
1'adoption de la resolution suivante : 

La Conference confirnie la resolution adopted par la Conference 
de 1899 a l'egard de la limitation des charges militaires ; et, vu 
que les charges militaires se sont considerablement accrues dans 
presque tous les pays depuis la dite annee, la Conference declare 
qu'il est hautement desirable de voir les Gouvernements reprendre 
l'etude serieuse de cette question. (Deuxieme Conference de la 
Paix, Tome I, p. 92.) 

United States. — A communication from the American 
delegation announced its support of the British proposi- 
tion. 

France. — The French delegation expressed approval 
of the British point of view. 

Spain. — A similar communication was made by the 
Spanish delegation. 

Argentine Republic and Chili. — The delegates from 
Argentine and Chilian Republics presented a communi- 
cation setting forth the agreement between those two 
states by which their naval armaments had been limited. 

Russia. — Recalling the fact that the Czar in 1899 had 
placed the subject of limitation of armaments at the head 
of his program and had made it the corner stone of his 
proposition, the Russian delegate, who was president of 
The Hague conference of 1907, said : 

Mais ici encore la pratique de la vie ne devait pas repondre a 
1'idealite du voeu. Ainsi que je viens de le signaler, deux Etat 
seuls, la Republique Argentine et le Chili, out pu le realiser en 
concluant une convention de desarmement, dont j'ai eu 1'honneur 
de vous donner lecture. La plupart des Puissances europeennes 
avaient d'autres preoccupations. A peine la Conference avait-elle 
termine ses travaux, que des desordres surgis dans un Empire de 
1'Asie orientale obligerent les Gouvernements a y intervenir a 
main armee. Peu de temps apres, une des grandes Puissances 
europeennes se trouva engagee dans le Sud de l'Afrique dans une 
lutte qui exigea de sa part un grand effort militaire. Enfin, _es 
dernieres annees, l'Extreme-Orient fut le theatre d'une guerre 
colossale dont la liquidation est a peine terminee. Faut-il parler 



86 LIMITATON OF ARMAMENTS. 

aussi des luttes coloniales et des difficultes diploma tiques qui 
purent obliger inoinentaneinent telle Puissance k augmenter ses- 
arinements? Le r§sultat eu fut que les .Gouvernements, loin de 
pouvoir s'occuper, conforineinent au vceu exprime par la Con- 
ference, des moyens de limitation des arinements, durent au con- 
tra ire les augmenter dans des proportions que vient de vous indi- 
quer en chiffres S. Exc. Sir Edward Fry. 

C'est en considerant ces circonstances, Messieurs, que le Gou- 
vernement russe a §vite d'inscrire cette fois dans le programme de 
la Conference qu'il a propose aux Puissances, la limitation des 
armements. II jugeait d'abord que cette question n'etait pas mure 
pour etre discutee avec fruit. II ne voulait ensuite pas pro- 
voquer de discussions qui, comme l'experience de 1899 l'a de- 
montre, ne pouvaient, contrairement au but qu'on poursuivait en 
commun, qu'accentuer entre les Puissances un disaccord en don- 
nant lieu & des debats irritants. II etait pour sa part decide a 
ne pas y participer et savait que c'etait egalement la resolution 
de quelques autres Grandes Puissances. 

Pourtant, les semences jetees lors de la premiere Conference 
ont germe en dehors de Taction des Gouvernements. Un mouve- 
ment tres accentue de l'opinion publique s'est produit dans dif- 
ferents pays en faveur de la limitation des armements, et les 
Gouvernements, dont les sympathies pour le priucipe n'ont pas 
diniinue, malgre les difficultes de l'execution, se trouvent en face 
de manifestations qu'ils ne sont pas en mesure de satisfaire. 

C'est ainsi, Messieurs, que le Gouvernement britannique, tra- 
duisant ses propres preoccupations et se faisant l'organe du sen- 
timent public, temoigna son intention d'attirer tout de m§me sur 
la question de la limitation des armements l'attention des Puis- 
sances reunies en Conference a La Haye et que son premier 
delegue vient de nous saisir du voeu que le Cabinet de Londres 
voudrait voir emis par nous. 

Je ne trouve, pour ma part, aucun autre moyen de temoigner 
l'interet que les Puissances portent a cette question. Si elle 
n'etait pas mure en 1899, elle ne Test pas d'avantage en 1907. 
Rien n'a pu etre fait en cette voie et la Conference se trouve 
aujourd'hui tout aussi peu preparee a l'aborder qu'alors. Tonte 
discussion, sterile en elle-meme, ne serait que nuisible a la cause 
qu'on a eu en vue en accentuant les divergences d'appreciation 
sur les questions de fait, tandis qu'il y a unite d'intentions 
generales qui pourraient un jour trouver leur realisation. 
(Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome, I, p. 94.) 

Hague toish y 1907. — The conference at The Hague in 
1907 was able to reach no conclusion other than that the 
Governments " taking into consideration the proposals 
made at the conference, may examine the possibility of 



GENERAL VIEW. 87 

an agreement as to the limitation of armed forces by 
land and sea, and of war budgets." 

Convention of Argentine and Chili, 1902. — In 1902 the 
Argentine and Chilean Republics agreed upon a conven- 
tion in regard to the limitation of armaments for a period 
of five years. The essential portions of this convention 
are: 

Article premier. Dans l'esprit de dissiper tout motif d'in- 
quietude et de m§fiance dans l'un ou l'autre pays, les Gouverne- 
nients du Chili et de la Republique Argentine, desistent d'entrer 
en possession des navires de guerre qu'ils ont actuellement en 
construction ainsi que de faire pour le moment de nouvelles 
-acquisitions. 

Le deux Gouvernements conviennent de plus reduire leurs 
escadres respectives, et H cet effet ils poursuivront leurs pourpar- 
lers en vue d'arriver a un accord qui etablisse une equivalence 
raisonnable entre les deux escadres. Cette reduction de la flotte 
se fera dans le delais d'un an a compter de la date de Tecnange 
de la prgsente Convention. 

Article 2. Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent a ne pas aug- 
menter leurs forces navales j)endant une duree de cinq ans, avec 
la condition p:ur celui des deux qui aurait l'intention d'augmenter 
ses forces de donner & l'autre Gouvernement avis prealable, en 
le prevenant dix-liuit mois d'avance. II est entendu que demeure 
exclu de cet engagement tout armement relatif aux fortifications 
des cotes et des ports, l'un et l'autre pays conservant egalement 
toute faculte pour acquerir tout engin flottant destine' exclusive- 
ment a la defense des cotes et des ports, tels que : sous-marins, etc. 

General view. — The broad view which was taken in the 
conferences at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 show how 
difficult it is to reach a basis upon which to negotiate for 
the limitation of armaments. The propositions made at 
The Hague and elsewhere have received attention, but 
none have seemed to appeal to the nations of the world as 
immediately practicable. The proposition for an " inter- 
national armament holiday " or for an agreement to fix a 
period during which preparations for war should cease 
has been made and has been given support. The prac- 
tical method of carrying out such an agreement has, how- 
ever, presented many difficulties. 

The convention of 1902, between the Argentine and 
Chilean Republics, shows what may be done where the 
conditions are similar and where the disposition exists. 



88 LIMITATON OF ARMAMENTS. 

Other agreements and understandings show a gradual 
development of policy in regard to limitation of arma- 
ments. The testimony seems to be that before a practical 
means of restricting preparation for war can be found 
the actual conditions confronting the various States must 
be much more fully understood and the subject must re- 
ceive much more careful attention in all its bearings. 
This is evident in the review of the positions assumed at 
The Hague in 1899 and 1907, as well as in subsequent 
negotiations. 

Conclusion. — In view of the evident differences of opin- 
ion and difficulties the wish expressed at The Hague in 
1907 may be reaffirmed, viz, that the Governments " exam- 
ine the possibility of an agreement as to the limitation of 
armed forces by land and sea and of war budgets." 



Topic IV. 

ENEMY VESSELS AND THEIR PERSONNEL. 

What treatment should enemy vessels and their per- 
sonnel receive? 

CONCLUSIONS. 

(a) Public vessels. — Public vessels of the enemy ma}^ 
be captured or destroyed, except the following when 
innocently employed : 

1. Cartel ships designated for and engaged in ex- 
change of prisoners. 

2. Vessels engaged in scientific work. 

3. Properly designated hospital ships. 

4. Vessels exempt by treaty or special proclamation. 

(b) Days of grace for private vessels of the enemy. — 
A reasonable period of grace, to be determined by each 
belligerent, shall be allowed for vessels of the other bel- 
ligerent bound for or within the opponent's ports at the 
outbreak of war. 

(c) Private vessels. — Private vessels of the enemy may 
be captured, except the following when innocently em- 
ployed : 

1. Cartel ships designated for and engaged in exchange 
of prisoners. 

2. Vessels engaged in religious, philanthropic, and 
scientific work. 

3. Properly designated hospital ships. 

4. Small coast fishing vessels. 

5. Small boats employed in local trade, e. g\. transport- 
ing agricultural products. 

6. Vessels exempt by treaty or special proclamation. 

(d) Personnel of public vessels of the enemy.— 

1. The personnel of public vessels which are liable to 
capture are liable to be made prisoners of war. 

2. The personnel of enemy public vessels which are ex- 
empt from capture share in the exemption so long as 
innocently employed. 

89 



90 ENEjMY vessels and personnel. 

(e) Personnel of private vessels of the enemy (Arts. 
V-VIII, Hague Convention XI).— 

Art. V. When an enemy merchant ship is captured by a bel- 
ligerent, such of its crew as are nationals of a neutral State are 
not made prisoners of war. 

The same rule applies in the case of the captain and officers 
likewise nationals of a neutral State, if they promise formally 
in writing not to serve on an enemy ship while the war lasts. 

Art. VI. The captain, officers, and members of the crew, when 
nationals of the enemy State, are not made prisoners of war on 
condition that they make a formal promise in writing not to un- 
dertake, while hostilities last, any service connected with the op- 
erations of the war. 

Art. VII. The names of the persons retaining their liberty 
under the conditions laid down in Article V, paragraph 2, and in 
Article VI, are notified by the belligerent captor to the other bel- 
ligerent. The latter is forbidden knowingly to employ the said 
persons. 

Art. VIII. The provisions of the three preceding articles do 
not apply to ships taking part in the hostilities. 

(f) Passengers on private vessels of the enemy. — In- 
nocent passengers on a private vessel of the enemy are 
to be accorded the utmost freedom consistent with the 
necessities of war. 

NOTES. 

Definitions. — Certain definitions of terms precede the 
French instructions of 1912, which, though not clearly 
distinguished in some writers, can be with propriety and 
advantage differentiated: 

Dans tout le cours des presentes instructions, les expressions 
capture, saisie, confiscation, se"questre ont 6t4 employees avec le 
sens et dans le but qui vont etre indiques. 

1. Operations effectuees par Jc oatiment de guerre. — La capture 
est l'acte purement militaire par lequel le commandant du navire 
de guerre substitue son autorite a celle du capitaine du navire 
de commerce, dispose du navire, de son equipage et de sa cargai- 
son comme il est dit aux presentes instructions, sous reserve du 
jugement ulterieur du Conseil des prises quant au sort defmitif 
du navire et de sa cargaison. 

La saisie, lorsqu'elle s'applique aux marchandises seules, est 
l'acte par lequel le navire de guerre, avec ou sans l'assentiment 
du capitaine du navire arrete, s'empare et dispose de ces mar- 
chandises comme 11 est dit aux presentes instructions, sous reserve 
du jugement ulterieur du Conseil des prises. 

La saisie, lorsqu'elle s'applique au navire, differe de la capture 
en ce que le sort ulterieur du navire n'est pas en cause quant & 
l'eventualite de sa confiscation. II y a saisie, lorsque le navire 
doit etre mis sous sequestre pendant la dnree des hostilites ; il y a 



CLASSIFICATION OF VESSELS. 91 

saisie, lorsque le navire doit etre contraint tie venir debarquer 
sa merchandise illicite dans un port national ou allie, sous 
reserve du jugement ulterieur du Conseil des prises quant au 
sort de cette marchandise. 

La saisie est toujours accoinpagnee des operations d'inventaire 
et d'apposition des scelles. 

Le mot prise est nne expression generale s'appliquant au navire 
capture ou a la marcliandise saisie. (See Appendix.) 

Classification of vessels in time of "war. — In a broad 
way vessels in time of war may be classified as belligerent 
vessels and as neutral vessels. 

In general the neutral or enemy character of the vessel 
is determined by the flag the vessel is entitled to fly. 

Belligerent vessels may be public vessels or may be 
private vessels. 

Similarly, neutral vessels may be public or private. 

The treatment of vessels will be determined by the 
rights of the class to which they belong. 

Enemy public vessels. — The public vessels of the enemy 
are liable to capture or destruction unless exempt by 
special convention or under the general principles of in- 
ternational law. 

The following public vessels of the enemy are exempt 
from capture or destruction when innocently employed: 

1. Cartel ships designated for and engaged in exchange 
of prisoners. 

2. Vessels engaged in scientific work. 

3. Properly designated hospital ships. 

4. Vessels exempt by special convention or agreement. 

The provision that such vessels shall be innocently em- 
ployed may relate to any fact connected with their em- 
ployment. Some States have by treaty or other agreement 
and sometimes by special proclamation exempted mail 
vessels or some particular class of vessels. 

The rules in regard to the general right of capture of 
public vessels of the enemy are so generally recognized as 
to need little discussion. 

Enemy private vessels. — Under the present rules pri- 
vate vessels, of the enemy are subject to capture unless 
exempt by special convention or under the general prin- 
ciples of international law. 



92 ENEMY VESSELS AND PERSONNEL. 

The following private vessels of the enemy are exempt 
from capture when innocently employed: 

1. Cartel ships designated for and engaged in exchange 
of prisoners. 

2. Vessels engaged in religious, philanthropic, and sci- 
entific missions. 

3. Properly designated hospital ships. 

4. Small coast fishing vessels. 

5. Small boats employed in local trade. 

6. Vessels exempt by treaty or special proclamation. 
As in the case of public vessels, the provision relating 

to innocent employment is strictly construed. 

In the case of private vessels the question of deter- 
mination of right to fly the flag may involve visit and 
search, but it may be said that the principles as set 
forth in article 57 of the declaration of London of 1909 
and in the general report upon that article are usually 
accepted : 

ARTICLE 57. 

Subject to the provisions respecting the transfer of flag, the 
neutral or enemy character of a vessel is determined by the flag 
which she has the right to fly. 

The case in which a neutral vessel is engaged in a trade which 
is reserved in time of peace, remains outside the scope of, and is 
in no wise affected by, this rule. 

The principle, therefore, is that the neutral or enemy character 
of a vessel is determined by the flag which she has the right to 
fly. It is a simple rule which appears satisfactorily to meet the 
special case of ships, as compared with other movable property, 
and especially with merchandise. From more than one point 
of view ships have a kind of individuality, especially they have 
a nationality, a national character. This nationality is manifest in 
the right to fly the flag ; it places the ships under the protection 
and control of the State to which they belong ; it makes them 
amenable to the sovereignty and to the laws of that State, and, 
should the occasion arise, to requisition. This is the surest test 
of whether a vessel is really a part of the merchant marine of a 
country, and therefore the best test for determining whether she 
is neutral or enemy. It is, moreover, expedient to rely exclu- 
sively upon this test, and to discard whatever is connected with 
the personal status of the owner. 

The text mentions the flag which the vessel has the right to 
fly; that means, naturally, the flag which, whether she is actually 



CONSIDERATION OF EXEMPTIONS. 93 

flying it or not, the vessel has the right to display according to 
the laws which govern the port of the flag. 

Article 57 safeguards the provisions respecting transfer of flag, 
as to which it is sufficient to refer to articles 55 and 56; it might 
be that a vessel would really have the right to fly a neutral flag, 
from the point of view of the law of the country to which she 
claims to belong, but may be regarded as an enemy by a belliger- 
ent, because the transfer in virtue of which she has hoisted the 
neutral flag is annulled by article 55 or by article 56. 

Lastly, the question was raised whether a vessel loses her neu- 
tral character when she is engaged in a trade which the enemy, 
prior to the war, reserved for his national vessels. An agreement 
could not be reached, as has been explained above, in connection 
with the chapter on Unneutral service, and the question remains 
wholly open, as the second paragraph of article 57 is careful to 
state. 

Consideration of exemptions. — It should be borne in 
mind that many of the propositions in regard to the ex- 
emption from capture of enemy private property at sea 
would include exemption of innocent enemy ships. 

That this exemption does extend to vessels is evident 
in the treaty of 1871 between the United States and Italy, 
which, after stating the general principle of exemption 
of private property except contraband of war, says in 
Article XII, " it being understood that this exemption 
shall not extend to vessels and their cargoes which may 
attempt to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of 
either party." 

Ships engaged in exchange of prisoners under cartel 
agreements are by contract exempt while fulfilling their 
mission. 

Vessels engaged in religious, philanthropic, and scien- 
tific missions are exempt under article 4 of The Hague 
convention relative to certain restrictions on the exercise 
of the right of capture in maritime war. The proposi- 
tion which led to the formulation of this regulation was 
proposed by Italy and was also coupled with the recom- 
mendation that the state to which the vessel belongs 
should notify the opposing belligerent of the fact in or- 
der that a safe conduct might issue and that measures 
might be taken that it should be respected. This quali- 
fication of the regulation was not adopted. 



94 ENEMY VESSELS A^D PERSONNEL. 

The exemption of hospital ships was an extension of 
the principles of the Geneva convention of 1864 through 
its elaboration for maritime warfare in 1906. The regu- 
lations for the treatment of such ships are very well 
established. 

Small coast fishing vessels were granted exemption in 
early days. An agreement between the King of England 
and the King of France in 1403 was followed by other 
similar agreements exempting coast fishing vessels and 
fishermen, " provided they should comport themselves 
well and properly." Practice and opinion favored such 
exemption because the occupation of the fishermen had 
little or no bearing upon the war. 

From the early days of the United States this exemp- 
tion of coast fishermen has been advocated, and the pro- 
vision for exemption was embodied in some treaties. The 
treaty between the United States and Prussia of 1785 
contained a clause relating to this matter, which was 
repeated in subsequent treaties between the same states: 

Art. 23. * * * All women and children, scholars of every 
faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manufacturers, and 
fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified towns, villages, or 
places, and in general all others whose occupations are for the 
common subsistence and benefit of mankind, shall be allowed 
to continue their respective employments, and shall not be mo- 
lested in their persons ; nor shall their houses or goods be burnt 
or otherwise destroyed, nor their fields wasted by the armed 
force of the enemy into whose power, by the events of war, they 
may happen to fall ; but if anything is necessary to be taken from 
them for the use of such armed force, the same shall be paid 
for at a reasonable price. 

With few exceptions, exemption of coast fishermen 
with their vessels has been the rule, so that the Supreme 
Court of the United States said, after reviewing prece- 
dents, opinions, and practice in 1900 in the case of the 
Paquete Habana: 

This review of the precedents and authorities on the subject 
appears to us abundantly to demonstrate that at the present day, 
by the general consent of the civilized nations of the. world, and 
independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is an 
established rule of international law, founded on considerations 
of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the 



EXEMPTION OF SMALL BOATS. 95 

mutual convenience of belligerent states, that coast-fishing vessels, 
with their implements and supplies, cargoes and crews, unarmed, 
and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of catching and 
bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war. 

The exemption, of course, does not apply to coast fishermen or 
their vessels, if employed for a warlike purpose or in such a 
way as to give aid or information to the enemy; nor when mili- 
tary or naval operations create a necessity to which all private in- 
terests must give away. 

Nor has the exemption been extended to ships or vessels em- 
ployed on the high sea in taking whales or seals, or cod or other 
fish which are not brought fresh to market, but are salted or 
otherwise cured and made a regular article of commerce. (U. S. 
Supreme Court Reports, vol. 175, p. 677.) 

The exemption of small boats employed in local trade 
is not supported by such an array of precedents and opin- 
ions, but the arguments for this exemption are upon prac- 
tically the same grounds. 

The proposition of Rear Admiral Haus, of Austria, at 
the Second Hague conference shows the intent of the 
exemption : 

A l'egard des bateaux de peche cotiere, sont, exemptes de capture 
les bateaux et barques affectes dans les eaux territoriales de 
quelques pays au service de l'econoinie rurale ou a celui du petit 
trafic local. 

Ce n'est que dans les cas ou des raisons militaires l'exigent, 
que lesdits bateaux et barques pourront etre requisitionnes contre 
indemnite conformement aux dispositions en vigueur pour la 
guerre sur terre. 

Cette proposition ne vise que les bateaux et barques de petites 
dimensions et destines au transport de produits agricoles ou de 
personnes le long de cotes accores, ou entre la cote et des iles situees 
au-devant, ou dans les archipels, ou eniin dans les canaux des 
cotes plates. 

Sans porter, d'une part, un prejudice quelque peu sensible au 
commerce ou aux resources de l'Etat ennemi, et sans rapporter, 
d'autre part, au capteur un benefice pouvant pour lui entrer en 
ligne de compte, la capture de ces embarcations ne ferait, en 
r§alite, que compromettre l'existence de marins, d'insulaires ou 
d'habitants du littoral se trouvant tout dans une situation de for- 
tune des plus precaires, reduits qu'ils sont au maigre produit de 
leur metier. 

II semble done s'imposer, dans l'int§ret de l'humanite, d'inter- 
dire la capture' des bateaux et barques en question, excepte les 
cas d'exigences militaires. Mais meme dans cette derniere hy- 
pothese la capture ne devrait etre admise que contre indemnite. 



96 ENEMY VESSELS AND PEESONNEL. 

Abstraction fait$ de ces sentiments humanitaires, la capture 
desdites embarcations se presente conime une inconsequence evi- 
dente, si Ton considere cette mesure au point de vue des prin- 
cipes regissant la guerre sur terre. 

Car, si la cote se trouve etre occupee par des troupes de terre, 
les bateaux et barques, dont il s'agit conime etant de la pro- 
priety privee, echappent necessairement a toute prise et pourrai- 
ent, tout au plus, etre mis en requisition. 

Aussi ne saurait-on-guere trouver un motif raisonnable qui put 
gtre invoque pour autoriser des forces navales, ayant occupe des 
eaux territoriales, a proceder, sans en avoir le moindre profit, a 
la capture, voir meme a la destruction de ces monies embarcations. 
(Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome III, p. 910.) 

The official report upon the interpretation of The 
Hague convention, which provided for the exemption 
from capture of " small boats employed in local trade," 
said: 

Conformement a la proposition de rAutriche-Hongrie, le texte 
etend dans les inemes conditions l'immunite a la petite navigation 
locale, c'est-a-dire aux bateaux et barques de petite dimension 
transportant des produits agricoles et se livrant a un modeste 
traflc local, par example entre la c6te et des lies ou ilots voisins. 
(Deuxieme Conference de La Haye, Tome I, p. 271.) 

It is evident from the purpose of the regulation and 
from the official interpretation that it was the intent to 
restrict the exemption within narrow limits. 

Days of grace. — The subject of delay to be accorded to 
merchant ships of one belligerent within ports of the 
other belligerent at the outbreak of war was considered 
by the Naval War College in 1906 and in 1910. The reg- 
ulations proposed in 1906 were — 

1. Eacb state entering upon a war sball announce a date before 
wbicb enemy vessels bound for or witbin its ports at tlie out- 
break of war shall under ordinary conditions be allowed to enter, 
to discbarge cargo, to load cargo, and to depart, without liability 
to capture while sailing directly to a permitted destination. If 
one belligerent state allows a shorter period than the other, the 
other state may r as a matter of right, reduce its period to corre- 
spond therewith. 

2. Each belligerent state may make such regulations in regard 
to sojourn, conduct, cargo, destination, and movements after de- 
parture of the innocent enemy vessels as may be deemed necessary 
to protect its military interests. 



DAYS OF GRACE. 97 

3. A private vessel suitable for warlike use belonging to one 
belligerent and bound for or within the port of the other bellig- 
erent at the outbreak of war is liable to be detained unless the 
government of the vessel's flag makes a satisfactory agreement 
that it shall not be put to any warlike use, in which case it may 
be accorded the same treatment as innocent enemy vessels. (In- 
ternational Law Topics, 1906, p. 46.) 

The American delegation at the Second Hague Confer- 
ence in 1907 maintained that the practice of exempting 
from capture enemy ships in an opponent's ports at the 
outbreak of hostilities had acquired the force of a general 
obligation. The British delegation regarded the exemp- 
tion as a matter of favor which might or might not be 
granted. The only agreement that could be reached was 
that embodied in the convention relative to the status of 
enemy merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities. 
This convention provides that " it is desirable " that mer- 
chant ships of one of the belligerents in an enemy port at 
the outbreak of hostilities " be allowed to depart freely, 
either immediately or after a sufficient term of grace," 
with provision for safe conduct along prescribed route. 
The convention, while granting some exemptions, does not 
seem to be as liberal as modern practice. The report of 
the American delegation in setting forth their reasons 
for not signing the convention shows this. (Senate Doc. 
444, 60th Cong., 1st sess., 1908.) 

The discussion in the International Law Situations for 
1910 shows that Great Britain was unfavorable to the 
more liberal treatment of enemy vessels in port at out- 
break of hostilities. The course of the development of 
the rule for the da} r s of grace is shown in the Interna- 
tional Law Situations for 1910, pages 66 to 78. The rule 
that was finally evolved at the Second Hague Conference 
in 1907 was as follows : 

When a merchant ship of one of the belligerent powers is at 
the commencement of hostilities in an enemy port, it is desirable 
that it be allowed to depart freely, either immediately or after a 
sufficient term of grace, and to proceed direct, after being fur- 
nished with a passport to its port of destination or to such other- 
port as shall be named for it. 

19148—14 7 



98 ENEMY VESSELS AND PERSONNEL. 

. The same applies in the case of a ship which left its last port 
before the commencement of the war and enters an enemy port in 
ignorance of the hostilities. 

Mail vessels. — -By certain treaties between states, mail 
steamers are made exempt from interference by the 
enemy. Sometimes such vessels are exempt under proc- 
lamation. The growing use of mail as the means of 
innocent communication, and the use of other means, such 
as the telegraph, for warlike purposes, has tended to in- 
cline opinion toward the exemption of mail vessels when 
they are employed strictly for that service, but this has 
not become a part of international law. Great Britain 
and the United States in 1848, and Great Britain and 
France in 1860, made conventions by which mail vessels 
were to continue their service during war until notifi- 
cation that it was to be discontinued, and in such case the 
vessel was to be permitted to return without interference. 

The convention of 1907, relative to certain restrictions 
on the exercise of the right of capture in maritime war, 
article 2, says of the inviolability of mails that — 

The ship, however, may not be searched except in case of neces- 
sity, and then only with as much consideration and expedition as 
possible. 

Under exceptional conditions during the Chino- Japan- 
ese war the prize law of Japan in 1894 exempted " boats 
belonging to lighthouses," and in 1904, " lighthouse ves- 
sels and tenders" were exempted. 

In early days it was not unusual for one belligerent to 
hold in its ports vessels of the other belligerent until he 
knew what treatment his own vessels were to receive in 
the harbors of his opponent. 

In general, exemptions would not be granted to vessels 
which are involved in the hostilities or to vessels " whose 
construction indicates that they are intended to be con- 
verted into ships of war." 

Rules of the Institute of International Law, 1913. — In 
section 2 of the Manual of the Institute of International 
Law in 1913 there is the following provision : 



PERSONS ON ENEMY VESSELS. 99 

Art. 2. — Bdtiments de guerre. — Font partie de la force armee 
d'un Etat belligerant et sont, des lors, sounds conmie tels aux 
lois, de la guerre maritime: 

1° tous batiments appartenant a l'Etat qui, sous la direction 
d'un commandant militaire et montes par un equipage militaire, 
protent, avec autorisation, le pavilion et la flamme de la marine 
militaire. 

2° les navires publics, transformed par l'Etat en batiments de 
guerre conformement aux articles 3 et 6. 

Persons on enemy vessels. — The treatment of persons 
found on board enemy vessels has not always been uni- 
form. It has varied under different flags and at differ- 
ent times under the same flag. Some complications have 
arisen because vessels are of different classes and some 
difficulties because vessels may pass from one class to 
another by the action of those who are in control of their 
movements. The conduct or other relations of the per- 
sons on board an enemy vessel may also affect their treat- 
ment. 

Early French regulations. — An order of the days of 
Napoleon provides for prisoners taken in war on the sea : 

Art. 35. Tout capitaine de navire arme en guerre qui aura fait 
des prisonniers & la mer, sera tenu de les garder jusqu'au lieu 
de sa premiere relache dans un port de France, sous peine de 
payer, pour chaque prisonnier qu'il aura relache, cent francs 
•d'amende au profit de la caisse des invalides de la marine, laquelle 
sera retenue sur ses parts de prises ou salaires, et prononcee par 
le conseil des prises. 

Art. 36. Lorsque le nonibre des prisonniers de guerre excedera 
celui du tiers de l'equipage, il est permis au capitaine preneur 
d'embarquer le surplus de ce tiers; et dans le cas ou il manqueroit 
de vivres, un plus grand nombre, sur les navires des Puissances 
neutres qu'il rencontrera a la mer, en prenant, au bas d'une liste 
des prisonniers ainsi debarques, une soumission sign£e du capi- 
taine du batiment pris, et des autres principaux prisonniers, por- 
tant qu'ils s'engagent a faire echanger et renvoyer un pareil 
nombre de prisonniers frangais de meme grade; laquelle liste 
originate sera remise, it la premiere relache dans les ports de 
France, a l'administrateur de la marine; et. dans les ports 
strangers, au commissaire des relations commerciales de la Re- 
publique frangaise. 

Art. 37. II est permis aux capitaines qui relacheront dans les 
ports des Puissances neutres, d'y d£barquer les prisonniers de 



100 ENEMY VESSELS AND FEKSONNEL. 

guerre qu'ils auront faits, pourvu qu'ils en aient Justine la 
necessite aux agents de la Republique, dont ils seront obliges de 
rapporter une permission par ecrit, lesquels remettront lesdits 
prisonniers au commissaire de la nation ennemie, et en tireront 
un regu avec obligation de faire tenir compte de l'ecbange desdits 
prisonniers par un pared nombre de prisonniers franchise de 
rneme grade. 

Art. 38. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les capitaines preneurs seront 
obliges, snns pouvoir s'en dispenser sous quelque pretexte que ce 
puisse etre, de garder a leur bord le capitaine avec un des prin- 
cipaux officiers de l'equipage du batiment pris, pour les ramener 
dans les ports de France, ou ils seront retenus pour servir d'otages, 
jusqu'a ce que l'ecbange promis ait ere effectue. (Boucber, In- 
stitution au droit maritime (1803), p. 574.) 

French regulations, 1912. — The French regulations of 
December 19, 1912, briefly state : 

146. Si le navire capture est un batiinent de guerre, vous 
transborderez le capitaine, la majeure partie des officiers, une 
portion de l'equipage, et vous conduirez ces prisonniers dans un 
port francais ou allie\ ou occupe par les forces armees frangai? 
ou alliees. 

Passengers and others. — The treatment of those who 
may be with the military forces, whether on land or on 
sea, has received consideration in international confer- 
ences and has been the subject of domestic regulations. 
The regulations in regard to their treatment in time of 
land warfare are well defined. The regulation of The 
Hague convention respecting the laws and customs of 
war on land of 1907 accords with generally accepted 
practice : 

Art. 13. Individuals who follow an army without directly be- 
longing to it, such as newspaper correspondents and reporters, 
sutlers, and contractors, who fall into the enemy's hands and 
whom the latter thinks expedient to detain are entitled to be 
treated as prisoners of war, provided they are furnished with a 
certificate from the military authorities of the army which they 
were accompanying. 

The rules proposed at the meeting of the Institute 
of International Law in 1913, to be considered at the 
Oxford meeting in 1913, were similar in principle to 
those of The Hague conference of 1907. The wording 
is slightly different, however, as the control of the sea 



TREATMENT OF PASSENGERS. 101 

can not be of exactly the same character as the control 
over the land area. The proposed article 66 was: 

Les individus qui suiyent une force' navale sans en fa ire partie, 
tels que les fournisseurs, correspondants de journaux, etc., et qui 
tombent an pouvoir de rennemi, et que celui-ci jnge utile de 
detenir, ne peuvent etre detenus qu'aussi longtenips que les 
necessities militaires l'exigent. lis ont droit au traitement des 
prisonniers de guerre. 

This article was the subject of a considerable inter- 
change of views. The brief statement of this interchange 
is given in the report: 

L'article du pro jet assimilait, en les tfaitant tous comme des 
prisonniers de guerre, si le belligerant a juge utile de les detenir, 
les correspondants et reporters de journaux attaches a une 
escadre et embarques sur cette force navale et ceux se trouvant 
a bord d'un navire public ou prive; et, pour les premiers, a la 
difference du Reglement de La Haye sur les lois de la guerre sur 
terre, il n'exigeait pas qu'ils fussent munis d'une legitimation de 
i'autorite militaire de la force qu'ils accompagnent. Cet article 
a §te l'objet d'un certain nombre d'observations de la part des 
membres de la Commission, et celle-ci lui a fait subir sur <Jivers 
points des modifications. 

M. Hagerup a d'abord deinande qu'on retablit dans l'article la 
necessite de la legitimation exigee par le Reglement de La Haye. 
Mais M. Edouard Rolin Jaequemyns a fait remarquer, et la Com- 
mission s'est rangee a son avis, que cette exigence sera it ici su- 
perfine; car, tanclis que dans la guerre sur terre les correspondants 
de journax pourraient etre considered comme espions a defaut d'une 
legitimation de I'autorite militaire competente, ils sont dans la 
guerre maritime libres en principe comme tous les autres passagers 
trouves sur le navire. 

Le projet, en reconnaissant au belligerant le droit de detenir 
" s'il le jugeait utile" les correspondants de journaux, lui donnait 
un pouvoir qui a semble exagere a la Commission. Celle-ci a 
declare, sur l'observation de M. Hagerup, qu'il ne pourrait les 
detenir "qu'aussi longtenips que les necessites militaires l'exige- 
raient." Leur situation a ete nettement precisee apres un echange 
de vues entre MM. Hagerup, Kaufmann, Edouard Rolin Jaeque- 
myns et Strisower : les correspondants de journaux doivent, en 
regie generale, etre laisses libres; ils ne peuvent etre faifs prison- 
niers de guerre ; mais le belligerent pent, si les necessites mili- 
taires l'exigent, les retenir et, s'il les retient, ils anront droit au 
traitement des prisonniers de guerre. 

Un pareil traitement ne devra, toutefois, d'apres la Commission, 
etre attribue aux correspondants de journaux que s'ils sont em- 



102 ENEMY VESSELS AND PERSONNEL. 

barques sur line force navale. S'ils sont a. bord d'nn navire 
public on prive, ils seront laisses libres comme les antres passagers 
du navire : on ne saurait les traiter plus severement que les mem- 
bres de l'equipage du batinient sur lequel ils se trouvent. La 
Commission a done decide de supp rimer le second alinea de l'arti- 
cle. M. Kaufmann aurait voulu qu'on appliquat le traitement 
reconnu aux journalistes a bord d'une force navale k tous ceux 
se trouvant sur un navire quelconque " dans le rayon d'action 
d'une escadre." Mais on a fait remarquer que le rayon d'action 
batiments dans la zone des operations militaires avait §te reglee 
par Particle 67 du projet (article 53 de la Commission). 

. La Commission a pense qu'il etait inutile de prevoir les re- 
porters k cote des correspondants de journaux : ce dernier terme 
est assez large pour englober les uns et les antres. Mais elle a 
juge necessaire d'assimiler specialement aux correspondants de 
journaux certains individus qui, en debors d'eux, peuvent aussi 
se trouver sur un navire, comme des fournisseurs : l'enumeration 
qu'elle a donnee a cet egard n'a pas un caractere limitatif. 

M. Holland a propose, et la Commission a decided de snpprimer 
de la disposition du projet le mot " armee ", qui semblait se 
referer plutot a la guerre sur terre. et les expressions " attacbes a 
une escadre," dont le sens ne laissait pas d'etre un peu obscur. 

Correspondents, reporters, etc., may be regarded as be- 
longing in some degree to the forces of the enemy, and 
therefore liable to detention as prisoners of Avar. 

Passengers who are paying for transit are in a some- 
what different relation. There is not an exact parallel in 
land warfare to passengers on a vessel flying an enemy 
flag. Passengers may have no choice of means of trans- 
port in time of war. Their carriage may have no rela- 
tion to the war. The tendency in land warfare has been 
to give to noncombatants the largest possible degree of 
freedom. The rule proposed by the Institute was : 

Art. 67. Les passagers qui, sans faire partie de l'equipage, se 
trouvent a bord d'nn navire ennemi ne peuvent etre retenus comme 
prisonniers de guerre par l'ennemi, a. moins qu'il s ne se soient 
rendus coupables d'un acte bostile. 

Les passagers militaires et les passagers civils deja enr51§s 
peuvent etre captures comme prisonniers de guerre, meme si le 
navire n'est pas susceptible de confiscation. 

The article proposed in 1912 was as follows: 

Art. 81. Les passagers qui, sans faire partie de l'equipage, se 
trouvent a bord d'un navire ennemi ne peuvent etre retenus par 



TREATMENT OF PASSENGERS. 103 

l'ennemi, a rnoins qu'ils ne se soient rendus coupables d'nn acte 
hostile: en pareil cas, ils peuvent etre faits prisonniers de guerre. 
Les passagers militaires et les passagers civils d4ja enroles 
peuveut etre captures comme prissoniers de guerre, m§me si le 
navire n'est pas susceptible de confiscation. 

The reasons for the changes are thus stated in the re- 
port of the committee and illustrate the ideas of several 
representatives : 

La redaction de l'alinea l er de l'article 81 ete legerement 
inodifiee dans sa forme pour donner satisfaction a une observation 
de M. Dupuis. Le projet, jugeant qu'il y avait la une question de 
legislation interieure, n'avait pas cru devoir se preoccuper des 
penalites auxquelles, en dehors du traitement de prisonniers de 
guerre, un belligerant pourrait soumettre les passagers qui se 
seraient rendus coupables d'un acte hostile. Or, tel qu'il §tait 
libelle, l'article 81 permettait de croire que le traitement de prison- 
niers de guerre serait l'unique sanction infligee a ces passagers. 
Pour bien indiquer la possibility de penalites, sans toutefois la 
mentionner expressement .dans l'article comme l'auraient desire 
certains membres, notamment M. Dupuis, on a decide, sur la pro- 
position de M. Hagerup, de supprimer la derniere phrase de l'alinea 
l e \ et d'ajouter dans la premiere les mots : " comme prisonniers de 
guerre " apres les mots : " ne peuvent etre detenus." 

L'alinea 2 de l'article 81, aux termes duquel " les passagers mili- 
taires et les passagers civils deja enroles peuvent etre captures 
comme prisonniers de guerre, meme si le navire n'est pas suscep- 
tible de confiscation", a ete adopts sans modification. En autori- 
sant la capture des passagers civils "deja enroles", cette disposi- 
tion n'a entendu viser que les individus incorpores dans la force 
armee des belligerants, c'est-a-dire non pas ceux qui a raison de 
leur age sont d'apres les lois de leur pays susceptibles d'etre 
enroles ma is seulement ceux qui se trouvent en fait entres dans 
les cadres de l'armee. M. Kaufmann a declare au sein de la Com- 
mission : " Les mots ' passagers civils deja enroles ' ne compren- 
nent pas tons les hommes qui, autant que ce^ depend de leur 
Sge, peuvent etre enroles suivant les lois de leur pays, mais unique- 
ment ceux qui, conformement aux lois de leur pays, ont ele, actu- 
eUement enroles par un acte administratif (ordre d'appel special ou 
general) sans etre par ce seul acte deja, devenus ou redevenus des 
personnes militaires." Au snjet de cet article 81, alinea 2, M. Paul 
Fauchille avait cru devoir appeler l'attention de la Commission sur 
l'article 144 des Instructions du 19 decembre 1912 pour les offi- 
ciers de la marine frangaise, que donne la solution suivante : " Les 
hommes de 18 a\ 50 ans, nationaux de l'Etat ennemi, et qui ne sont 
ni des passagers militaires, ni des passagers civile d£ja enroles, ni 
des membres du personnel religienx, medical et hospitalier, ne 



104 EKEMY VESSELS AND PERSONNEL. 

seront pas faits prisonniers -de guerre, a la condition qu'ils s'en- 
gagent, sons la foi d'une promesse fornielle ecrite. a ne prendre 
pendant la duree des hostilites aucun service ayant rapport avec 
les operations de la guerre." L'opinion de la Commission a §te 
qu'on ne devait pas inserer dans le Reglement une pareille dispo- 
sition. Celle-ci lui a paru excessive. Non seulement, en effet, elle 
regarde comme faisant partie de l'armee tous les homines soumis 
par leur age, d'apres les lois de leur pays, au service militaire, 
c'est-a-dire, suivant la regie generalement admise, tous les hommes 
de 20 a 45 ans, mais elle assujettit encore aux lois de la guerre 
des individus que leur age y soustrait: c'est dans des cas tout a 
fait exceptionnels que les homines de IS a 20 ans et ceux de 45 
a 50 ans peuvent fournir une reserve aux forces armees; on ne 
saurait les traiter comme s'ils devaient la constituer normalement. 

Propositions in 1913. — The Institute of International 
Law received from its committee both in 1912 and in 1913 
a draft of a manual for war on the sea. The draft of 
1913 was accompanied by a detailed report. The articles 
proposed in 1913 were. 

Sec V. Des droits et devoirs du belliuerants vis-a-vis des per- 

SONNES DE L'ENNEMI. 

Art. 59. A. Personnel des navires — Bdtiments de guerre.— En 
cas de capture par l'ennemi d'un batiment de guerre, les combat- 
tants et les non combattants faissant partie de la force armee 
des belligerants ont droit au traitement des prisonniers de guerre. 

Art. 60. Navires publics au prives. — Lorsqu'un navire ennemi 
public ou prive est capture par un belligerant, les hommes de son 
equipage, nationaux d'un Etat neutre. ne sont pas faits prison- 
niers de guerre. 

II en est de menie du capitaine et des officiers, egalement na- 
tionaux d'un Etat neutre. s'ils promettent formellement par 
ecrit de ne pas servir sur un navire ennemi pendant la duree de 
la guerre. 

Le capitaine, les officiers et les membres de l'equipage, nationaux 
de l'Etat ennemi, ne sont pas faits prisonniers de guerre, k condi- 
tion qu'ils s'engagent, sous la foi d'une promesse formelle ecrite, 
a ne prendre, pendant la dnree des hostilites, aucun service ayant 
rapport avec les operations de la guerre. 

Art. 61. Les noms des individus laisses libres dans les condi- 
tions visees a Particle 60, alineas 2 et 3, sont notifie par le belli- 
gerant capteur a r autre belligerant. II est interdit a ce dernier 
d'employer sciemment lesdits individus. 

Art. 62. Toute personne faisant partie de l'equipage d'un navire 
public au prive ennemi est. sauf preuve contraire, presume de 
nationalite ennemie. 



PROPOSITIONS BEFORE INSTITUTE, 1913. 105 

Aet. 63. Ne peuvent etre retenus conime tels les mernbres du 
personnel d'un navire ennemi qui, a raison de son caractere par- 
ticulier. est lui-ineTne exempt de saisie. 

Art. 64. Personnel (les navires publics ou prives qui ont. pris 
part au.v hostilites. — Lorsqu'un navire public ou un navire preve 
a, directement ou indirectement, pris part aux hostilites, l'ennemi 
peut retenir conime prisonniers de guerre tous les mernbres du 
personnel du navire qui peuvent etre consideres comme ayant pris 
part au fait de guerre reproche' au navire. 

Art. 65. Personnel des navires publics ou prives personnelle- 
ment coupaole cVactes hostiles. — Les mernbres du personnel d'un 
navire public ou d'un navire prive qui se rendent personnellement 
coupabies d'un acte hostile envers l'ennemi peuvent etre retenus 
par lui comme prisonniers de guerre. , 

The intent of these articles may be seen from the some- 
what extended comment given in the report of the com- 
mittee upon the several articles. There was a disposition 
to conform to the wording of the Hague conventions. In 
commenting on article 60 in regard to the paroling of the 
officers and crews of enemy vessels which were not ships 
of war, the report says : 

Cet article dispose que le capitaine, les officiers et les mernbres 
de l'equipage, nationaux de l'Etat ennemi, ne doivent pas etre 
faits prisonniers de guerre, s'ils s'engagent a ne prendre, pendant 
la dure des hostilies, aucun service ayant rapport avec les opera- 
tions de la guerre. M. Dupuis en a reclame la suppression, car 
il stipule en realite Yohligation de la liberation conclitionelle, 
or cela est contraire ice qui, k tr£s juste titre, est admis pour la 
guerre terrestre par l'article 10 du Reglement de La Haye du 18 
octobre 1907 : l'Etat capteur doit etre libre de juger s'il convient 
ou non de mettre en liberte les individus captures comme ceux-ci 
doivent etre libres d'accepter ou de refuser la liberte sur parole. 
M. Holland a fait, d'autre part, remarquer que " si Ton peut avoir 
confiance dans la parole des officiers, il n'en est probablement pas 
de meine dans la parole des homines de l'equipage ". Mais la 
Commission a estime, par quatre voix contre trois, qu'il y avait 
la, suivant l'expression de M. Stri sower, une disposition " humani- 
taire " qu'il y avait lieu de maintenir : ce serait un recul que 
d'admettre a cet egard une solution differente de celle consacree 
par l'article 6 de la Convention n° XI de La Haye. 

Personnel of private vessels of the enemy. — Formerly 
the personnel of private vessels of the enemy was sub- 
ject to such treatment as the opposing belligerent might 



106 ENEMY VESSELS AND PEKSOAXEL. 

determine. A common rule before 1907 was to hold as 
prisoners of war those who by training or relation to 
the state might be immediately available for service of 
the enemy. In early days the crews of belligerent pri- 
vate vessels had often been treated with great severity, 
but with the growing tendency to limit hostilities to 
the armed forces on land and on sea there had been a 
drift of opinion toward liberality in the treatment of 
crews of captured private vessels. 

In the call for the Second Hague Conference this sub- 
ject was not mentioned, but it was introduced by the 
British delegation. Amendments were offered by other 
delegations. Discussion showed a remarkable unanimity 
of opinion in favor of very liberal treatment of the per- 
sonnel of enemy private vessels. The tendency seemed 
to be to recognize the noncombatant persons at sea as 
nearly on the same footing as noncombatant persons on 
land. This marked a decided change from earlier prac- 
tice, and one with far-reaching effects. The introductory 
part of the report of the committee upon these rules may 
well be considered : 

Dans la pratique internationale actuelle, les hommes, les officiers 
et le capitaine composant l'equipage d'un navire de commerce 
ennemi capture sont traites comme des prisonniers de guerre. 
Le droit de prise est, en quelque sorte, applique a l'equipage 
comme au navire lui-meme, souvent m§me sans ce preoccuper de 
distinguer les sujets neutres des sujets ennemis. 

Pour justifier cette maniere d'agir, on invoque generalement 
l'interet du belligerant capteur a affaiblir les forces de son ad- 
versaire. on le privant d'effectifs plus ou moins destines a servir 
sur les navires de guerre. 

Quelqu'etablie qu'elle soit, cette pratique a donne lieu, & 
plusieurs reprises, a des difficultes. On la critiquee, en faisant re- 
marquer ce qu'il y avait de rigoureux a trailer comme prisonniers 
de guerre des particuliers qui ne participent pas aux hostility, 
dont la plupart sont le pauvres gens, dont le dm* metier est 
l'unique gagne-pain, et qui meritent autant de sollicitude que les 
particuliers etrangers aux armees et se trouvant sur le territoire 
ennemi. 

Cette matiere ne figurait pas au programme russe de la Con- 
ference. La Quatrieme Commission s'en est trouvee saisie par 
nne proposition britannique (1) visant seulement les marins neu- 



KXKMI'TION OF I'hKKON S. 107 

tres, puis par une proposition beige (2) etendant meme aux 
marine enemis le benefice de la liberte. 

La question, n'ayant souleve aucune discussion devant la Com- 
mission, et la Delegation britannique ayant declare accepter le 
principe de l'amendement beige, fut renvoyg au comite d'examen. 

Votre Comite a ete unamime a admettre, en principe, l'adoucis- 
sement du sort des equipage dans na vires ennemis inoffensifs 
captures ne participant pas & la guerre, a condition de ne pas 
porter atteinte par 1& & l'interet legitime du belligerant capteur 
de ne pas voir ces equipages a Her grossir les effectifs de son 
adversaire. 

C'est dans cet esprit qu'ont ete preparees les dispositions ci- 
apres : elles posent, en principe, que les equipages des navires 
ennemis captures ne sont pas faits prisonniers de guerre, mais 
qu'il y a lieu de subordonner, en certains cas, cette liberte & cer- 
taines conditions, en vue d'assurer au belligerant capteur le 
respect de ses droits dans la mesure compatible avec l'humanite. 
(Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome III, p. 1027.) 

Exemption of persons from capture. — In land warfare 
the exemption of persons from capture is necessarily 
wide. In warfare on the sea the exemption has been 
less extended. 

The general principle is that the subjects of enemy 
states are enemies and the subjects of other states friends. 
Both these principles may be conditioned by other rela- 
tions and by the conduct of the parties. On the ground 
of conduct persons may be combatants or noncombatants, 
and the tendency is to determine their treatment accord- 
ing as they fall in one or the other of these categories, 
combatants being liable to the full consequences of the 
war and noncombatants being, so far as possible, exempt 
from such consequences. 

The Hague convention of 1907, respecting the laws and 
customs of war on land, outlines with considerable full- 
ness the rules for the treatment of persons in time of 
land warfare. No such complete statement of principles 
has been agreed upon for treatment of persons in warfare 
on the sea. 

The personnel of duly authorized hospital ships is 
exempt from capture and treatment as prisoners of war. 
These ships may be public hospital ships of the enemy, 



108 ENEMY VESSELS AND PERSONNEL. 

private hospital ships of the enemy, or may belong to 
neutrals. 

The personnel of ships of Avar is in general liable to 
capture and to treatment accorded to prisoners of war. 
Exemption under The Hague convention of 1907 for the 
adaptation to maritime war of the principles of the 
Geneva convention provides, in article 10: 

The religions, medical, and hospital staff of any captured ship 
is inviolable, and its members can not be made prisoners of war. 
On leaving the ship they take away with them the objects and 
surgical instruments which are their own private property. 

This staff shall continue to discharge its duties while necessary 
and can afterwards leave, when the commander in chief con- 
siders it possible. 

The belligerents must guarantee to the said staff when it has 
fallen into their hands the same allowances and pay as are given 
to the staff of corresponding rank in their own navy. 

The treatment of the personnel of private vessels of 
the enemy is under The Hague convention of 1907 rela- 
tive to certain restrictions with regard to the exercise of 
the right of capture in maritime war. These provisions 
are : 

Art. 5. When an enemy merchant ship is captured by a bel- 
ligerent, such of its crew as are nationals of a neutral state are 
not made prisoners of war. 

The same rule applies in the case of the captain and officers 
likewise nationals of a neutral state, if they promise formally, in 
writing, not to serve in an enemy ship while the war lasts. 

Art. 6. The captain, officers, and members of the crew who are 
nationals of the enemy state are not made prisoners of war, on 
condition that they undertake, on the faith of a formal written 
promise, not to engage, while hostilities last, in any service con- 
nected with the operations of the war. 

Art. 7. The names of the persons left at liberty under the con- 
ditions laid down in article 5, paragraph 2, and in article 6, are 
notified by the belUgerent captor to the other belligerent. The 
latter is forbidden knowingly to employ the said persons. 

Art. 8. The provisions of the three preceding articles do not 
apply to ships taking part in the hostilities. 

Under this same convention it would be held that the 
personnel of innocently employed small coast. fishing ves- 
sels, small boats engaged exclusively in the local trade, 



PRISONERS OP WAR. 109 

vessels charged with religious, scientific, or philanthropic 
missions would be exempt from capture and treatment as 
prisoners of war. 

Neutral persons who actually engage in the hostilities 
lose their exemption as neutrals and are liable to the same 
treatment as belligerents under similar conditions. 

Prisoners of war. — The right to capture a vessel im- 
plies a right to restrain those on board the vessel to such 
an extent as may make the capture effective. The degree 
of restraint will depend upon the character of the vessel 
and the relation of the persons on board to the vessel. 
The crew of a captured war ship would naturally be lia- 
ble to restrain as prisoners of war, while a shipwrecked 
sailor which the warship had rescued from a foreign 
private vessel might be released at the earliest moment 
compatible with military necessity. 

The early practice would make prisoners of war of the 
officers and crew of an enemy vessel liable to capture. 
The argument was that the detention as prisoners of war 
reduced the power of the enemy and hastened the end of 
the war. This practice was sanctioned by the rules of 
many states. A limitation was later imposed which gave 
neutral members of the crew exemption under certain 
conditions which would not affect the issue of the war. 
It was held, however, that as on land the men who might 
be capable of military service might be detained in an 
area occupied by military forces, so crews of captured 
vessels might be detained. 

From this idea developed the later doctrine that was 
generally adopted early in the twentieth century that 
those who by training or otherwise were immediately 
available for enemy naval service might be detained as 
prisoners of war. As a sailor had had special training 
in order to become a sailor he would be of special value 
to the enemy and the detention of a number of these spe- 
cially prepared men would weaken the enemy's resources. 
This argument had in the eighteenth century sometimes 
been applied ,to the crews of fishing vessels, but had grad- 
ually become obsolete. 



110 ENEMY VESSELS AND PERSONNEL. 

In the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, captains and 
crews of captured vessels were detained as prisoners of 
war. 

In the Spanish-American War in 1898 the passengers 
of captured private vessels were released, the crews and 
officers were given very liberal treatment when detained, 
though both were usually soon released unless needed as 
witnesses. 

During the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-5 Russia gen- 
erally followed the early policy of holding as prisoners 
of war the officers and crew of captured Japanese vessels. 

Japan seems to have granted liberty to those of the offi 
cers and crew not needed as witnesses, unless they had 
been previously enrolled in the naval service. 

Resume. — Without going into detailed discussion of 
the reasons for exemption it is evident that certain classes 
of vessels are granted exemption from capture when they 
are innocently employed. The general grounds of hu- 
manity and expediency are behind these exemptions. 
There are also exemptions granted in treaties and con- 
ventions for special reasons as well as for general reasons. 
These exemptions may be applicable to all states or only 
to a small number of states, according to the treaty pro- 
visions. The convention in regard to treatment of fish- 
ing vessels is generally accepted, while the treaties as to 
mail vessels are limited to a comparatively small number 
of states. 

The treatment of public vessels of the enemy may by 
general assent be more drastic than the treatment of pri- 
vate vessels. A ship of war may be destroyed, while a 
merchant ship should in general be taken to port. 

The principles governing the treatment of vessels in a 
broad way apply to the treatment of the persons on 
board. The persons on board a public vessel of an enemy 
are supposedly in the service of the enemy vessel, and are 
liable to be treated accordingly, as the vessel and its per- 
sonnel can not always be disassociated. 

The personnel of private vessels of an enemy may 
usually be considered on the principles which are based 
on its relation to the war. These persons may be of any 



CONCLUSIONS. Ill 

nationality, and as engaged service of a private person 
may have no relation to the war. Similarly passengers on 
a vessel flying the flag of the enemy may not be and ordi- 
narily are not involved in the war. These persons who 
are only remotely or not at all connected with the hos- 
tilities should not be unduly inconvenienced by the war. 

At The Hague in 1907 these principles were recognized 
and conventions embodying some of. these principles were 
drawn up by the conference. Some states have by deci- 
sion and practice defined the rights of vessels and per- 
sonnel. The treatment of certain vessels and their per- 
sonnel is so well fixed that there is no need for explana- 
tion under a consideration of general rules, as in the case 
of cartel and hospital ships. 

Considering all sources and regulations certain conclu- 
sions seem to be fairly established. 

CONCLUSIONS. 

(a) Public vessels. — Public vessels of the enemy may 
be captured or destroyed except the following when inno- 
cently employed : 

1. Cartel ships designated for and engaged in exchange 
of prisoners. 

2. Vessels engaged in scientific work. 

3. Properly designated hospital ships. 

4. Vessels exempt by treaty or special proclamation. 

(b) Days of grace for "private vessels of the enemy. — 
A reasonable period of grace, to be determined by each 
belligerent, shall be allowed for vessels of the other bel- 
ligerent bound for or within the opponent's ports at the 
outbreak of war. 

(c) Private vessels. — Private vessels of the enemy may 
be captured, except the following, when innocently 
employed : 

1. Cartel ships designated for and engaged in exchange 
of prisoners. 

2. Vessels engaged in religious, philanthropic, and sci- 
entific work. 

3. Properly designated hospital ships. 

4. Small coast fishing vessels. 



112 ENEMY VESSELS AND PERSONNEL. 

5. Small boats employed in local trade, e. g., transport- 
ing agricultural products. 

6. Vessels exempt by treaty or special proclamation. 

(d) Personnel of public vessels of the enemy. — 1. The 
personnel of public vessels which are liable to capture 
are liable to be made prisoners of war. 

2. The personnel of enemy public vessels which are 
exempt from capture share in the exemption so long as 
innocently employed. 

(e) Personnel of private vessels of the enemy (Arts. 
V-VIII, Hague Convention XI). — 

Art. V. When an enemy merchant ship is captured, by a bel- 
ligerent, such of its crew as are nationals of a neutral state are 
not made prisoners of war. 

The same rule applies in the case of the captain and officers 
likewise nationals of a neutral state, if they promise formally in 
writing not to serve on an enemy ship while the war lasts. 

Aet. VI. The captain, officers, and members of the crew when 
nationals of the enemy state are not made prisoners of war on 
condition that they make a formal promise in writing not to 
undertake, while hostilities last, any service connected with the 
operations of the war. 

Art. VII. The names of the persons retaining their liberty 
under the conditions laid down in Article V, paragraph 2, and in 
Article VI, are notified by the belligerent captor to the other bel- 
ligerent. The latter is forbidden knowingly to employ the said 
persons. 

Art. VIII. The provisions of the three preceding articles do not 
apply to ships taking part in the hostilities. 

(/) Passengers on private vessels of the enemy. — Inno- 
cent passengers on a private vessel of the enemy are to be 
accorded the utmost freedom consistent with the necessi- 
ties of war. 



Topic V. 

IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

Should private property at sea be exempt from 
capture ? 

CONCLUSION. 

The United States may with propriety abandon the 
contention for the general exemption of enemy pri- 
vate property at sea and seek agreement upon a certain 
list of exemptions which meet the approval of the states 
of the world and which may from time to time be ex- 
panded as the sentiment for exemption becomes more 
general. 

NOTES. 

Introduction. — A decision as to the treatment of pri- 
vate property at sea in time of war is in certain respects 
fundamental. A code of rules for the conduct of maritime 
warfare based on the right to capture private property 
would be materially modified by the prohibition of this 
right. The strategy of war would also probably be modi- 
fied. The attempts to make private property immune 
from capture have not yet met with success, therefore, 
any rules drawn up may properly concede the right of 
capture at sea of enemy private property. The con- 
siderations advanced in regard to the exemption of pri- 
vate property at sea should, however, receive attention. 

United States proposition at The Hague, 1899. — Under 
date of June 20, 1899, the American commission at the 
First Hague Conference presented a communication to 
the conference stating that they were instructed to place 
before the conference the following proposition : 

The private property of all citizens or subjects of the signatory 
powers, with the exception of contraband of war, shall be exempt 
from capture or seizure on the high seas or elsewhere by the 

19148—14 8 113 



114 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

armed vessels or by the military forces of any of the said signa- 
tory powers. But nothing herein contained shall extend exemp- 
tion from seizure to vessels and their cargoes which may attempt 
to enter a port blockaded by the naval forces of any of the said 
powers. (Holls, Peace Conference at The Hague, p. 311.) 

This was signed by the commission, consisting of An- 
drew D. White, Seth Low, Stanford Newel, A. T. Mahan, 
William Crozier, Frederick W. Holls. 

The communication of the American commission 
showed that the attitude of the United States had been 
favorable to the exemption of private property from cap- 
ture. The committee of the conference did not feel itself 
competent to take up the subject, but recommended that 
it be included in the program of a further conference. 
In speaking on this subject Mr. White said in behalf of 
the American commission : 

The commission have found several of the delegations ready to 
accept this proposal, and sundry others whose opinions evidently 
incline toward its adoption, but we have not succeeded in securing 
a support sufficiently unanimous to justify us in pressing the 
matter further during the present conference. (Ibid., 314.) 

Mr. White also made quite an extended argument for 
the exemption, and the proposition was inserted in the 
form of a wish in the Final Act of the First Hague Con- 
ference, as follows: 

5. The conference expresses the wish that the proposal, which 
contemplates the declaration of the inviolability of private prop- 
erty in naval warfare, may be referred to a subsequent conference 
for consideration, (Ibid., p. 379.) 

Capture or destruction of enemy private property at 
sea. — Topic I considered at the Naval War College Con- 
ference in 1905 proposed the question, " What regulations 
should be made in regard to private property at sea in 
time of war ? " 

In the discussion of this topic the attitude of the 
United States was traced from the early days of the 
Republic. It was shown that the attitude of the United 
States had usually been in favor of the exemption of pri- 
vate property at sea from capture. 

From the general conclusions as to the policy of capture 
a few citations may be made. 



CAPTURE AND DESTRUCTION OE ENEMY PROPERTY. 115 

There is a growing opinion that the rea soils for capture of 
the enemy's private property at sea are economic and political 
rather than military. The immunity to private property should 
not, however, be so extended as to interfere with necessary mili- 
tary operations. It would not be reasonable to exempt private 
property to such an extent as to cause the war to be of neces- 
sity prolonged or to result in greater destruction of life. Impera- 
tive military necessity, of which the superior officer on the field 
of action at the time must judge, must override rights of private 
property. The question of damages may be reserved for subse- 
quent settlement. (International Law Topics and Discussions, 
1905, p. 17. ) 

The equitable practice of days of grace will probably be con- 
tinued. The use of improved means of communication will be 
extended. Privateering is abandoned. Prize money is beginning 
to be abolished. Land commerce is more and more developed. 
In time of war commerce is more easily transferred to neutral 
flags. The actual influence of the capture of private property 
does not seem to be great. The weakening of a naval force in 
order to pursue and capture private property is of doubtful ex- 
pediency. Such considerations as these show why the tendency 
to guarantee the exemption of all private property at sea in 
time of war by an international agreement has been looked upon 
with increasing favor. 

The proposed exemption, if it extended to all goods and prop- 
erty, would probably make necessary an extension of the list of 
contraband. Contraband as now used applies only to certain 
classes of goods carried by or belonging to neutrals. If enemy 
property is placed on the same basis as neutral property, the 
doctrine of contraband must be interpreted accordingly and the 
principles enunciated with this in view. (Ibid., p. 19.) 

After lengthy discussion and considerable difference of 
opinion, it was found necessary in the conference of 1905 
to make some special provision in regard to vessels. The 
brief statement was as follows : 

The vessels of the enemy used in commerce may be enemy pri- 
vate property. Certain of these vessels may readily become of 
great service to the enemy. Vessels of like character, if belong- 
ing to a neutral, could not be classed as contraband. Owing to 
the ease with which many types of commercial vessels may be 
converted to warlike uses, it seems proper that such agencies of 
transportation should not be placed under the general exemption. 

The degree of exemption to be extended to vessels may prop- 
erly be left to the belligerents to determine. 

Considering the general conditions of modern naval warfare 
and commercial relations, as well as the trend of opinion, to- 



116 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

gether with the exceptional character of private vessels belonging 
to enemy citizens, an attempt to formulate a proper regulation 
iu regard ±o the exemption of private property at sea may be 
considered expedient. Of course such exemption does not cover 
property of contraband nature, property involved in violation of 
blockade, property involved in unneutral service or otherwise con- 
cerned directly in the war. The regulation of exemption should 
apply, therefore, only to innocent property and ships. 

Some such regulation in regard to vessels as the following 
seems to meet the requirements imposed by the above discussion 
and conclusions : 

Innocent private ships, except belligerent vessels propelled by 
machinery and capable of keeping the high seas, are not liable 
to capture. 

It may be said that the word . " innocent " applies only to such 
private property or ships as have no direct relation to or share 
in the hostilities. It may be assumed that innocent belligerent 
goods or ships may be taken in case of military necessity, and 
wben so taken full remuneration shall be paid, after the analogy 
of similar action on land. (Ibid., p. 20.) 

' The proposed regulation in regard to the treatment of 
private property at sea was : 

Innocent neutral goods and ships are not liable to capture. 

Innocent enemy goods and ships, except vessels propelled by 
machinery and capable of keeping the high seas, are not liable to 
capture. (Ibid., p. 20.) 

United States proposition at The Hague, 1907. — In ac- 
cordance with the vote of the First Hague Conference as 
expressed in the " wish " of the final act of the Confer- 
ence, the immunity of private property at sea was in- 
cluded in the program of the Second Hague Conference 
in 1907. The subject was referred to the fourth commit- 
tee, and the American proposition was in almost the same 
words as in 1899. 

Mr. Choate, on June 28, 1907, made a long speech re- 
viewing the attitude of the United States upon the ques- 
tion of inviolability of private property at sea. (Deux- 
ieme Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III,, 
pp. 750-764.) Mr. Choate, representing the American 
delegation, speaks of the immunity of private property 
at sea, saying: 

This proposition involves a principle which has been advocated 
from the beginning by the Government of the United States and 



AMERICAN PROPOSITION, 190 7. 117 



urged by it upon other nations and which is most warmly cher- 
ished by the American people, and the President is of opinion 
that whatever may be the apparent specific interest of our own 
or of any other country for the time being, the principle thus de- 
clared is of such permanent and universal importance that no 
balancing of the chances of probable loss or gain in the immediate 
future on the part of any nation should be permitted to outweigh 
the considerations of common benefit to civilization which call 
for the adoption of such an agreement. (Deuxieme Conference 
Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 766.) 

Mr. Choate also speaks of this doctrine as " our favor- 
ite proposition," " the traditional policy of the United 
States," and at the same time saying, " I ought most 
frankly to concede that the United States has never been 
able to put this policy into practical operation." Mr. 
Choate cites the opinion of statesmen and writers in favor 
of exemption and argues that the reasons for exemption 
of private property on land apply to similar property at 
sea. He urges the exemption — 

First, on humanitarian grounds; secondly, we place it on a 
ground more important still, of the unjustifiable interference with 
innocent and legitimate commerce, which concerns not alone the 
nation to which the ship belongs, but the who'e civilized world. 
We insist upon our proposition in the third place as a direct ad- 
vance toward the limitation of war to its proper province, a con- 
test between the armed forces of the States by land and sea 
against each other and against the public property of the respec- 
tive states, engaged. And, finally, we object to the old practice 
and insist upon our demand for its abolition on the ground that 
it is now no longer necessary, and that it tends to invite war 
and to provoke new wars as a natural result of its continuance. 
(Ibid., pp. 774-775.) 

Mr. Choate supports his position by arguments, some 
of which have a bearing upon the military significance of 
this doctrine of exemption : 

Apart from all historical and ethical points of view, it may well 
be claimed that there is another strong ground in support of the 
immunity of private property at sea, not needed for military pur- 
Doses, for which we contend. From economical considerations 
it is no longer worth the while of maritime nations to construct 
and maintain ships of war for the purpose of pursuing merchant 
?hips which have nothing to do with the contest. The marked 
trend of naval warfare among all great maritime nations at the 
present time is to dispense with armed ships adapted to such 



118 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

service, and to concentrate their entire resources upon the con- 
struction of great battleships whose encounters with those of 
their adversaries shall decide any. contest, thus confirming wai a& 
it should be, to a test of strength between the armed foL^es and 
the financial resources of the combatants on sea and land. It is 
probable that, if the truth were known, there has been an actual 
diminution by all the maritime nations in the construction of 
war vessels adapted to the pursuit of merchantmen, and, indeed, 
a sale or breaking up of such vessels which had been for some 
time in service. Indeed, none of the great navies now existing 
could afford to employ any of their great and costly ships of war 
or cruisers in the paltry pursuit of merchantmen scattered over 
the seas. \ The game would not be worth the candle and the ex- 
pense would be more than any probable result. 

This presents in another form the idea already referred to that 
war has come to be, as it should be, a contest between the nations 
engaged and not between either nation and the noncombatant 
citizens or individuals of the other nation, and it results from it 
that the noncombatant citizens should be let alone, and that no 
amount of pressure that can be brought to bear upon them will 
have any serious effect in shortening the controversy. (Ibid., 
p. 777.) 

Of the proposition that the " most effective way of pre- 
venting war is to make it as terrible as possible," Mr. 
Choate, after showing that the trend of the Geneva and 
other conventions is in the opposite direction, says : 

Of course there is no truth or sanity in such a brutal sugges- 
tion. Our duty is not to make war as horrible as possible, but 
to make it as harmless as possible to all who do not actually 
take part in it, to prevent as far as we can, to bring it to an end 
as speedily as we can, to mitigate its evils as far as human 
ingenuity can accomplish that result, and to limit the engines and 
instruments of war to their legitimate use — the fighting of battles 
and the blockading and protection of sea coasts. (Ibid., p. 778.) 

Other arguments are also presented, and as these con- 
stitute what is regarded as an official statement of the 
position of the United States, the paragraphs concluding 
Mr. Choate's address may be cited : 

Again, it is urged that the retention of this ancient right of 
capture and detention is necessary as the only means of bringing 
war to an end. That when you have destroyed the fleets of your 
enemy and conquered its armies it has no object in suing for 
peace as long as its commerce and its communication by trans- 
portation with other nations in the way of trade is left undisturbed. 



mr. choate's address. 119 

But this seems to us to be a purely fanciful and imaginary 
proposition. The history of modern wars, and, in fact, of all 
wars, shows that the decisive victory over an enemy by the de- 
struction of his fleets and the defeat of his armies is sure to bring 
about peace. The test of strength to which the parties appealed 
has thereby been decided and there is no further object in con- 
tinuing the war. 

The picking up or destruction of a few harmless and helpless 
merchantmen upon the sea, will have no appreciable effect in 
reducing the government and nation to which they belong to 
subjection, if the defeat of fleets and armies has not accomplished 
that result. Besides, there is a limit to the legitimate right of 
even the victor upon the seas for fhe time being to employ his 
power for purposes of destruction. Victory in naval battles is 
one thing, but ownership of the high seas is another. In fact, 
rightly considered, there is no such thing as ownership of the 
seas. According to the universal judgment and agreement of 
nations they have been and are always free seas — free for inno- 
cent and unoffending trade and commerce. And in the interest 
of mankind in general they must always remain so. 

Again, it has been urged that the power to strike at the mercan- 
tile marine of other nations is a powerful factor in deterring them 
from war — that the merchants having such great interests in- 
volved, liab.e to be sacrificed by the outbreak of war, will do 
their utmost to hold their government back from provoking to 
or engaging in hostilities. But this, we submit, is a very feeble 
motive. Commerce and trade are always opposed to war, but 
have little to do with causing or preventing it. The vindication 
of national honor, accident, passion, the lust of conquest, revenge 
for supposed affront, are the causes of war, and the commercial 
interests which would be put in jeopardy by it have seldom, if 
ever, been persuasive to prevent it. 

And as to its continuance or termination, commerce really has 
nothing to do with it. When the military and financial strength 
of one side is exhausted the war, according to modern methods, 
must come to an end, and the noncombatant merchants and 
traders have no more to do with bringing about the consummation 
than the clergymen and schoolmasters of a nation. 

Once more, it is said that the bloodless capture of merchant 
ships and their cargoes is the most humane and harmless em- 
ployment of military force that can be exercised, and that in view 
of the community of interest in commerce to which we have 
referred and the practice of insurance in distributing the loss, the 
effect of such captures upon the general sentiment and feeling of 
the nation to which they belong is most effective as a means of 
persuading their government to make peace. 



120 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

But we reply that bloodless though it be it is still the extreme 
of oppression and injustice practiced upon unoffending and inno- 
cent individuals, and that it has no appreciable effect in reaching 
or compelling the action of the Government of which the sufferers 
are subjects. 

We appeal, then, to our fellow delegates assembled here from 
all nations in the interest of peace, for the prevention of war, and 
the mitigation of its evils to take this important subject into se- 
rious consideration, to study the arguments that will be presented 
for and against this proposition, which has already enlisted the 
sympathy and support of the people of many nations, to be 
guided not wholly by the individual interest of the nations that 
they represent, but to determine what shall be for the best inter- 
est of all the nations in general and whether commerce, which is 
the nurse of peace and international amity, ought not to be pre- 
served and protected, although it may require from a few nations 
the concession of the remnant of an ancient right, the chief value 
of which has long since been extinguished. 

In the consideration of such a question, the interest of neutrals, 
who constitute at all times the great majority of the nations, 
ought to be first considered, and if they will declare on this occa- 
sion their adhesion to the humane and beneficent proposition 
which we have offered, we may rest assured that, although we 
may fail of unanimous agreement, such an expression of opinion 
will represent the general judgment of the world and will tend 
to dissuade those of us who may become belligerents from any 
further exercise of this right, which is so abhorrent to every prin- 
ciple of justice and fair play. (Ibid., p. 778-779.) 

Replies to the American proposition, 1907. — The recep- 
tion of Mr. Choate's address was most cordial, though not 
all the delegations were able to accept its conclusions. 
Some offered reasons of policy, others offered reasoned 
arguments. While political reasons were not supposed to 
influence the deliberations, it is evident that national con- 
ditions could not be disregarded. 

A Colombian delegate concluded a considerable discus- 
sion of Mr. Choate's address with the following words: 

Pour en finir, Messieurs, nous n'acceptons pas la proposition de 
M. Choate parce que nos conditions et nos circonstances ne nous 
permettent pas ce beau luxe en faveur des principes abstraits de 
la justice et de l'humanite. On pent etre apotre et chercher le 
martyre individuellement ; quand on represente un pays, on a le 
devoir de defendre ses interets ; dans le cas present,, il s'agit de 
politique internationale et non pas de philanthropic (Deuxieme 
Conference Internationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 792.) 



REPLIES, HAGUE, L907. 1^1 

M. Renault, of the French delegation, maintained that 
the analogy between war on land and on sea was not com- 
plete, that the disturbance of the economic life of the 
community by capture of merchant ships was a means of 
coercion which might prevent war or hasten peace, and 
one could not say it was in a high degree inhumane. As 
the ships may easily be converted into war vessels, they 
may constitute a potential means of defense the loss of 
which would hasten the close of hostilities. M. Renault 
was opposed to the ancient idea of prize money. He 
closes his address as follows : 

D'autre part, c'est clans l'interet general de l'Etat en menie 
temps que dans le leur que les armateurs et chargeurs des 
navires captures ont continue leurs operations malgre la guerre. 
II ne serait done pas juste qu'ils subissent seuls les consequences 
de la capture. Aussi l'idee que l'Etat, dan son ensemble, doit subir 
les consequences prejudiciables de la guerre non seulement en tant 
qu'elles se sont produites directement contre l'Etat lui-meme et 
ses etablissements, inais encore en tant qu'elles ont atteint les 
particuliers, s'affirme de plus en plus ; on peut differer sur les 
moyens de la realiser, mais il n'y a guere de doute sur le principe 
lui-meme. 

Si ces considerations sont, comme nous le croyons, justes, le 
droit de capture apparait comme une mesure dirigee par un Etat 
belligerant contre un autre Etat belligerant, cette mesure faisant 
partie de l'ensemble des operations par lesquelles un Etat s'efforce 
de reduire son adversaire a composition et n'ayant par elle-meme 
aucun caractere particulier de rigueur. II n'y a done pas, suivant 
nous, de raison suffisante pour y renoncer, tant que l'entente neces- 
saire a laquelle nous avons fait allusion an debut et a la formation 
de laquelle nous sommes prets a concourir, ne se sera pas realisee. 
(Ibid., p. 794.) 

Sir Edward Fry, of the English delegation, said : 

Je demande la parole seulement sur un sujet de nos debats. Le 
Delegue' americain que nous venons d' entendre avec tant d'interet 
a beaucoup parle de la cruaute de l'exercice du droit de capturer 
la propriete privee. A mon avis c'est un mal-entendu. II est 
vrai que dans toutes les operations de la guerre, il y a quelque 
chose de barbare, mais de toutes les operations il n'y en a pas 
une qui soit aussi humaine que l'exercice de ce droit. Considerez, 
je vous prie, ces deux cas : l'un, la capture d'un vaisseau marchand 
sur mer ; l'autre, les operations d'une armee ennemie. Dans le 
premier cas. vous voyez une force majeure contre laquelle il est 
impossible de combattre ; personne n'est tue, meine personne n'est 



122 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

blesse ; c'est nne affaire pacifique. De l'autre cote, qu'est-ce 
que vous voyez? Vous voj-ez le terrain desole, le betail detruit, 
les maisons brulees, les femrnes et les enfants fuyant devant les 
soldats ennemis et peut-etre des borreurs sur lesquelles je vou- 
drais garder le silence. Se plaindre done de la capture des vais- 
seaux marchands sur mer, et ne pas interdire la guerre sur terre, 
(rest choisir le plus grand des deux maux. (Ibid., p. 800.) 

The delegate from the Argentine Republic took a simi- 
lar position. (Ibid, p. 810.) 

Position of Netherlands, 1907. — The Netherlands posi- 
tion in the Second Hague Conference was that it shared 
fully the sentiments and adhered to the principles of 
inviolability of private property as set forth by the 
American delegation : 

La delegation des Pays-Bas est favorable a toute proposition 
etablissant le principe de rinviolabilite de la propriete privee sur 
mer. 

Afin que la possibility de transformer en temps de guerre des 
na vires de commerce en croiseurs auxiliaries ne puisse elre un 
motif pour ne pas accepter ce principe, la delegation soumet aux 
considerate ns de la Commission la proposition suivante: 

Aucun navire marcband ne peut etre capture par une partie 
belligerante pour le seul fait de naviguer sous pavilion ennemi 
s'il est muni d'un passeport delivre par l'autorite competente de 
son pays, dans lequel passeport il est declare que le navire ne 
sera pas transforms en vaisseau de guerre ni utilise 1 comme tel 
pendant toute la duree de la guerre. (Deuxieme Conference Inter- 
nationale de la Paix, Tome III, p. 1142.) 

Brazil. — The Brazilian delegation was favorable to as- 
similating the status of private property at sea to the 
status of private property on land. He refers in his 
proposition to the articles of The Hague convention rela- 
tive to the laws and customs of war on land : 

B. Lorsque le capitaine d'un navire ou d'une flotte belligerante se 
trouvera dans la necessite de requisitionner, dans le cas prevu 
k l'article 23, lettre g, de la susmentionne convention, e'est-ii- 
dire dans le cas ou la destruction ou la saisie de ces biens lui 
sont commandees par les exigences les plus imperieuses de la 
guerre, un vaisseau de commerce ennemi, sa cargaison, ou une 
portion quelconque de celle-ci, la requisition sera constatee par 
celui qui la fait moyennant des regus delivres au .capitaine du 
vaisseau qu'on aura saisi, ou dont on aura saisi les marcbandises, 
avec tous les details possibles pour assurer aux parties interes- 
sees leur droit a une juste indeminite. 



POSITION OF STATES, L907. 123 

C. Cette clause s'applique aux marchandises ueutres, qui so 
trouveront an bord des vaisseaux marchands euuemis requisi- 
tioned. 

Le capitane du navire ou de la flotte de guerre, qui aura deter- 
mine la requisition, est tenu de faire mettre a terre, dans un des 
ports les plus proches, les officiers et l'e'quipage du ba\tiinent snisi, 
avec les ressources necessaires pour leur retour au pays auquel il 
appartenait. 

Denmark. — Denmark was in favor of exemption if it 
could be by common agreement. 

Belgium. — The Belgian delegate submitted a set of 
rules which had in view that private vessels of the enemy 
could be seized and retained by a belligerent, but were to 
be restored at the close of hostilities. The crews of such 
vessels were to be liberated on condition that they would 
take no part in the war. 

France. — The French delegation, admitting that war 
was not for the profit of individuals and that the loss 
should not be borne by individuals, showed a disposition 
to accept the American proposition in case of unanimity. 
The delegation made a reasoned proposition: 

Considerant que, si le droit des gens positif admet encore la 
legitime du droit de capture applique a la propriete privee ennemie 
sur mer, il est eminemment desirable que, jusqu'a ce que l'entente 
puisse s'etablir entre les Etats au sujet de sa suppression, l'exer- 
cice en soit subordonne a certaines modalites. 

Considerant qu'il import au plus baut point que, conformement 
a la conception moderne de la guerre qui doit etre dirigee contre 
les Etats et non contre les particuliers, le droit de prise apparaisse 
uniquemeut comme un moyen de coercition pratique par un Etat 
contre un autre etat; 

Que, dans cet order d'idees, tout benefice particulier au profit 
des agents de l'Etat qui exercent le droit de prise devrait etre 
exclu et que les pertes subies par les particuliers de cbef des prises 
devraient finalement incomber a l'Etat dont ils relevent. 

La Delegation franchise a riionneur de proposer a la Quatrieme 
Commission d'emettre le voeu que les etats qui exerceront le 
droit de capture suppriment les part de prises attributes aux 
equipages des batiments capteurs et prennent les mesures neces- 
saires pour que les pertes causees par l'exercice du droit de prise 
ne restent pas entierement k la charge des particuliers dont les 
biens auront ete captures. (Ibid., p. 1148.) 



124 IMMUNITY OF PKIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

Austria-Hungary. — The Austro -Hungarian delegation 
proposed amendments to the French form : 

Animee du vif desir de voir terminer la discussion de la Qua- 
trieme Commission sur l'inviolabilite de la propriete privee 
ennemie sur mer par une amelioration, si legere f&t-elle, de l'€tat 
actuel, et estimant que le vceu propose par la Delegation frangaise 
renferme des elements propres a arriver a ces fins, mais tennant 
compte toutefois de certaines objections que ce voeu lui semble 
avoir rencontre de la part d'un nombre considerable des membres 
de cette Commission, la Delegation d'Autriche-Hongrie a l'hon- 
neur de proposer les' amendements suivants dans le texte emis 
par la Delegation de France : 

(a) mettre apres "que les" au lieu de " Etats qui exerceront 
le droit de capture " les mots : " Puissances qui maintiennent la 
faculte de faire des prises " ; 

(&) a la place de " prennent les mesures necessaires" inserer 
les mots : " s'occupent a chercher un moyen praticable " ; et 

(c) au lieu de " du droit de prises" mettre " de cette faculte." 

Resume of The Hague propositions, 1907. — The presi- 
dent of the commission having the subject of the im- 
munity of private property at sea under consideration 
at The Hague in 190T was M. de Martens, a skilled and 
experienced Russian diplomat. He endeavored to give 
a resume of the various propositions and arguments ad- 
vanced before the commission. At the meeting of July 
17, 1907, he spoke to the following effect: 

La proposition americaine a suscite beaucoup d'autres proposi- 
tions; la question a ete posee en 1899, elle a ete alors 6tudiee 
par la Premiere Conference sous benefice d'inventaire ; liuit annees 
se sont passees depuis, on a done eu le temps de se preparer sur 
la question qui semble aujourd'bui epuisee. II est incontestable, 
a raison des propositions intermediaires qui ont ete deposees, que 
l'application du principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriety privee 
sur mer ne reunit pas 1'unanimite des suffrages; ce n'est pas & 
la Commission qu'il appartient de discuter les motifs qui peuvent 
faire valoir les differents Gouvernements, mais il n'en est pas 
moins vrai qui sur cette question on rencontre des hesitations, des 
scruples et merne des craintes. Les Etats ont evidemment l'appre- 
hension d'apporter une solution dont les consequences leur sont 
inconnues; d'entrer dans les tenet>res. De nombreux auteurs ont 
ecrit sur le principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete sur mer; 
ils sont loin d'etre d'accord entre eux, meme s'ils appartien- 
nent au meme pays. Le President rapelle qu'on a cite 1'ouvrage 
qu'il a ecrit il y a qnarante ans; il etait alors le partisan con- 



RESUME OF PROPOSITION S. 125 

vaincu de l'inviolabilite, mais depuis cette longue epoque il est 
devenu plus circonspect sur cette question delicate. 

Les faits historiques qui vienneut a l'appui de la these ameri- 
caine, suggerent quelques observations. Le traite que la Prusse 
signa avec les Etats-Unis on 1785 a consacre le principe de l'invio- 
labilite, niais il faut se rapeller que ce traite fut signe par un 
Itoi philosophe et un Prince parini les philosophes, qui du reste 
n'avaient gu§re d'illusions sur la portee pratique de leur accord, 
car ils savaient tous les deux qu'une guerre entre leurs deux 
pays n'etait guere probable. On a encore cite une depeche qui 
fut addressee en 1824 a M. Mittleton, ministre des Etats-Unis & 
Petersbourg et dans laquelle le Conite Nesselrode exprimait toute 
sa synipathie pour le principe de l'inviolabilite de la propriete 
prives sur mer. 

Mais il faut prendre aussi en consideration la depeche, datant 
de la meme epoque, ou le Comte Nesselrode, ecrivant au Comte 
Pozzo di Borgo, ambassadeur de Russie it Paris, exclut l'even- 
tualite d'un engagement ferme dans une question grosse de con- 
sequences qu'on ne pourrait pas aisement calculer. En 1856, le 
Prince Gortcbakoff a egalement exprime son energique sympathie 
pour l'abolition de la capture, niais, lui aussi, a entrevu les 
difficultes qu'elle suscitait. 

Depuis 1785 jusqu'a aujourd'bui, le principe que discute la Com- 
mission n'a ete mis qu'une fois en application, pendant la guerre 
entre la Prusse, l'ltalie et rAutriche en 1866. Ces Puissances 
ont declare au monde qu'il n'y aurait pas de capture des navires 
de commerce, mais cette guerre a ete d'une si courte duree 
qu'elle ne peut etre citee comme un precedent. L'argument le plus 
concluant que Ton a mis en avant a ete la difference du regime 
qui pendant la guerre regit la propriete sur terre et la propriete 
sur mer, mais cet argument repose sur un malentendu. La Con- 
ference de 1899 a fonde, pour ainsi dire, une societe d' assurances 
mutuelles contre les abus de la force pendant la guerre sur terre; 
neanmoins si on les compare avec ceux de la guerre sur mer, ils 
sont bien plus terribles. Que le territoire soit ou ne soit pas 
occupe par l'ennemi, quoique le pillage soit aujourd'bui interdit, 
les necessites militaires que reconnaissent les articles 47, 48, etc., 
de la Convention de 1899, pesent d'un poids tr§s lourd sur le 
paysan comme sur le proprietaire, elles les infligent non seule- 
ment des souffrances morales mais des souffrances materielles 
que les conventions ne peuvent pas supprimer au moment ou la 
force prime le droit meme. Si Ton n'admet pas le principe de 
l'inviolabilite de la propriete privee sur mer, les particuliers ont 
de nombreux moyens pour ecbapper aux consequences de la 
guerre; ils peuvent notamment vendre leurs navires et les recon- 
struire a la fin des bostilites. Leur situation deviendra bien plus 
favorable si Ton supprime le droit de capture; elle sera meme 



126 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

privilegiee, puisque leurs affaires augmeuteront et se feront au 
detriment des entreprises continentales paralysers par l'invasion. 
C'est a la Commission d'examiner sous tous ses cot6s la decision 
qu'el e va prendre en se conformant aux instructions que les 
Delegues out regues de leurs Gouvernements. 

Le President termine ainsi son discours: 

Tel est, Messieurs, l'expose impartial de toute la question sur 
laquelle vous allez vous prononcer. En vous presentant cet 
expose des faits historiques et des considerations documentees, 
je n'avais nullement l'intention ni d'influencer votre vote, ni de 
me prononcer personnellement contre la prise en cosideration de 
la proposition (Annexe 10) de la Delegation des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique. Je ne veux nullement prendre parti ni pour ni 
contre la proposition americaiue. Mon devoir de President de 
cette Commission m'imposa d'eclaircir le terrain sur lequel nous 
nous trouvons et de contribuer de mes faibles forces a une com- 
plete orientation sur tous les principaux faits et arguments de- 
veloppes devant vous sur cette tres interessante et tres compli- 
quee matiere. (Ibid., p. 833-834.) 

Vote at The Hague, 1907.— The vote taken at The 
Hague in 1907 upon the question of inviolability of pri- 
vate property at sea shows in a measure the modern atti- 
tude upon the subject. The subject was very fully dis- 
cussed, the delegates were authorized by their Govern- 
ments, and the matter had been included in the pro- 
gram of the Conference. Of 33 States voting, 21 States 
voted for the inviolability, 11 against, and 1 abstained 
from voting. 

Those voting for were Germany (under reservations), 
United States, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, 
Cuba, Denmark, Ecuador, Greece, Haiti, Italy, Norway, 
Netherlands, Persia, Eoumania, Siam, Sweden, Switzer- 
land, and Turkey. 

Those voting against were Colombia, Spain, France, 
Great Britain, Japan, Mexico, Montenegro, Panama, 
Portugal, Russia, and Salvador. 

Chile abstained from voting. (Ibid., p. 834.) 

M. de Martens remarked that the vote was hardly de- 
cisive, considering the maritime predominance of some 
of the powers voting in the negative. 

Upon the Brazilian proposition elaborating the as- 
similation of the treatment of private property at sea 



HAGUE CONCLUSION S, 19 7. 127 



to the treatment of private property on land 13 votes 
were in favor and 12 opposed. 

The Belgian proposition, amended by the Netherlands, 
looking to the mitigation and definition of warfare on 
sea, was taken up by a vote of 23 in favor, 3 against 
(Great Britain, Japan, and Russia), and 2 abstentions. 
This was subsequently withdrawn from consideration. 

The consideration of the French proposition led to no 
decisive action. 

Conclusion as to The Hague discussion, 1907. — At The 
Hague in 1907 there was undoubtedly a much wider dif- 
ference of opinion than many had anticipated in regard 
to inviolability of private property at sea. 

This difference is shown in the report of M. Fromageot 
upon the subject. This report concludes: 

Si le maintien de l'etat de choses actnel paralt devoir resulter 
de ceete deliberation, il est permis de penser, comme 1'a dit 
l'eminent Premier Delegue de Belgique, S. Exc. M. Beernaert, 
qu'une entente future n'a rien impossible. (Deuxieme Conference 
Internationale de la Paix, Tome I, p. 249.) 

Thus it may be concluded that the powers of the world 
were not prepared in 1907 to accept the principle of in- 
violability of private property at sea. 

The Brazilian proposition received some support, 
however, by embodiment among the wishes of the con- 
ference of the statement of the wish " that in any case 
the powers may apply, as far as possible, to war by sea 
the principles of the convention relative to the laws and 
customs of war on land." 

From the attitude of the powers in 1907 it is evident 
that agreement upon the subject of inviolability of pri- 
vate property at sea will not be reached till other matters 
relating to maritime warfare are settled. 

Enemy ships. — If all private property at sea except 
that of the nature of contraband is to be inviolable, there 
will be a tendency to extend the list of contraband 
articles. 

It is presumed that the laws governing liability in re- 
gard to blockade and unneutral service will still be op- 
erative. 



128 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

If. however, conversion of enemy private ships into 
ships of war is to be permitted on the high sea, it will be 
necessary for a belligerent to use great care in his conduct 
toward his opponent's private vessels. A private vessel 
of one belligerent which may be met on the high sea by 
the other belligerent may claim exemption on the ground 
that it is a private vessel, which may be the fact at the 
time. Shortly afterwards the private vessel may be con- 
verted into a public war vessel. It is now not only liable 
to capture, but also liable to be destroyed or seized, and 
its personnel may be made prisoners of war. As there 
are as yet no rules regulating reconversion, such a vessel 
may after a time, perhaps when capture may be expected, 
undergo reconversion into a private vessel and be accord- 
ingly exempt as private property. 

To include vessels without exception in the exemption 
making private property at sea inviolable is to give an 
exemption after war is opened and vessels have sailed 
with a knowledge thereof, which is not given to vessels 
in a belligerent port at the outbreak of war or to vessels 
which have sailed without knowledge of the war bound 
for a belligerent port. Article V of the convention rela- 
tive to the status of enemy merchant ships at the outbreak 
of hostilities provides that — 

The present convention does not affect merchant ships whose 
build shows that they are intended for conversion into war ships. 

At the present time few ships are of such construction 
that they may not, under some circumstances, be of use 
for war even if not originally constructed for that service. 
A pleasure yacht may become useful as a scouting vessel, 
an ordinary privately owned collier may easily be con- 
verted into a public collier, etc. 

It would seem necessary that if other innocent private 
property is granted exemption, it would be on the ground 
that the innocence can be determined from the nature of 
the property itself. 

Goods of the nature of contraband can be determined 
in most cases from inspection. Whether a vessel is to be 
converted from private to public can not be determined 



by inspection, for the physical af the vessel 

may remain 1 1 j f- same in private or in public control. The 
control is the main difference, and this may be transfei 
by radiotelegraph or even on a certain date by previous 

agreement, which date may noi have arrived at the time 
when the vessel was met by the belligerent of the other 
flag. 

Prof. Westlake'g opinion — The late Prof. Westlake. of 
Cambridge, in a note to Latifrs " Effects of TT ar on Prop- 
erty." .-peaks of the commercial blockade as a war aga 
neutrals. 

Bur if only sentiment can be gratified by limiting the war 

against the enemy's commercial flag, the war against neutrals is 
to continue, with the certainty that commercial b. les, when 

they have become the sole means of paralyzing the enemy's sea 
trade, will be practically carried as far as audacity can venture 
to strain or to violate rules. 

The name in which this topsy-turvy policy is advocated is that 
of immunity at sea of private enemy property as such, and this 
is asserted to be the extension to the sea of a principle admitted 
on land. In truth, however, the immunity of private enemy 
property is not admitted anywhere as absolute. It is only ad- 
mitted so far as it does not interfere with any operations deemed 
to be useful for putting pressure on the enemy or foi defense 
against him. 1'Latifi. Effects of War on Property, p. 147.) 

After a considerable discussion Prof. Westlake says : 

Lastly, if it can not be maintained, either legally or as a ques- 
tion of political fact, that individual subjects or citizens are for- 
eign to the wars of their State, there remains the plea urged on 
the ground of humanity — that they ought to be exempted as far 
as possible from the consequences of their solidarity. But they 
have to bear those consequences in land war. and in naval war 
the risk and loss are far more easily met and spread over the 
community by insurance and by the increased price of the cargoes 
which escape the risk. 

The conclusion is: 

(1) That there is no principle, consistent with the existence 
and nature of war, on which a belligerent can be required to ab- 
stain from trying to suppress his enemy's commerce under his 
flag. 

(2) That between trying by commercial blockades to suppress 
the enemy's commerce under the neutral flag and allowing it to 
pass free under his own flag there is a glaring inconsistency. 

19148 — 14 9 



130 IMMUNITY OF PRIVATE PROPERTY AT SEA. 

(3) And that the subject is therefore open to be dealt with on 
the ground of the probable effects of any change in the law. 
(Ibid, p. 151.) 

Resume. — The wide consideration that has been given 
to the subject of immunity of private enemy property at 
sea shows that there are differences of opinion among 
different states and even within single states. These dif- 
ferences are supported by arguments which are worthy 
of careful consideration. It is not proved to the satisfac- 
tion of many that the exemption of private enemy prop- 
erty will shorten or even make war more humane. Some 
maintain with strong arguments that the reverse would 
be the result. It is certain that not all private enemy 
property could consistently with the ends of war be 
exempt from capture. It is probable that in some wars 
the list of free goods could be extended more than in other 
wars. 

The United States has uniformly striven for the prin- 
ciple of exemption of private property at sea in time of 
war. The other states of the world have not been willing 
to adopt this principle. The United States has there- 
fore been obliged to shape its policy in recent years ac- 
cordingly and to accept the fact that other nations were 
not prepared to agree to exemption of private property 
at sea. 

There are many who maintain that in war, under pres- 
ent conditions of fleets, the capture of private property 
could not be resorted to as a means of injuring the enemy, 
as it would be more to the disadvantage of the captor 
than to the belligerent from whom capture is made. 

It is certain that the capture of private enemy property 
at sea as an object of war has become of much less im- 
portance than formerly, and the United States may re- 
gard the question as much less vital than before the 
twentieth century. Certain private property at sea could 
certainly be seized under restrictions similar to those 
governing seizure on land even if the doctrine of invio- 
lability was approved. This, in fact, would result in 
treatment which would be about all that could be de- 
manded if war upon the sea is to exist. There would 



CONCLUSION. 131 

therefore arise, in case of the adoption of the principle 
of inviolability, a doctrine in regard to exception of cer- 
tain classes of property from the inviolability. On the 
other hand, the same result is gradually being brought 
about by the agreement not to interfere with or not to 
capture certain classes of vessels or property in time of 
war on the sea. Perhaps the gradual enlargement of the 
list of exemptions may be more easy to obtain and more 
in accord with rational procedure than a sweeping prohi- 
bition which would be accompanied with a large list of 
exceptions of classes of property which would be liable 
to capture. The United States can consistently indorse 
either method of harmonizing maritime warfare with the 
principles of humanity, for one method of procedure 
may reach the goal sought as quickly as the other, and 
the gradual development of a list of property free from 
capture may be practicable with the minimum of friction 
and difficulty. 

Conclusion. — The United States may with propriety 
abandon the contention for the general exemption of 
enemy private property at sea and seek agreement upon 
a certain list of exemptions which meet the approval of 
the states of the world and which may from time to time 
be expended as the sentiment for exemption becomes more 
general. 



Topic VI. 

MEANS OF INJURING THE ENEMY. 

Having regard to The Hague conventions, what limits 
should be imposed upon the means of injuring an enemy, 
including the use of mines ? 

CONCLUSION. 

Having regard to the regulations adopted at The 
Hague and to regulations which have seemed to meet 
wide approval, the following regulations in regard to 
means of injuring the enemy in maritime war may be 
suggested : 

Means of injuring the enemy — 

1. " The right of belligerents to the choice of means 
of injuring the enemy is not unlimited." 

2. It is forbidden — 

(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons or pro- 
jectiles whose sole object is the diffusion of asphyxiating 
or deleterious gases. 

(b) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a na- 
ture to cause unnecessary suffering. 

3. Torpedoes and mines — 

(a) It is forbidden to use torpedoes which do not 
become harmless when they have completed their run. 

(b) It is forbidden to lay mines in the high seas except 
within the immediate area of belligerent operations. 

(c) It is forbidden in the high seas and in marginal 
waters of the belligerent (1) to lay unanchored auto- 
matic contact mines, except when they are so constructed 
as to become harmless one hour at most after those who 
laid them have lost control of them; (2) to lay anchored 
automatic contact mines which do not become harmless 
as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings. 

(d) A belligerent is forbidden to lay mines off the 
the coast or before the ports of the enemy except for 
strictly military or naval purposes. 

It is forbidden to lay mines in order to establish or to 
maintain a commercial blockade. 
132 



RESTRICTIONS ON INSTRUMENTS OF WAR. 133 

(e) When mines are employed every possible precau- 
tion must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. 

The belligerents undertake to provide as far as pos- 
sible that these mines shall become harmless within a 
limited time, and, should they cease to be under sur- 
veillance, to notify the danger zones as soon as military 
exigencies permit by a notice to mariners, which must 
also be communicated to the Governments through the 
diplomatic channel. 

(/) At the close of the war the belligerent states un- 
dertake to do their utmost to remove the mines which 
they have laid, each state removing its own mines. 

As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by 
one of the belligerents off the coast of the other, their 
position must be notified to the other party by the state 
which laid them, and each state must proceed with the 
least possible delay to remove the mines in its own 
waters. 

The belligerent states upon which the obligation to 
remove the mines falls after the end of the war should 
as soon as possible give notice that the mines have so far 
as possible been removed. 

NOTES. 

Restrictions on instruments of warfare. — From early 
days it has been customary for writers and others, from 
time to time, to propose restriction upon the instruments 
of warfare, particularly upon the introduction of new 
instruments. There was opposition to the introduction 
of the musket in the sixteenth century, and four centu- 
ries earlier objection had been raised to projectiles in 
general. In 1759, even, Admiral Connans is reported 
to have ordered his captains not to use shells. 

The rules for war on land developed earlier than those 
for war on the sea. These rules did not develop early, 
however. The perfecting of a bullet which exploded on 
contact with a hard substance, in Russia, in 1863, and 
later of one which would explode on contact with a soft 
substance led in 1868 to the formation of the Declara- 
tion of St. Petersburg. The declaration was the first 
formal international agreement restricting the means of 
war. The actual restriction of the use of a specified 
form of projectile is not now of an importance at all 



134 MEANS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

commensurate with the enunciation of principles of gen- 
eral conduct which are set forth in the declaration : 

On the proposition of the imperial cabinet of Russia an inter- 
national military commission having assembled at St. Petersburg 
in order to examine into the expediency of forbidding the use of 
certain projectiles in time of war between civilized nations, and 
that commission having by common agreement fixed the tech- 
nical limits at which the necessities of war ought to yield to the 
requirements of humanity, the undersigned are authorized by 
the orders of their Governments to declare as follows: 

Considering that the progress of civilization should have the 
effect of alleviating as much as possible the calamities of war; 

That the only legitimate object which states should endeavor 
to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy ; 

That for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest 
possible number of men; 

That this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms 
which uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men or ren- 
der their death inevitable; 

That the employment of such arms would, therefore, be contrary 
to the laws of humanity ; 

The contracting parties engage mutually to renounce, in case 
of war among themselves, the employment by their military or 
naval troops of any projectile of a weight below 400 grams which 
is either explosive or charged with fulminating or inflammable 
substances. 

The states parties to this declaration also gave evidence 
that they might endeavor by later concerted action- " to 
maintain the principles which they have established'" 
and endeavor " to conciliate the necessities of war with 
the laws of humanity." 

An attempt to establish rules in regard to the treatment 
of prisoners of war and other matters in 1874 did not 
meet with general approval. The Geneva convention of 
1864, in regard to the treatment of the wounded of 
armies in the field, was, however, generally accepted. 
During the wars of 1866 and of 1870 in Europe various 
statements were made that one or another party was con- 
ducting the war without regard to recognition of the 
principles of civilized warfare, but as there was no agree- 
ment as to what these principles were, it was impossible 
to establish or controvert the statements. There was a 



RESTRICTIONS AT HAGUE, 1899. 135 

general acknowledgment that the principles of the Ge- 
neva convention and of the declaration of St. Petersburg 
should be observed. 

Gradually there was formulated in different states 
codes of laws for use in time of war, similar in some 
respects to Lieber's Code of 1863 in the United States. 
Attempts to formulate such codes by international agree- 
ment followed the establishment of the Institute of Inter- 
national Law in 1873. The Brussels Manual of 1874 and 
the Oxford Manual of 1880 are examples of such codi- 
fication. 

Godfre} 7 Lushington's Manual of Naval Prize Law, 
prepared for the British navy in 1866, furnished a basis 
for subsequent codification. The Manual was revised and 
amplified by Prof. Holland in 1888 and has subsequently 
been revised. 

Such codifications showed that definite statements in 
regard to the conduct of hostilities might be formulated. 
The demand for formulation aifd definition of rights of 
belligerents and of neutrals became more imperative. 

Restrictions and First Hague Conference, 1899. — Be- 
sides the proposal to limitation of armaments, the Czar's 
circular of January 11, 1899, suggested the interdiction 
of new firearms, new explosives, as well as powder more 
powerful than then in use, the limitation of certain for- 
midable explosives, and of the discharge of projectiles 
from air craft, the prohibition of submarine mines and 
boats, and the prohibition of the use of rams. The sub- 
jects were considered at the Conference of 1899. 

The Hague convention of 1899, concerning the laws 
and customs of war on land, provided : 

Aet. 22. The right of the belligerents to adopt means of injuring 
the enemy is not unlimited. 

This same article was reaffirmed in the conference of 
1907. 

Both Conferences also declared it prohibited "Art. 23 
(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature 
to cause superfluous injury." While these restrictions 
were drawn primarily to apply to war on land, yet it has 



136 MEANS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

been maintained that the principles apply to maritime 
warfare. 

The contracting states agreed at the Conference of 1899 
" to prohibit for a term of five years the discharge of pro- 
jectiles and explosives from balloons or by other new 
methods of a similar nature." This agreement expired 
while the Russo-Japanese war was in progress, but 
neither power took advantage of this fact. The declara- 
tion was renewed at the conference of 1907, to continue 
for a period extending to the close of the Third Peace 
Conference. 

The improvement in systems of aerial navigation are so 
great that it is doubtful whether this declaration will be 
renewed. The declaration was conceived as one which 
would mitigate the horrors of war, in the same spirit as 
the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868. If projectiles 
",an be discharged from balloons with no risk beyond the 
ordinary war risk, it is maintained that there is no reason 
for the prohibition of such discharge. That projectiles 
should not be launched from balloons against undefended 
or unfortified places would accord with the present laws 
of war and would prevail even if there were no conven- 
tion in regard to balloons. 

The proposition that aerial warfare be prohibited al- 
together, as being a first practical step toward the limita- 
tion of armaments, was not sufficiently supported to se- 
cure adoption in 1907, and since that time much effort has 
been devoted to the improvement of air craft. Few large 
states have ratified the declaration prohibiting the dis- 
charge of projectiles and explosives from balloons. 
Among the states that have ratified the declaration are 
the United States, Great Britain, and France. Like the 
other conventions, this declaration is not binding except 
among contracting states. Italy made use of air craft in 
the war with Turkey in Tripoli. Most of the large states 
have constituted aerial corps in connection with their 
other forces. 

The Hague Conference of 1899 agreed upon a declara- 
tion prohibiting the use of projectiles, the sole object of 



ASFHYXIATING AM) DELETERIOUS CASKS. 137 

which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious 
gases. 

The declaration has not been signed by the United 
States, though it has been signed by the other States rep- 
resented at the First Hague Conference. The American 
delegation at the First Hague Conference, 1899, opposed 
this declaration, and Capt. (Admiral) Mahan states these 
reasons : 

These reasons were, briefly : 1. That no shell emitting such 
gases is as yet in practical use or has undergone adequate experi- 
ment ; consequently, a vote taken now would be taken in ignorance 
of the facts as to whether the results would be of a decisive char- 
acter or whether injury in excess of that necessary to attain the 
end of warfare — the immediate disabling of the enemy — would 
be inflicted. 2. That the reproach of cruelty and perfidy, ad- 
dressed against these supposed shells, was equally uttered for- 
merly against firearms and torpedoes, both of which are now em- 
ployed without scruple. Until we knew the effects of such 
asphyxiating shells, there was no saying whether they would be 
more or less merciful than missiles now permitted. 3. That it 
was illogical, and not demonstrably humane, to be tender about 
asphyxiating men with gas, when all were prepared to admit that 
it was allowable to blow the bottom out of an ironclad at midnight, 
throwing four or five hundred into the sea, to be choked by water, 
with scarcely the remotest chance of escape. If, and when, a shell 
emitting asphyxiating gases alone has been successfully produced, 
then, and not before, men will be able to vote intelligently on the 
subject. (Holls' Peace Conference, p. 494.) 

To these reasons of Admiral Mahan might be added the 
fact that even when projectiles may discharge gases which 
may be deleterious or asphyxiating, it is very difficult to 
prove that this is the " sole object " of the discharge. The 
lyddite shells which have been used diffuse asphyxiating 
gases, but that is not the sole object in the use of this high 
explosive, and its use is not regarded as contrary to law. 
The same has been said in regard to melinite and roburite. 

Another restrictive declaration of the First Hague 
Conference, 1899, related to bullets with a hard envelope. 
In this declaration " the contracting parties agree to ab- 
stain from the use of bullets which expand or flatten 
easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard en- 



138 MEANS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

velope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced 
with incisions." 

This declaration, also, the United States has not signed, 
though the other 25 States represented at the Conference 
have signed. The United States opposed the form rather 
than the purpose of the declaration. 

Torpedoes. — Torpedoes were objected to in early days 
of their use as contrary to the principles of humane 
warfare. It was claimed that these constituted a hid- 
den danger, to which an enemy should not be exposed. 
The subject of regulation of the use of torpedoes has 
been generally considered with that of the use of sub- 
marine mines with which in many respects, except that 
of movement in a certain direction, they are similar. 
The discussion of the principles relating to torpedoes 
may, therefore, be coupled with that of mines. 

Mines. — The Naval War College in 1905, International 
Law Topics, Topic VIII, pages 147 to 153, gave atten- 
tion to the general subject of use of mines, and Inter- 
national Law Situations of 1908, Situation V. pages 98 
to 113, gave considerable attention to the use of mines 
for blockading purposes. The discussion of the confer- 
ence in 1908 seemed to lead to the conclusion that mines 
should not be used for the maintenance of a strictly com- 
mercial blockade. 

Report to Hague Conference, 1907. — The reporter of 
the committee having in charge the question of formula- 
tion of regulations for the use of mines at The Hague 
in 1907 said, in regard to submarine mines: 

Les prineipes unaniniement accepted pen vent etre resumes 
com me suit : 

(1) II y a ime distinction fondamentale a faire entre les mines 
autpmatiques de contact amarrees et les mines non-amarrees; 
ces dernieres pen vent etre employees partout. mais el les doivent 
f-tr'e construites de fa con a devenir inoffensives dans mi laps de 
temps extremement limite; il doit en etre de meme des torpilles, 
qui ont manque leur but. 

(2) Quant aux mines amarrees. une limitation est necessaire 
dans l'espace, c'est-a-dire concernant les lienx on il sera loisible 
de les placer. Mais, 

(3) Comme cette limitation ne pent pas one absolue et comme. 
dans tons les cas, elle n'exclnt pas la possibility de placer des 



SUBMARINE MINES. 139 

mines ainarr§es la ou la navigation pacifique doit pouvoir compter 
sur une libre circulation, il faut, ici encore, avoir recours & une 
limitation dans le temps, c'est-a-dire a une limitation du temps, 
pendant lequel la mine est dangereuse, ce qui serait possible, 
gr&ce aux inventions techniques modernes. On a egalement pu 
decider unanimement : 

Que toute mine amarrges doit etre construite de fagon & deve- 
nir inoffensive dans le cas ou, rompant ses amarres, elle irait 
flottter librement. 

Par cette heureuse combinaison des limitations apportees quant 
a l'espace, avec les conditions techniques, que nous venons de 
mentionner, un progres tres sensible a ete effectue" sur l'§tat 
actuel des choses. A plusieurs reprises on fit notamment ressortir 
le grand progr&s que constituerait, vis-a-vis de la situation actu- 
elle, l'obligation d'employer des mines amarrees, qui deviennent 
inoffensives aussitot qu'elles auraient rompu leurs amarres. 

(4) Ces dispositions sont encore completers par des regies, 
egalement votees & l'unanimite et etablissant l'obligation des 
Etats, qui emploieraient des mines amarrees, non seulement de 
prendre toutes les mesures de precautions possibles, notamment 
en signalant les regions dangereuses (article 6) mais aussi d' en- 
lever, h, la fin de la guerre, les mines amarre'es qu'on aurait 
placees et, en tout cas, de pourvoir, dans la mesure du possible, a 
ce que les mines employees deviennent inoffensives apres un laps 
de temps limite, afin qu'elles ne restent pas dangereuses long- 
temps apr&s la fin de la guerre. 

(5) Enfin, des dispositions transitoires, engageant a appliquer 
ces regies de plus tot possible et donnant. en m§me temps les 
delais necessaires pour la transformation du materiel existant, 
ainsi que le voau de voir reprendre la question, avant l'expiration 
du terme, forcement assez court, pour lequel la convention pour- 
rait etre conclue ont pu rallier l'assentiment general des Etats 
representes au Comite d'Examen. (Deuxieme Conference de la 
Paix, Tome III. p. 376.) 

There was a marked difference of opinion in regard to 
the use of submarine mines, some States favoring an ex- 
treme limitation, others a wide freedom. 

Germany. — The German delegation at The Hague. Con- 
ference in 1907 opposed the British idea of limitation as 
being too strict. Marschall de Bieberstein said : 

La Delegation allemande s'est vue dans le necessite de 
s'opposer a une grande partie des dispositions visant a restreindre 
l'emploi des mines. Je tiens a expliquer en peu de mots la port&e 
de nos reserves et notamment & defendre notre attitude contre 
cette interpretation qu'a l'exception des restrictions que nous 
acceptous, nous demandons une liberty illimitee pour l'emploi de 



140 MEANS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

ces engins. Nous n'avons pas l'intention, pour me servir d'une 
expression de M. le Delegue de Graude-Bretagne " de semer a. 
profusion des mines dans toutes les niers." 

Ce n'est pas le cas. Nous ne sommes pas d'avis que tout ce 
qui n'est pas expressement prohibe, est permis. 

Un belligerant qui pose des mines, assume une responsabilite 
tres lourde envers les neutres et la navigation pacifique. Sur ce 
point nous sommes tous d'accord. Personne n'aura recours a ce 
moyen sans des raisons militaires absolument urgentes. Or, les 
actes militaires ne sont pas regis uniquement par les stipulations 
du droit international. II y a d'autres facteurs : la conscience, le 
bon sens et le sentiment des devoirs imposes par les principes de 
l'humanite seront les guides les plus surs pour la conduite des 
marins et constitueront la garantie la plus efflcace contre des 
abus. Les officiers de la marine allemande. je le dis & vois haute, 
rempliront toujours, de la maniere la plus stricte, les devoirs qui 
decoulent de la loi non-ecrite de l'humanite et de la civilisation. 

Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire que je reconnais enti§rement 
l'importance de la codification des regies a suivre dans la guerre. 
Mais il faut bien se garder d'edicter des regies dont la stricte 
observation pourrait etre rendue impossible par la force des 
choses. II est de premiere importance que le droit international 
maritime que nous voulons creer ne contienne que des clauses 
dont l'execution est militairement possible, meme dans des cir- 
constances exceptionnelles. Autrement le respect du droit serait 
amoindri et son autorite serait ebranlee. Aussi nous parait-il 
preferable de garder k present une certaine reserve en attendant 
que dans cinq ans on soit mieux en mesure de trouver une solu- 
tion qui soit acceptable pour tout le monde. 

Mais pour donner la preuve serieuse que la Delegation alle- 
mande contribnera volontiers a toutes les inesures acceptables qui 
peuvent rassurer 1'opinion publique, elle se declare prete a inter- 
dire pour cinq ans, c'est-a-dire pour la duree de cette convention, 
tout emploi de mines non-amarrees. Elle propose done de rem- 
placer l'alinea 1 du premier article par les mots: "II est interdit 
pour une duree de cinq ans de placer des mines automatiques de 
contact non-amarrees. (Ibid., p. 382.) 

Discussion at The Hague, 1907. — The discussion at The 
Hague in 1907 and the votes showed a wide divergence 
of opinion upon the subject of regulating the use of 
mines. China pointed out that many ships, with their 
crews, had been lost in waters about China by reason of 
mines which had been placed during the Russo-Japanese 
War and that unanchored mines formed a dangerous 
menace to peaceful shipping. 



DISCUSSION ON MINES. 141 

The report of the committee said: 

D'un autre cote, Ton devait se rendre compte du fait incontes- 
table, que les mines sous-marines constituent un moyen en guerre, 
dont on ne saurait ni esperer ni peut-etre desirer, dans l'inter§t 
meme de la paix, la prohibition absolue : moyen surtout de defense, 
peu couteux et tres efficace, extremement utile pour proteger des 
cOtes etendues et propre a epargner des depenses considerables 
qu'exige 1'entretien de grandes marines de guerre. Certes, la 
defense ideale des cotes, la defense qui ne peut jamais produire 
de dommage aux navires pacifiques, est celle que Ton obtient par 
des mines fixes qui eclatent au moyen de l'electricite. Mais 
l'emploi de pareilles mines est necessairement limitee & la vicinite 
de la terre, et la encore il n'est pas toujours possible ni suffisant, 
C'est dire que les mines automatiques de contact sont une arme 
indispensable . Or, viser a une prohibition absolue de cette arme, 
serait par consequent demander l'impossible ; il faut se borner & 
en reglementer Temploi. (Ibid., p. 398.) 

Hague convention, 1907. — At the Second Hague Con- 
ference a convention was adopted relative to the laying 
of automatic contact submarine mines. The essential 
regulations of this convention are as follows : 

Article I. It is forbidden : 

1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, except when 
they are so constructed as to become harmless 1 hour at most after 
those who laid them have lost control of them ; 

2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not be- 
come harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their 
moorings ; 

3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they 
have missed their mark. 

Art. 2. It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off the 
coast and ports of the enemy, with the sole object of intercepting 
commercial shipping. 

Art. 3. When anchored automatic contact mines are employed, 
every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peace- 
ful shipping. 

The belligerents undertake to provide, as far as possible, that 
these mines shall become harmless within a limited time, and, 
should they cease to be under surveillance, to notify the danger 
zones as soon as military exigencies permit by a notice to mari- 
ners, which must also be communicated to the Governments 
through the diplomatic channel. 

Art. 4. Any neutral power which lays automatic contact mines 
off its coasts must observe the same rules and take the same pre- 
cautions as are imposed on belligerents. 



142 MEANS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

The neutral power must inform mariners by a notice issued in 
advance, where automatic contact mines will be laid. This notice 
must be communicated at once to the Governments through the 
diplomatic channel. 

Art. 5. At the close of the war the contracting powers under- 
take to do their utmost to remove the mines which they have laid, 
each power removing its own mines. 

As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by one of the 
belligerents off the coast of the other, their position must be noti- 
fied to the other party by the power which laid them and each 
power must proceed with the least possible delay to remove the 
mines in its own waters. 

Art. 6. The contracting powers which do not at present own 
perfected mines of the type contemplated in the present con- 
vention and which, consequently, could not at present carry out 
the rules laid down in articles 1 and 3, undertake to convert the 
materiel of their mines as soon as possible, so as to bring it into 
conformity with the foregoing requirements. 

The report of the commission of The Hague Conference 
which had the matter of submarine mines under consid- 
eration admitted that it had not reached more than a 
tentative and conditional conclusion. 

The position of the Naval War College on the use of 
mines, as set forth in the International Law Topics of 
1905, pages 147 to 153, was presented to The Hague 
Conference (Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, Tome III, 
p. 384-387). This position was stated in the War Col- 
lege conclusion in 1905 as follows : 

1. Unanchored contact mines are prohibited, except those that 
by construction are rendered innocuous after a limited time, cer- 
tainly before passing outside the area of immediate belligerent 
activities. 

2. Anchored contact mines that do not become innocuous on 
getting adrift are prohibited. 

3. If anchored contact mines be used within belligerent juris- 
diction or within the area of immediate belligerent activities, due 
precaution shall be taken for the safety of neutrals. (Interna- 
tional Law Topics, 1905, p. 147.) 

Limitations of convention relative to submarine 
mines. — It should be pointed out that the convention ne- 
gotiated at The Hague in 1907 places practically no re- 
striction upon the use of mines by states which have not 
mines of late models which conform to the requirements 
of the convention. Under such circumstances it is dim- 



INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON MINES. 143 

cult to prohibit the use of any kind of a mine by a state 
because no inventory of mines possessed by different 
states has been made. 

The restriction purporting to prohibit commercial 
blockade by mines can be easily evaded by alleging other 
reasons, which might in most cases exist. 

Besides, several of the great powers have made reserva- 
tions in regard to this convention which limit its opera- 
tion. 

There is no regulation in regard to the laying of mines 
in straits. Straits are supposed to be open to innocent 
passage of neutral ships. If the area of jurisdiction of 
marginal sea is increased the jurisdiction over wider areas 
in the nature of straits is granted and a possibility of 
more extended use of mines arises. 

Institute of International Law, 1910-13. — The Institute 
of International Law considered the question of regula- 
tion of the use of mines at the session at Paris in 1910 
and at Madrid in 1911. The vote of the Institute finally 
enunciated the following articles as suitable for the regu- 
lation of the use of mines : 

A. ARTICLES VOTES A PARIS. 

Article 1. II est interdit de placer en pleiu mer des mines auto- 
inatiques de contact, amarrees ou non, la question des mines a 
commande electrique etant reservee. 

Art. 2. Les belli gerants peuvent placer des mines dans leurs 
eaux territoriales et dans celles de l'ennemi. 

Mais il leur est interdit, ragme dans ces eaux territoriales : 

1°. De placer des mines automatiques de contact non amarrees, 
a moins qu'elles ne soient construites de maniere a devenir inof- 
fensives, une heure au maximum apres que celui qui les a placees 
en aura perdue le controle. 

2°. De placer des mines de contact amarrees qui ne deviennent 
pas inoffensives des qu'elles auront rompu leurs amarres. 

Art. 3. II est interdit de faire usage, aussi bien dans les eaux 
territoriales qu'en pleine mer, de torpilles qui ne deviennent pas 
inoffensives lorsqu'elles auront manque leur but. 

Art. 4. Unbelligeraut ne peut placer des mines devant les cotes 
et les ports de son adversaire que pour des buts navals et mili- 
taires. II lui est interdit de les y placer pour etablir ou maintenir 
un blocus de commerce. 



144 MEANS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

Abt. 5. Lorsque les mines autornatiques de contact, amarrees on 
non amarrees, sont employees, toutes les precautions doivent etre 
prises pour la securite de la navigation pacifique. 

Les belligerants pourvoiront notamment a ce que les mines de- 
viennent inoffensives apres un laps de temps limite. 

Dans le cas oil les mines cesseraient d'etre surveillees par eux, 
les belligerants signaleront les regions dangereuses, aussitot que 
les exigences militaires le permettront, par un avis a la navigation 
qui devra etre aussi communique aux Gouvernements par la voie 
diplomatique. 

B. ARTICLES VOTES A LA SESSION DE MADRID DE 1911. 

Art. 6. L'Etat neutre peut placer des mines dans ses eaux terri- 
toriales pour la defense de sa neutrality. II doit, en ces cas, 
observer les memes regies et preudre les memes precautions que 
celles qui sont imposees aux belligerants. 

L'Etat neutre doit faire connaitre a la navigation par un avis 
prealable les regions ou. seront placees les mines automatiques de 
contact. Cet avis devra etre communique d'urgence aux Gouverne- 
ments par la voie diplomatique. 

Art. 7. La question du placement de mines dans les detroits est 
reservee, tant en ce qui concerne les neutres que les belligerants. 

Art. 8. A la fin de la guerre, les Etats belligerants et neutres 
feront tout ce qui depend d'eux pour enlever, cbacun de son cOte, 
les mines qu'ils auront placees. 

Quant aux mines automatiques de contact amarrees que l'un 
des belligerants aurait laissees sur les cotes de l'autre, l'emplace- 
ment en sera notifie a l'autre partie par l'Etat qui les aura posees, 
et chaque Etat devra proceder, dans le plus bref delai. a l'enleve- 
ment des mines qui se trouvent dans ses eaux. 

Les Etats belligerants et neutres auxquels incombe r obligation 
d'enlever les mines apres la fin de la lutte devront faire connaitre 
la date a laquelle l'enlevement de ces mines sera termine. 

Art. 9. La violation d'une des regies qui precedent entraine la 
responsabilite de l'Etat fautif. 

L'Etat qui a pose la mine est jusqu'a preuve contraire presume 
fautif. 

Cette responsabilite pourra etre mise en jeu, meme par des 
particuliers, devant le tribunal international competent. (An- 
nuaire de Droit International, vol. 24, pp. 301, 302.) 

The Institute of International Law also considered the 
question of regulation of the use of mines in the session 
of 1913. A project had been laid before the Institute 
in 1912 in practically the same form as the rules voted 
in 1911. In 1913 question was particularly raised in 



DISCUSSION OF INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. 145 

regard to the text which appeared as article 8 in 1911 and 
as article 27 of the manual proposed in 1913. 

The discussion of this article led to an amendment. 
The report says : 

L'alinea final disait : " Les Etats belligerants auxquels incombe 
l'obligation d'enlever les mines apres la fin de la lutte devront faire 
connaitre la date a laquelle l'enlevement de ces mines sera termine." 
Les derniers mots de cette disposition etaient ampbibologiques. 
Quelle est exactement la notification prescrite par l'alinea? Les 
Etats sont-ils tenus d'annoncer a l'avance que l'enlevement des 
mines sera termine d'ici tel ou tel delai ; ou leur suffit-il, une fois 
que cet enlevement a ete termine, de faire connaitre qu'il en est 
ainsi? M. Hagerup a done demande que le texte soit corrige de 
maniere qu'il ne puisse plus prefer a discussion. La Commission 
s'est rangee a\ l'opinion de M. Hagerup, malgre les reserves que M. 
Edouard EoMn Jaequemyns a cru devoir faire sur la competence 
de la Commission pour faire subir un cbangement a une resolution 
aussi recemment votee par l'lnstitut : elle a estime qu'il s'agissait 
ici d'un eclaircissement et non d'une modification. 

Quel sens convenait-il de donner au texte de l'article 27? Deux 
propositions ont ete, a cet egard, soumises a la Commission. 
L'une, presentee par MM. Holland et Kaufmann, imposait aux 
puissances une double notification : notification pour faire con- 
naitre le commencement et le delai approximatif de l'enlevement 
des mines, notification pour annoncer que l'enlevement est effec- 
tivement termine. L'autre, libellee par M. Hagerup, n'exigeait des 
Puissances qu'une seule notification, une fois que l'enlevement des 
mines est termine. C'est cette derniere proposition que la Commis- 
sion a adoptee. II lui a paru que la notification d'un delai approxi- 
matif pour l'enlevement des mines serait plus dangereuse qu'utile : 
l'Etat qui fait connaitre son intention de proceder a l'enlevement 
des mines dans un certain delai ne peut, en effet, jamais savoir, h 
raison des difficultes innerentes a cet enlevement, si effectivement 
il aura lieu au terme indique : en attendant, et malgre 1 la notifica- 
tion, la navigation demeurera done perilleuse. II serait bon, 
cependant, que les Etats ne fassent pas trop longtemps attendre 
l'enlevement des mines: pour bien marquer cette idee, MM. Paul 
Fauchille et Hagerup avaient propose de dire que " les Etats 
auxquels incombe l'obligation d'enlever les mines apr§s la fin 
de la lutte devront faire connaitre la date a laquelle l'enlevement 
des mines est terming " ; en imposant l'indication de la date, on 
saura si la- notification a suivi immediatement l'enlevement des 
mines et s'il a ete procede h celui-ci assez t6t apr§s la fin de la 
lutte. Mais M. Edouard Rolin Jaequemyns a fait observer que 
les mots " la date " se referaient plutot au futur qu'au passe". 
La Commission a, des lors, decide d'inscrire simplement que la 
19148—14 10 



146 MEANS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

notification sera faite " dans le plus bref delai possible" et qu'elle 
indiquera que 1'enleVenient des mines aura §te termine " dans la 
mesure du possible." La redaction de l'alinea votee par la Com- 
mission a, en consequence, ete la suivante : " Les Etats belligerants 
auxquels incombe l'obligation d'enlever les mines apres la fin de la 
lutte devront, dans le plus bref delai possible, faire connaitre que 
l'enlevement de ces mines a ete termine dans la mesure du 
possible. 

In 1911 the regulation of the use of mines controlled 
by electricity was reserved. In 1913 mines of this class 
were not mentioned. 

Resume. — The discussions at the Naval War College in 
previous years and printed in the International Law Situ- 
ations, 1905, pages 147 to 153, and 1908, pages 98 to 113, 
furnish a general view of the subject. The discussions 
at The Hague show the views of various states and the 
conclusions of the Conference of 1907. The propositions 
before the Institute of International Law and the discus- 
sions upon these show the progress of opinion, which 
seems to be toward greater restrictions. The movement 
in this direction seems also to be sanctioned by the rep- 
resentations made by governments from time to time. 

The general attitude seems to be that, while war mast 
be pursued vigorously, the effects should be such as con- 
duce to the military end and that the conduct of war 
should be, with all regard for life and property, consist- 
ent with military necessity. Certain rules have been gen- 
erally approved ; others are in the process of development. 

Conclusion. — Having regard to the regulations adopted 
at The Hague and to regulations which have seemed to 
meet wide approval, the following regulations in regard 
to means of injuring the enemy in maritime war may be 
suggested : 

Means of injuring the enemy : 

1. " The right of belligerents to the choice of means of 
injuring the enemy is not unlimited." 

2. It is forbidden — 

(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons or projec- 
tiles whose sole object is the diffusion of asphyxiating or 
deleterious gases. 



CONCLUSION. 147 

(b) To employ arms, projectiles, or material of a na- 
ture to cause unnecessary suffering. 
3. Torpedoes and mines : 

(a) It is forbidden to use torpedoes which do not be- 
come harmless when they have completed their run. 

(b) It is forbidden to lay mines in the high seas except 
within the immediate area of belligerent operations. 

(c) It is forbidden in the high seas and in marginal 
waters of the belligerent ( 1 ) to lay unanchored automatic 
contact mines except when they are so constructed as to 
become harmless one hour at most after those who laid 
them have lost control of them; (2) to lay anchored au- 
tomatic contact mines which do not become harmless as 
soon as they have broken loose from their moorings. 

(d) A belligerent is forbidden to lay mines off the 
coast or before the ports of the enemy except for strictly 
military or naval purposes. 

It is forbidden to lay mines in order to establish or to 
maintain a commercial blockade. 

(e) When mines are employed every possible precau- 
tion must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping. 

The belligerents undertake to provide as far as possible 
that these mines shall become harmless within a limited 
time, and, should they cease to be under surveillance, to 
notify the danger zones as soon as military exigencies 
permit by a notice to mariners, which must also be com- 
municated to the governments through the diplomatic 
channel. 

(/) At the close of the war the belligerent states under- 
take to do their utmost to remove the mines which they 
have laid, each state removing its own mines. 

As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by 
one of the belligerents off the coast of the other, their po- 
sition must be notified to the other party by the state 
which laid them, and each state must proceed with the 
least possible delay to remove the mines in its own waters. 

The belligerent states upon which the obligation to 
remove the mines falls after the end of the war should 
as soon as possible give notice that the mines have so 
far as possible been removed. 



Topic VII. 

CONVERSION OF PRIVATE VESSELS INTO PUBLIC VESSELS. 

How should the conversion of private vessels into ships 
of war and reconversion be limited? 

CONCLUSION. 

Article 1. A private ship converted into a ship of war 
can not have the rights and duties accruing to such ves- 
sels unless it is placed under the direct authority, imme- 
diate control, and responsibility of the power whose flag 
it flies. 

Art. 2. Private ships converted into ships of war must 
bear the external marks which distinguish the ships of 
war of their nationality. 

Art. 3. The commander must be in the service of the 
State and duly commissioned by the competent authori- 
ties. His name must figure on the list of the officers of 
the fighting fleet. 

. Art. 4. The crew must be subject to military disci- 
pline. 

Art. 5. Every private ship converted into a ship of war 
must observe in its operations the laws and customs of 
war. 

Art. 6. A belligerent who converts a private ship into 
a ship of war must, as soon as possible, announce such 
conversion in the list of ships of war. (Hague Conven- 
tion relative to the Conversion of Private Vessels into 
Public Vessels.) 

Art. 7. Conversion of a private ship into a ship of 
war is not to take place except in the waters of its own 
State or of an ally or in the waters occupied by one of 
these. 

Art. 8. A vessel converted into a ship of war retains 
this character to the end of the war. 

Art. 9. These provisions do not apply except between 
contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents 
are parties. 

notes. 

Conversion from private to public vessels in time of 
war. — The presentation of this subject as Situation VI of 
148 



WAR COLLEGE DICUSSIONS. 149 

the Naval War College, International Law Situations, 
1912, pages 159 to 195, makes it necessary only to refer to 
those pages for a general account of the subject of con- 
version. 

It is there shown that the Second Hague Conference, 
1907, in the convention relative to the conversion of mer- 
chant ships into warships was concerned with the na- 
tional control, evidences of character, command, disci- 
pline, conduct, and notification of conversion of a ship 
already converted, but not with the subject of conversion 
itself, the question of time, place, etc., of conversion re- 
maining entirely outside the agreement. 

At the International Naval Conference at London in 
1908-9, after long discussion and many attempts, the 
naval powers were unable to reach an agreement. (Int. 
Law Situations, 1912, pp. 174-190.) 

In the preliminary opinions of the members of the 
Institute of International Law in 1912, as at the inter- 
national conferences of earlier years, there seems to be a 
considerable difference of opinion. 

The matters already agreed upon at The Hague in 1907 
seem to be generally satisfactory, though needing revi- 
sion in minor particulars. The Hague rules do not, how- 
ever, touch the main points of controversy, particularly 
the matter of the place of transfer. It seems to be gener- 
ally admitted that conversion from a private vessel to a 
ship of war may not take place in neutral jurisdiction. 
It seems also to be generally admitted that such a transfer 
is permitted in the jurisdiction of a belligerent or of an 
ally in war. The main question is, therefore, in regard 
to conversion on the high sea. One thing is evident, that 
if conversion on the high sea is permitted there will be 
an element of uncertainty in regard to the status of some 
vessels. This uncertainty may lead to controversies, or, 
in order to avoid these, neutrals may be obliged to assume 
duties from which they should be free. If neutrals are 
burdened with additional obligations, it will be natural 
for them to impose more stringent regulations upon the 
use of their ports. This procedure might much more 



150 CONVERSION OF VESSELS. 

than counterbalance any advantage obtained through 
conversion on the high sea. That rights and obligations 
should be definite and clear is one of the main aims of 
modern regulations. 

Conversion from public to private vessels. — As the pri- 
vate vessel may receive less severe treatment than a pub- 
lic vessel if met at sea by an enemy, there would be an 
inducement to convert public vessels into private vessels 
whenever possible. If all innocent private property at 
sea, including private vessels, should be exempt from 
capture, the inducement might be much greater. 

It has been generally argued that a belligerent would 
not transfer a vessel to private control in time of war 
except with a view to obtaining a military advantage, 
and in consequence such transfers shoul/i not be recog- 
nized as valid. The transfer from private to public con- 
trol would probably be for military advantage, and the 
vessel transferred would become liable to treatment as 
a vessel of war. The transfer from public to private con- 
trol might relieve a vessel from these risks. 

Reconversion. — At The Hague Conference in 1907 it 
was proposed that a vessel converted from a private ves- 
sel into a public vessel should remain a public vessel dur- 
ing the war. This proposition was advanced by Austria- 
Hungary. Japan did not wish the right of reconversion 
to be denied, but was willing to propose that both con- 
version and reconversion be limited to ports under na- 
tional jurisdiction. (Deuxieme Conference de la Paix, 
Tome III, pp. 745, 1014.) 

The question of conversion and reconversion was again 
discussed at the International Naval Conference in 
1908-9, but no agreement could be reached. 

The proposition submitted for consideration of the 
Institute of International Law in 1912 and 1913 was : 

Art. 12. Une navire militaire ne peut, tant que durent les hos- 
tilites, etre transforme en navire public ou en navire _priv§. 

Regulations proposed to Institute of International Law, 
191% and 1913. — The report presented to the Institute of 



INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CONVERSION. 151 

International Law in 1912 and amplified in 1913 sug- 
gests the following regulations in regard to conversion: 

Art. 4. Transformation des navires publics et prive" s en navires 
de guerre. — Aucun navire prive transforme en navire de guerre 
ne peut avoir les droits et les obligations attaches & cette qualite 
s'il n'est place sous l'autorite directe, controle irnmediat et la 
responsabilite de la Puissance dont il porte le pavilion. 

Art. 5. Les navires transformed en navires de guerre doivent 
porter les signes exterieurs distinctifs des navires de guerre de 
leur nationality. 

Art. 6. Le commandant doit etre au service de l'Etat et dtiment 
commissionne par les autorites competentes; son nom doit figurer 
sur la liste des officiers de la* flotte militaire. 

Art. 7. L'equipage doit §tre soumis aux regies de la discipline 
militaire. 

Art. 8. Tout navire transforme en navire de guerre est tenu 
d'observer dans ses operations les lois et coutumes de la guerre. 

Art. 9. Le billigerant qui transforme un navire en navire de 
guerre doit, le plus t6t possible, mentionner cette transformation 
sur la liste des bailments de sa flotte militaire. 

Art. 10. La transformation d'un navire en navire de guerre ne 
peut etre faite qu'en pleine mer, dans les eaux des Etats bellige- 
rants ou d'un Etat allie, ou enfin dans celles occupees par les 
troupes de l'un ou l'autre de ces Etats. 

Art. 11. Le navire transforme en navire de guerre conservera 
ce caractere pendant la duree des bostilites, et il ne pourra pendant 
ce temps etre k nouveau transforme en navire public ou en navire 
prive. 

The regulations proposed to the Institute of Interna- 
tional Law and submitted to a committee were not much 
changed in committee. The discussion showed that there 
is a growing opposition to conversion on the high sea. 
The committee admits that there is a general consensus 
favorable to permitting conversion within the waters of 
the belligerents or of their allies or within waters under 
their control. This consensus did not extend to the per- 
mission to make the open sea a place for conversion. The 
discussion of the subject was full and showed the drift 
of opinion and the main arguments upon both sides of 
the question. The summary of this discussion is of suffi- 
cient importance to warrant consideration: 

MM. Hagerup, Holland et Edouard Rolin Jaequemyns se sont 
opposes a cette transformation, et cela pour un triple motif: 



152 CONVERSION OF VESSELS. 

1°. La transformation en haute mer a quelque chose qui choque 
la loyaut§. 2°. Elle sera une source de surprises et de dangers 
pour les neutres qui ont interet a savoir a l'avance quels navires 
peuvent exercer a. leur egard les droits d'un belligerant. 3°. II 
est difficile d'adrnettre qu'un navire marchand sortant d'un port 
neutre ou il s'est ravitaille — ce qu'il n'aurait pu faire s'il avait 
ete un navire de geurre — puisse, aussitot en mer, mettre a profit 
les avantages dont il a joui en port neutre pour se transformer et 
se livrer a la capture. Ces arguments n'etaient pas sans replique : 
1°. L'interet des neutres a connaitre a l'avance de quels navires ils 
sont exposes a subir la visite peut etre satisfait par des mesures 
de publicite. En temps de guerre, la plus grande circonspection 
s'impose, d'ailleurs, aux navires neutres. Les neutres qui trans- 
portent de la contrebande de guerre -savent, au surplus, ton jours a 
quels risques ils s'exposent. 2°. Pour empecher qu'un navire 
marchand n'abuse, par sa transformation en pleine mer en bati- 
ment de guerre, des avantages qu'il a regus dans un port neutre, 
ii n'y a qu'& rendre les Etats neutres responsables des dommages 
causes par les navires dont la transformation eut ete impossible 
sans les approvisionnements effectues en port neutre. (1) II y a, 
au contraire, au point de vue des principes juridiques, un motif 
des plus serieux pour admettre la transformation sur la haute 
mer : la transformation constitue un acte de souverainete, or rien 
ne s'oppose dans la mer ouverte a l'exercice de la souverainete 
des Etats a regard des navires portant leur pavilion ; il faudrait 
des raisons tr£s graves pour interdire au belligerant l'execution 
de cet acte de souverainete qui dans certaines occasions peut etre 
pour lui d'une incontestable utilite. C'est ce motif que M. 
Strisower a longuement developpe. Et son argumentation parait 
avoir convaincu la Commission. En effet, M. Holland lui ayant 
demande de supprimer dans l'article 10 ce qui a trait a la trans- 
formation en pleine mer, elle s'y est refusee, mais seulement par 
quatre voix contre trois. 

Est-ce a dire que la transformation sur la haute mer ne doive 
pas etre soumise a certaines regies speciales? Si les arguments 
en faveur de la non transformation n'ont pas semble decisifs a 
la Commission, ils ne lui ont pas paru, cependant, denues absolu- 
ment de valeur. Deux de ses membres se sont des lors efforces 
d'y faire droit en proposant une reglementation particuli£re de la 
transformation en pleine mer. 

Afin d'empecher qu'un navire de commerce belligerant n'abuse 
de l'hospitalite en port neutre pour se changer aussitot apr£s en 
batiment de guerre, M. Strisower a propose qu'un delai fut fixe 1 
entre la sortie du navire hors du port neutre et le" moment ou il 
pourra se comporter en navire de guerre : la transformation faite 
en pleine mer ne deviendra effective qu'il l'expiration de ce delai. 
II a, en consequence, presente le texte suivant comme second 
alinea de l'article 10: " Lorsque le batiment a quitte un port 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. 153 

neutre, la transformation en pleine mer n'est valable qu'apres 
l'ecoulement d'un delai de . . . jours." Mais la motion de M. 
Stri sower a ete rejetee par trois voix contre deux et deux 
abstentions. 

M. Paul Fauchille a, de son cote\ chercM a supprimer les 
incertitudes dans lesquelles peuvent se trouver les neutres au 
regard des navires trensformes en haute mer. Dans ce but, il a 
saisi la Commission d'une proposition ainsi congue : " La trans- 
formation d'un navire en pleine mer doit £tre notifiee aux neutres 
et elle ne sera valable que si le navire rencontre auquel elle est 
opposee a connaissance de la notification. Ce navire est cense 
avoir eu connaissance de la transformation s'il a quitte un port 
aprds que notification de la transformation y a ete faite, ou s'il 
rencontre le navire transforme . . . jours apres que la notifica- 
tion de la transformation a eu lieu." Ce texte a 6te" adopte par 
la Commission par cinq voix contre une et une abstention, pour 
etre insere comme alinea 2 dans l'article 10 du projet. 

Summary. — As the subject of conversion of merchant 
ships into ships of war was so fully presented in Inter- 
national Law Situations, 1912, pages 159 to 195, it seems 
unnecessary to enlarge upon that discussion further. The 
rules of The Hague convention relative to the conversion 
of merchant ships into war ships may be taken as reason- 
ably satisfactory for the points which it covers. Taking 
the provisions of this convention as a basis, the following 
rules may be proposed as embodying approved provisions. 

Conclusion.— Regulations relative to the conversion of 
vessels in time of war. 

Article 1. A private ship converted into a ship of war 
can not have the rights and duties accruing to such ves- 
sels unless it is placed under the direct authority, imme- 
diate control, and responsibility of the power whose flag 
it flies. 

Art. 2. Private ships converted into ships of war must 
bear the external marks which distinguish the warships 
of their nationality. 

Art. 3. The commander must be in the service of the 
state and duly commissioned by the competent authori- 
ties. His name must figure on the list of the officers of 
the fighting fleet. 

Art. 4. The crew must be subject to military discipline. 

Art. 5. Every private ship converted into a ship of war 



154 CONVERSION OF VESSELS. 

must observe in its operations the laws and customs of 
war. 

Art. 6. A belligerent who converts a private ship into 
a ship of war must, as soon as possible, announce such 
conversion in the list of ships of war. (Hague Conven- 
tion relative to the Conversion of Private Vessels into 
Public Vessels.) 

Art. 7. Conversion of a private ship into a ship of war 
is not to take place except in the water of its own state 
or of an ally or in the waters occupied by one of these. 

Art. 8. A vessel converted into a ship of war retains 
its character to the end of the war. ♦ 

Art. 9. These provisions do not apply except between 
contracting powers, and then only if all the belligerents 
are parties. 



Topic VIII. 

TRANSFER OF VESSEL FROM ENEMY TO NEUTRAL OF FLAG. 

What regulations should be made in regard to the 
transfer of a vessel from an enemy to a neutral flag in 
anticipation of or in time of war? 

CONCLUSION. 

Articles 55 and 56 of the Declaration of London, 1909, 
in regard to transfer of private vessels from a belligerent 
to a neutral flag are in accord with modern ideas and safe- 
guard rights of neutrals and the rights of belligerents. 

Art. 55. The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral 
flag, effected before the opening of hostilities, is valid 
unless it is proved that such transfer was made in order 
to evade the consequences which the enemy character of 
the vessel would involve. There is, however, a presump- 
tion that the transfer is void if the bill of sale is not on 
board in case the vessel has lost her belligerent nation- 
ality less than 60 days before the opening of hostilities. 
Proof to the contrary is admitted. 

There is absolute presumption of the validity of a 
transfer effected more than 30 days before the opening of 
hostilities if it is absolute, complete, conforms to the laws 
of the countries concerned, and if its effect is such that 
the control of the vessel and the profits of her employ- 
ment do not remain in the same hands as before the trans- 
fer. If, however, the vessel lost her belligerent national- 
ity less than 60 days before the opening qf hostilities, and 
if the bill of sale is not on board, the capture of the vessel 
would not give a right to compensation. 

Art. 56. The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral 
flag, effected after the opening of hostilities, is void un- 
less it is proved that such transfer was not made in order 
to evade the consequences which the enemy character of 
the vessel would involve. 

There is, however, absolute presumption that a transfer 
is void — 

(1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or 
in a blockaded port. 

155 



156 TRANSFER OF FLAG. 

(2) If there is a right of redemption or of reversion. 

(3) If the requirements upon which the right to fly the 
flag depends according to the laws of the country of the 
flag hoisted have not been observed. 

NOTES. 

Transfer to another flag.— The transfer of a vessel 
from a belligerent to a neutral was under consideration 
in Naval War College Conferences on International Law 
in 1906 and 1910. 

In 1906 the following suggestions were made in regard 
to transfer : 

(a) The transfer of a private vessel from a belligerent's flag 
during war is recognized by the enemy as valid only when bona 
fide and when the title has fully passed from the owner and the 
actual delivery of the vessel to the purchaser has been completed 
in a port outside the jurisdiction of the belligerent States in con- 
formity to the laws of the State of the vendor and of the vendee. 
(International Law Topics and Discussiosn, 1906, p. 21.) 

Declaration of London. — The subject of transfer re- 
ceived careful consideration at the International Naval 
Conference in 1908-9. The various propositions and 
course of the discussion is shown in Naval War College, 
International Law Situations, 1910, pages 108 to 128. 

The rules adopted at the Naval Conference and the 
official report in regard to these rules is as follows : 

CHAPTER V. TRANSFER OF FLAG. 

An enemy merchant vessel is liable to capture, whereas a neu- 
tral merchant vessel is spared. It may therefore be understood 
that a belligerent cruiser encountering a merchant vessel which 
lays claim to neutral nationality has to inquire whether such na- 
tionality has been acquired legitimately or for the purpose of 
shielding the vessel from the risks to which .she would have been 
exposed if she had retained her former nationality. This ques- 
tion naturally arises when the transfer is of a date compara- 
tively recent at the moment at which the visit and search takes 
place, whether the transfer may actually be before, or after, the 
opening of hostilities. The question will be answered differently 
according as it is looked at more from the point of view of com- 
mercial or more from the point of view of belligerent interests. 
It is fortunate that agreement has been reached on a rule which 
conciliates both these interests so far as possible and which in- 
forms belligerents and neutral commerce as to their position. 



DECLARATION OF LONDON. 157 

ARTICLE 55. 

Tlie transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected 
before the opening of hostilities, is valid, unless it is proved that 
such transfer was made in order to evade the consequences which 
the enemy character of the vessel would involve. There is, how- 
ever, a presumption that the transfer is void if the bill of sale 
is not on board in case the vessel has lost her belligerent nation- 
ality less than 60 days before the opening of hostilities. Proof 
to the contrary is admitted. 

There is absolute presumption of the validity of a transfer 
effected more than 30 days before the opening of hostilities 
if it is absolute, complete, conforms to the laws of the countries 
concerned, and if its effect is such that the control of the vessel 
and the profits of her employment do not remain in the same 
hands as before the transfer. If, however, the vessel lost her 
belligerent nationality less than 60 days before the opening of 
hostilities, and if the bill of sale is not on board, the capture of 
the vessel would not give a right to compensation. 

The general rule laid down in the first paragraph is that the 
transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag is valid, assuming, 
of course, that the ordinary legal requirements relative to validity 
have been fulfilled. It is for the captor, if he wishes to have the 
transfer annulled, to prove that the object of the transfer was to 
evade the consequences of the war in prospect. There is one case 
which is regarded as suspicious, that, namely, in which the bill 
of sale is not on board when the ship has changed her nationality 
less than 60 days before the opening of hostilities. The presump- 
tion of validity set up by the first paragraph in favor of the vessel 
is transposed in favor of the captor. It is presumed that the 
transfer is void, but proof to the contrary may be admitted. With 
a view to establishing the contrary, proof may be given that the 
transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences of the 
war. It is unnecessary to add that the ordinary legal require- 
ments relative to validity must have been fulfilled. 

There was a wish to give to commerce a guaranty that the 
right to regard a transfer as void on the ground that it was made 
in order to evade the consequences of war should not extend too 
far, and should not cover too long a period. Consequently, if the 
transfer has been made more than 30 days before the opening 
of hostilities, it can not be assailed on that ground alone, and it is 
regarded as unquestionably valid if it has been made under con- 
ditions which show its character is genuine and final. These are 
as follows : The transfer must be absolute, complete, and in con- 
formity with the laws of the countries concerned, and its effect 
is to place the control of, and the profits earned by, the vessel 
in other hands. When once these conditions are established, the 
captor is not allowed to contend that the vendor foresaw the 



158 TRANSFER OF FLAG. 

war in which his country was about to be engaged and wished 
by the sale to shield himself from the risks which he would incur 
in respect of the vessels he was transferring. Even in this case, 
however, if the vessel is encountered by a cruiser and her bill of 
sale is not on board, she may be captured if the change of nation- 
ality has taken place loss than 60 days before the opening of 
hostilities; that circumstance renders her suspect. But if before 
the prize court she furnishes the proof specified by the second 
paragraph, she must be released, though she can not obtain com- 
pensation, inasmuch as there was sufficient reason for capturing 
the vessel. 

ARTICLE 56. 

The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected after 
the opening of hostilities, is void unless it is proved that such 
transfer was not made in order to evade the consequences which 
the enemy character of the vessel would involve. 

There is, however, absolute presumption that a transfer is void. 

(1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a 
blockaded port. 

(2). If there is a right of redemption or of reversion. 

(3) If the requirements upon which the right to fly the flag 
depends according to the laws of the country of the flag hoisted 
have not been observed. 

Respecting transfer after the opening of hostilities, the rule is 
more simple; the transfer is valid only if it is proved that it has 
not been made in order to evade the consequences which the enemy 
character of a vessel would involve. This is the opposite solution 
from that admitted for the transfer before the opening of hostili- 
ties ; in that case there is a presumption that the transfer is valid ; 
in the present, that it is void, subject to the possibility of furnish- 
ing proof to the contrary. It might be proved, for instance, that 
the transfer had taken place by inheritance. 

Article 56 mentions cases in which the presumption of nullity 
is absolute, for reasons which can be readily understood. In the 
first case, the connection between the transfer and the war risk 
run by the vessel clearly appears ; in the second, the transferee, 
one merely in name, is to be regarded as owner during a dangerous 
period, after which the vendor will recover his vessel ; lastly, the 
third case might strictly be inferred, since the vessel which claims 
a neutral nationality must naturally prove that she has a right 
to that nationality. 

Provision was at one time made for the case of a vessel which 
was retained after the transfer in the trade in which she had 
previously been engaged. This would be a circumstance in the 
highest degree suspicious; the transfer has a fictitious appearance, 
since nothing is changed as regards the vessel's trade. This would 



RESUME AND CONCLUSION. 159 

apply, for instance, in case the vessel maintained the same line 
of sailing before and after the transfer. It was, however, ob- 
jected that the absolute presumption would sometimes be too 
severe, as certain vessels, for example, tank ships, could, on ac- 
count of their build, engage only in a definite trade. To recognize 
this objection the word " route " was added, so that it would 
have been necessary that the vessel should be retained in the same 
trade and on the same route; it was thought that in this way there 
would be given to the contention sufficient consideration. How- 
ever, in consideration of the insistence on the suppression of this 
case from tbe list, its suppression has been conceded. Conse- 
quently the transfer now comes within the provision of the gen- 
eral rule; it is certainly presumed to be void, but proof to the 
contrary is admitted. 

Resume. — The discussions in International Law Situa- 
tions, 1910, pages 108 to 128, showed that while the rules 
of the Declaration of London differed somewhat from the 
form proposed by the plenipotentiaries of the United 
States, yet the effect of the rules in operation might not 
differ in any marked degree. 

Under the provisions of the Declaration of London the 
presumption in case of a transfer made before the war is 
wholly in favor of the one to whom transfer has been 
made unless the transfer has been made within 60 days 
and the bill of sale is not on board. The burden of proof 
is in the main upon the captor when the transfer is made 
before the opening of hostilities. In case of transfer 
from a belligerent to a neutral flag after the outbreak of 
hostilities the burden of proof is shifted to the one to 
whom the transfer is made to establish its validity. The 
rules of the Declaration of London in regard to transfer 
of flag have been favorably received and while their form 
may be somewhat involved it would seem that they should 
be generally approved. 

Conclusion. — The articles 55 and 56 of the Declaration 
of London, 1909, in regard to transfer of private vessels 
from a belligerent to a neutral flag are in accord with 
modern ideas and safeguard rights of neutrals and the 
rights of belligerents. 

Art. 55. The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral 
flag, effected before the opening of hostilities, is valid, 
unless 'it is proved that such transfer was made in order 



160 TRANSFER OF FLAG. 

to evade the consequences which the enemy character of 
the vessel would involve. There is, however, a presump- 
tion that the transfer is void if the bill of sale is not on 
board in case the vessel has lost her belligerent nation- 
ality less than 60 days before the opening of hostilities. 
Proof to the contrary is admitted. 

There is absolute presumption of the validity of a 
transfer effected more than 30 days before the open- 
ing of hostilities if it is absoltue, complete, conforms to 
the laws of the countries concerned, and if its effect is 
such that the control of the vessel and the profits of her 
employment do not remain in the same hands as before 
the transfer. If, however, the vessel lost her belligerent 
nationality less than 60 days before the opening of 
hostilities, and if the bill of sale is not on board the cap- 
ture of the vessel would not give a right to compensation. 

Art. 56. The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral 
flag, effected after the opening of hostilities, is void un- 
less it is proved that such transfer was not made in order 
to evade the consequences which the enemy character of 
the vessel would involve. 

There is, however, absolute presumption that a transfer 
is void — 

(1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or 
in a blockaded port. 

(2) If there is a right of redemption or of reversion. 

(3) If the requirements upon which the right to fly 
the flag depends according to the laws of the country 
of the flag hoisted have not been observed. 



Topic IX. 

METHODS OF INJURING THE ENEMY. 

What regulations should be made in regard to deceiving 
and injuring the enemy? 

CONCLUSIONS. 

The following are in general prohibited : 

1. Deceit, involving perfidy. 

2. To declare that no quarter will be given. 

3. To declare that no flag of truce will be received. 

4. To kill or wound an enemy who has surrendered and 
has no longer the means of defense. 

5. To destroy a vessel which has surrendered before 
attempting to rescue those on board. 

NOTES. 

Treachery. — Ruses of war have always been common 
and are regarded as legitimate and often praiseworthy. 
Ruses and stratagems must not be confused with deceit 
involving treachery or perfidy. Treachery or perfidy in 
the sense used in war implies a betrayal of legitimate con- 
fidence or breaking of faith. The use of the white flag 
or of the Red Cross flag for purpose of attack upon an 
enemy would be a breach of faith. There may be a con- 
ventional or tacit agreement in regard to a course of 
conduct between enemies in time of war, and action con- 
trary to such agreement would involve a breach of faith. 
Deceit is often resorted to and is not criticized. False 
reports may be circulated in regard to the position or 
movements of forces, but deceit not involving perfidy is 
usually admitted as legitimate practice. 

Denial of quarter or of flag of truce. — The Hague con- 
vention respecting the laws and customs of war on land 
of 1907 says it is especially forbidden, "Article 23 (d). To 
declare that no quarter will be given." 

19148—14 11 161 



162 METHODS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

Unquestionably, if this is to be read literally, it would 
meet general approval, because a literal reading would 
imply that the declaration that no quarter will be given 
is what is prohibited. Declaration that no quarter would 
be given was sometimes resorted to in early wars in order 
to deter or coerce an enemy. Several threats that no 
quarter would be granted were made during the Ameri- 
can Civil War. The Brussels rules of 1874 contained 
the prohibition against " The declaration that no quarter 
will be given." The idea in these rules was to prevent 
threats of " extermination towards a garrison which ob- 
stinately defends a fortress." It is clear that there will 
be times when quarter can not be granted, as when in an 
attack a small part of the opposing forces offers to sur- 
render while the remaining forces continue to fight. At 
such time the officer in command of the attacking force 
must be free to judge whether he will grant quarter to a 
small part of the forces or shall continue his attack on 
all. To accept the surrender of a few might burden the 
commander with prisoners to such a degree as would de- 
feat his movement and would perhaps prolong the war 
and make the sacrifice greater in the end. 

While a commander of forces on land or sea is forbid- 
den " to declare that no quarter will be given," it is not 
thereby implied that he will in every case give quarter 
in time of actual operations. 

The right to deny a flag of truce is granted in article 

33 of The Hague convention respecting the laws and 

customs of war on land. 

The commander to whom a flag of truce is sent is not obliged 
to receive it in all circumstances. 

In general the obligation, both on land and sea, would 
be to receive the flag of truce, but this obligation may be 
overridden by the military obligation to bring the opera- 
tion in which the forces are engaged to a successful issue 
with the least sacrifice of life and property. - 

Prof. Oppenheim, who assisted in preparation of the 

British Manual of Land Warfare, says : 

As soon as an attacked or counter-attacked vessel hauls down 
her flag, and therefore signals that she is ready to surrender, she 



INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1913. 163 

must be given quarter and seized without further firing. To con 
tinue an attack, though she is ready to surrender, and to sink her 
and her crew would constitute a violation of customary inter- 
national law and would only, as an exception, be admissible in 
case of imperative necessity or of reprisals. (International Law, 
2d ed., Vol. II, p. 231.) 

Institute of International Law, 1913. — After consider- 
ing the means of injuring an enemy, the committee of 
the Institute of International Law in 1913 proposed a 
regulation as follows: 

Art. 20. II est interdit : 

1° De tuer ou de blesser Un ennemi qui, ayant mis bas les armes 
on n'ayant plus les moyens de se defendre, s'est rendu h discretion. 

2° De couler un navire qui s'est rendu, avant d'avoir recueilli 
l'equipage. 

3° De declarer qu'il ne sera pas fait de quartier. 

The provisions contained in this article had been the 
subject of much discussion before 1913. The committee, 
however, reports upon the article, showing some of the 
opinions : 

Cet article, qui prevoyait pour les defendre quatre sortes de 
moyens de nuire, a motive certaines remarques de la part des 
membres de la Commission. 

En ce qui concerne le 1° de l'article, M. Holland a declare 
n'avoir aucune objection a presenter contre l'interdiction des pro- 
jectiles ayant pour but unique de repandre des gaz asphyxiants 
ou deletSres, lorsque la Declaration de La Haye du 29 juillet 
1899, qui y est relative, sera universellement acceptee par les 
Etats. 

Sur le 2°, M. Kaulmann a formule une observation qu'avait 
faite deja M. de Bar. II a demande que, contrairement a la 
Declaration de Saint-Petersbourg du 11 decembre 1868, on autori- 
sat les projectiles explosibles ou charges de mati&res fulminantes 
ou inflammables d'un poids inferieur a 400 grammes " en tant 
qu'il s sont employes contre des aeronefs et des hydro-aeroplanes," 
car ces projectiles peuvent dans certains cas §tre les seuls qui 
constituent un moyen d'action efflcace contre les navires de l'air. 
La motion de M. Kaufmann a Ste 1 rejetee par trois voix contre 
trois abstentions. II a paru a la Commission que son adoption 
aurait necessairement comme consequence l'abolition complete de 
Ta Declaration de Saint-Petersbourg, attendu qu'en fait il sera 
toujours impossible de savoir si les projectiles auront et£ dans la 
r£alit£. lances ou non sur des machines aeriennes ; or une pareille 
abolition constituerait sans conteste un retour en arri§re. 



164 METHODS OF INJURING ENEMY. 

M. Holland a estiine que les n os 3 et 4, interdisant (3°) de 
tuer ou de blesser un enneini qui s'est rendu a discretion et (4°) 
de declarer qu'il ne sera pas fait de quartier, n'etaient pas & 
leiir place dans l'article 20. La Commission a resolu d'en faire 
l'objet d'un texte special qui serait insere a la suite de l'article 
20. Ce texte comprendra, de plus, une disposition nouvelle. M. 
Hagerup ayant observe que la redaction du 3° de l'article 20 visait 
trop exclusivenient les personnes et qu'il fallait la completer par 
une autre concernant les navires, on a en effet decide d'ajouter & 
l'interdiction de tuer ou de blesser un ennemi qui s'est rendu & 
discretion celle " de couler un navire qui s'est rendu, avant d'avoir 
recueilli l'equipage." 

Destruction of enemy vessels at sea. — In 1905 the con- 
ference at the Naval War College considered as Topic 
IV the question of the destruction of captured vessels. 
At that time the practice and orders of the United States 
and of other states were considered. The conclusions 
reached were as follows: 

Enemy vessels. — If there are controlling reasons why enemy 
vessels may not be sent in for adjudication, as unseaworthiness, 
the existence of infectious disease, or the lack of a prize crew, 
they may be appraised and sold, and if this can not be done may 
be destroyed. The imminent danger of recapture would justify 
destruction, if there was no doubt that the vessel was good prize. 
But in all such cases all the papers and other testimony should 
be sent to the prize court in order that a decree may be duly 
entered. (International Law Topics, Naval War College, 1905, 
p. 62.) 

Of course, there would also be the understood obliga- 
tion of placing the ship's company of a private vessel in 
a place of safety. 

French Regulations, 1912. — The French " Instructions 
sur l'application du Droit International en Cas de 
Guerre" (1912) provide for destruction of prizes taken 
from the enemy. 

153. Les prises doivent etre amarinees, conduites dans un port 
national ou allie, et non pas detruites. 

Par exception, vous etes autorise a detruire toute prise dont la 
conservation compromettrait votre propre securite ou le succes de 
vos operations, notamment si vous ne pouvez conserver la prise 
sans affaiblir votre equipage. 

154. Avant la destruction, vous mettrez en surete les per- 
sonnes, quelles qu'elles soient, qui se trouvent a bord, ainsi que 
tons les pa piers et documents utiles pour le jugement de la prise. 



RESUME AND CONCLUSION. 165 

155. En cas cle combat provoque par une resistance armee, ceux 
qui niontent le vavire suivent la fortune des armes. (See Appen- 
dix.) 

Resume. — While deceit is generally allowed in war, 
the principle that deceit involving perfidy is prohibited 
is approved. Ruses not involving perfidy are allowed in 
both land and sea warfare. The belligerents are sup- 
posed to be on the guard against ruses, such as feigned at- 
tacks or withdrawals to lead the pursuing party into a 
less advantageous position. 

The denial of quarter or of a flag of truce might under 
certain exigencies be necessary, though such cases would 
be few. " To declare that no quarter will be given " or 
that no flag of truce will be received is to return to bar- 
baric practices and is properly prohibited in modern 
times. 

To kill those who have no longer arms with which to 
engage in combat and who surrender without conditions 
is in the class of acts which shock the sense of modern 
humanity. 

Similarly the destruction of a vessel which has surren- 
dered without first removing its officers and crew would 
be an act contrary to the sense of right which now pre- 
vails even between enemies in time of war. 

Conclusions. — The following are in general pro- 
hibited : 

1. Deceit involving perfidy. 

2. To declare that no quarter will be given. 

3. To declare that no flag of truce will be received. 

4. To kill or wound an enemy who has surrendered and 
has no longer the means of defense. 

5. To destroy a vessel which has surrendered before 
attempting to rescue those on board. 



APPENDIX 



INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE APPLICATION 

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 

IN CASE OF WAR 



167 



Etat-Major General: 1 re Section 



INSTRUCTIONS SUR L'APPLICATION DU DROIT INTER- 
NATIONAL EN CAS DE GUERRE. 

adressees par le mlnistre de la marine, a mm. les officiers 
Generaux, Superieurs et Autres, Commandant les Forces 
Navales et les Batiments de la Republique. 



(Da 19 decern ore 1912. 



observations generales. 

Dans tout le cours des presentes instructions, les expressions 
capture, saisie, confiscation, sequestre ont et4 employees avec le 
sens et dans le but qui vont etre indiques. 

1° Operations cffectuees par le bdtimcnt de guerre. 

La capture est l'acte purement militaire par lequel le com- 
mandant du navire de guerre substitue son autorite a celle du 
capitaine du navire de commerce, dispose du navire, de son equi- 
page et de sa cargaison comme il est dit aux presentes instruc- 
tions, sous reserve du jugement ulterieur du Conseil des prises 
quant au sort definitif du navire et de sa cargaison. 

La saisie, lorsqu'elle s'applique aux merchandises seules, est 
l'acte par lequel le navire de guerre, avec qu sans l'assentiment du 
capitaine du navire arrete, s'empare et dispose de ces marchan- 
dises comme il est dit aux presentes instructions, sous reserve du 
jugement ulterieur du Conseil des prises. 

La saisie, lorsqu'elle s'applique au navire, differe de la capture 
en ce que le sort ulterieur du navire n'est pas en cause quant k 
l'eventualite de sa confiscation. II y a saisie, lorsque le navire 
doit etre mis sous sequestre pendant la duree des hostilites : il y a 
saisie, lorsque le navire doit etxe contraint de veiiir debarquer sa 

169 



170 APPENDIX. 

inarchandise illicite dans un port national on allie, sous reserve 
du jugement ulterieur du Conseil des prises quant au sort de cette 
marchandise. 

La saisie est toujours accoinpagnee des operations d'inventaire 
et d'apposition des scelles. 

Le mot prise est une expression general e s'appliquant au navire 
capture ou a la marchandise saisie. 

2° Operations effectives par cVautres auto-rite's que le commandant 
du bdtiment de guerre. 

Ces operations sont envisagees dans les presentes instructions a 
titre de renseignements et pour permettre au commandant du 
batiment de guerre de regler sa conduite, dans certains cas, 
suivant les possibilites ulterieures de confiscation, de relaxe, de 
sequestre ou de saisie avec ou sans indemnite. 

La confiscation est prononcee par le Conseil des prises en con- 
sequence de la validation de la capture. C'est l'attribution defini- 
tive, au profit de 1'Etat, de la propriete du navire ou de la car- 
gaison capturee. 

Le sequestre est l'acte par lequel le Gouvernement ou les au- 
torites competentes d'un port retiennent le navire et sa cargaison, 
soit provisoirement en vue d'un jugement ulterieur du Conseil des 
prises, soit pendant la duree de la guerre pour des raisons d'ordre 
militaire. 

Aeticle Premier. 

bAtiments ennemis. 1 

1. D§s que vous avez connaissance de l'etat de guerre existant 

entre la France et , soit par les ordres directs que vous avez 

regus, soit par une information officielle de nos agents diplo- 
matiques ou consulaires, soit par toute autre information indirecte 
mais certaine, vous §tes requis, sous la reserve des interets 
speciaux de la mission qui vous est confiee, de courir sus £t tous 

les batiments de guerre de , de les detruire ou de vous en 

emparer par la force des armes. 

2. Vous §tes egalement requis de courir sus a tous les navires de 
commerce ennemis que vous rencontrerez et de les capturer. 

3. Sous reserve des dispositions de l'Article XIII ci-apr§s, rela- 
tives au transfert de pavilion, tout navire est presume ennemi 
qui ne peut justifier du droit de porter un pavilion neutre. 



1 Convention III de La Haye relative & l'ouverture des hostilites. — 
Article V des presentes instructions (eaux territoriales neutres). — Formule 
I. Capture d'un navire ennemi. — Convention VI de La Haye, relative au 
regime des navires de commerce ennemis ou d6but des hostilites. 



SHIPS OF WAR. 171 

4. Exceptioimellemeiit, vous laisserez libreraent passer les 
na vires de commerce ennemis munis d'un sauf-conduit £t souche, 
conforme an modele annexe aux presentes instructions, constatant 
qu'il leur a ete permis de sortir librement d'un port frangais 
apres l'ouverture des hostilites pour gagner directement le port 
qui leur aura ete designe dans ce sauf-conduit. 1 

Vous vous assurerez que Facte qui vous est presente est sincere 
et que les conditions en ont ete rigoureusement observees, par- 
ticulierement en ce qui concerne la route suivie par le navire et la 
composition de son equipage ou de sa cargaison. 

.En cas de soupgon sur l'authenticite de cet acte ou d'inexecu- 
tion des conditions stipulees, vous capturerez le navire. 

5. Vous laisserez librement passer les navires de commerce 
ennemis qui auront pris des cargaisons a destination de France 
ou pour compte frangais anterieurement a la declaration de 
guerre. Vous delivrerez un sauf-conduit a ces navires qui pour- 
ront librement se rendre dans le port frangais que vous leur desi- 
gnerez et y debarquer leur cbargement. 

Mais, si le lieu ou vous avez rencontre lesdits navires et la 
route suivie par eux vous permettent de conclure qu'ils ont mani- 
festement devie dela route qu'ils devaient suivre d'apres leurs 
papiers de bord, sans qu'ils y soient contraints par les circon- 
stances de leur navigation, vous les capturerez. 

6. Les navires de commerce ennemis qui ont quitt6 leur der- 
nier port de depart avant le commencement de la guerre, et qui 
sont rencontres en mer ignoran+ les hostilites, ne peuvent etre 
captures. 

Si la reussite des operations engagees l'exige, lesdits navires 
sont sujets a etre saisis, moyennant l'obligation de les restituer 
apres la guerre sans indemnity, ou k etre requisitionnes ou c^ine 
it §tre detruits, a cbarge d'indemnite et sous l'obligation de pour- 
voir a la securite des personnes ainsi qu'a la conservation des 
papiers de bord. 

Si, en particulier, la cargaison desdits navires est de nature a 
justifier leur saisie et leur mise sous sequestre pendant la duree 
des hostilites dans les conditions ci-dessus specifiees, et s'il ne vous 
est pas possible de les escorter jusqu'a un port frangais ou alli£ 
sans que, pour cela, leur destruction soit indispensable, vous leur 
ordonnerez, en inscrivant cet ordre sur leur journal de bord, de 
se rendre eux-memes, pour etre mis sous sequestre, dans tel port 
frangais ou allie que vous fixerez, et sous telles conditions de 
route et de vitesse que vous fixerez egalement. 

Vous leur specifierez alors qu'ils seront captures s'ils sont en- 
suite rencontres faisant route pour une destination differente ou 
n'ayant pas observe les conditions de votre ordre. 

1 FormuJe A de sauf-conduit a. souche. 



172 APPENDIX. 

7. Vous capturerez tons na vires de commerce ennemis qui, clans 
les cas de paragraphes 5 et 6 precedents, n'auraient pas stricte- 
inent observe les ordres donnes et prealablement inscrits a leur 
journal de bord par le commandant ou le delegue autorise du 
commandant d'un navire de guerre frangais. 

8. Vous capturerez clans tons les cas tous navires de commerce 
ennemis qui ne pourraient vous presenter des papiers de bord 1 
completement en regie et intacts ou que vous soupgonneriez spe- 
cialement d'avoir falsifie soit leur journal de bord, soit tout autre 
document relatif a leur route. 

9. Vous capturerez dans tous les cas les navires de commerce 
enemis dont la construction indique qu'ils sont destines a etre 
transformes en batiments de guerre, ou qui sont portes sur les 
listes officielles de leur Gouvernement comme destines a etre trans- 
formes en batiments de guerre. 

10. Les marchandises ennemies se trouvant a bord des navires 
ennemis vises aux paragraphes 5, 6, et non susceptibles d'etre 
captures, sont egalement sujettes it etre saisies et restitues apres 
la guerre sans indemnite, ou a. etre requisitionnees moyennant in- 
demnity conjointement avec le navire ou separement. 

11. En ce qui concerne la correspondance postale. vous vous 
conformerez aux prescriptions de l'Article XVI ci-apres. 

Article II. 

BATEAUX DE PECHE ET NAVIRES CHARGES DE CERTAINES MISSIONS. 2 

12. Les navires ennemis exclusivement affectes a la peche 
cotiere ou a des services de petite navigation locale sont exempts 
de capture, ainsi que leurs engins, agres, apparaux et charge- 
ment. Cette exemption cesse de leur etre applicable des qu'ils 
participent d'une fagon quelconque aux hostilites. 

13. Toutefois vous ne tolererez la peche et la petite navigation 
locale sur les cotes de l'ennemi que pendant le jour et qu'autant 
que cette faveur, dictee par un interet d'humanite, n'entrainerait 
aucun abus prejudiciable aux operations militaires et maritimes, 
notamment en cas de blocus. 

14. Tout navire prealablement prevenu des interdictions que 
vous auriez pu ainsi decider, ou provenant d'un port auquel vous 
auriez notifie ces interdictions, et qui ne les aurait pas observees. 
sera considere par vous comme participant aux hostilites. 

15. Les batiments charges de mission religieuse. scientifique ou 
philanthropique sont egalement exempts de capture, sous la meme 
reserve que ces batiments ne participent en aucune fagon aux 
hostilites. 

1 Article XV des prgsentes instructions (papiers de bord). 

2 XI e Convention de La Haye relative a certaines restrictions a l'exercice 
du droit de capture dans la guerre maritime. 



HOSPITAL SHIPS. SUBMARINE CABLES. 173 

16. II vous est interdit de profiter du caractere inoffensif des 
n.i vires frangais ayant les caracteres susvises pour les employer 
dans im but militaire en leur conservant leur apparence pacifique. 

Article III. 

XAVIRES HOSPITALIZES.— PEBSONNEL BELIGIEUX. MEDICAL ET 

HOSPITALIER. 1 

17. Vous vous conformerez aux prescriptions de la Convention 
de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 pour Tadaptation a la guerre mari- 
time des principes de la Convention de Geneve (annexe n° 9) en 
respectant les batiments hospitaliers mentionnes dans les articles 
1, 2 et 3 de cette Convention et dont la liste vous est addressee 
par ailleurs; le tout sous reserve des droits que vous conferent 
et des devoirs que vous imposent. d'une part, les articles 4. 7. 8. 9, 
10. 12, 14. d'autre part, les articles 7, 8. 9. 10. 11. 16. 17 de cette 
nierne Convention. II vous appartient d'apprecier vous-inerne l'op- 
portunite d'user de vos droits dans les divers cas envisages par 
ladite Convention. 

Article IV. 

CABLES SOUS-MARIXS. 2 

18. Autant que possible, et sans nuire aux operations princi- 
pales ou vous serez etfgage, vous vous efforcerez de proceder a la 
destruction des cables sous-marins reliant exclusivement des pos- 
sessions de l'ennemi. 

19. Vous respecterez les cables qui relient exclusivement entre 
eux deux pays neutres. 

20. Quant aux cables qui, venant d'un pays neutre. atterrissent 
eD territoire ennemi ou le traversent. vous les mettrez liors de 
service partout ailleurs que dans les eaux territoriales neutres. 
s'ils sont susceptibies d'etre utilises par le belligerant pour la 
conduite immediate de ses operations de guerre. 

21. Dans aucun de ces cas, vous n'avez a tenir compte de la 
r.ationalite de la compagnie ou societe proprietaire du cable. 

Article V. 

RESPECT DES DROITS DES ETATS XEUTRES. 3 

22. Vous vous conformez strictement aux interdictions impos^es 
aux belligerants par la Convention XIII de La Haye. du IS octo- 

1 X e ConYention de La Haye pour l'adaptation a la guerre maritime des 
principes de la ConTention de Geneve. 

2 Convention internationale du 14 mars 1884, concernant la protection 
des cables sous-marins. (Article 15, B. 0. 2 e semestre 1888, p: 154.) 

s Convention X11I de La Haye. (Droits et devoirs des Puissances 
neutres en cas de guerre maritime.) 



174 APPENDIX. 

bre 1907, concernant les droits et devoirs des Puissances neutres 
en cas de guerre maritime. 

23. Pour l'application de cette Convention, vous considererez 
les eaux territoriales comme ne s'etendant jamais Et moins de trois 
milles des cotes, des iles ou des bancs decouvrant qui en dependent, 
a compter de la laisse de basse mer, et jamais au delk de la 
portee de canon. 

Vous trouverez dans 1' Annexe II le tableau des Puissances qui, 
soit dans un texte legal ou reglementaire, soit dans une declara- 
tion de neutrality, ont fixe la limite de leurs eaux territoriales, 
quant au droit de la guerre, a une distance de la cote superieure 
a trois milles. 

Vous respecterez toute limite de cette nature qui se trouverait 
ainsi regulierement fixee avant l'ouverture des hostilit§s. 

Article VI. 

COMMERCE DES NATIONAUX. 

24. L'etat de guerre entrainant l'interdiction de toutes relations 
de commerce entre les nations belligerantes, vous devez arr^ter les 
navires de commerce francais qui, sans justifier d'une licence, 
tenteraient d'enfreindre cette interdiction ou qui, plus coupables 
encore, chercheraient a violer un blocus ou s'engageraient dans un 
transport de troupes, de depeches officielles„ou de contrebande de 
guerre, pour le compte ou a destination de l'ennemi. 

25. Les capitaines et toutes personnes soupgonnees de com- 
plicite devraient £tre arrgtes et remis k l'autorite judiciare fran- 
chise la plus proche, a l'effet d'etre poursuivis, s'il y a lieu, par 
application des articles 77 et suitvants du Code penal. 

Article VII. 

COMMERCE DES NEUTRES CARACTERE NEUTRE. 1 

26. Les neutres sent auotrises par le droit des gens a continuer 
librement leur commerce avec les belligerants. 

Toutefois les navires neutres sont soumis au droit de visite et, 
eventuellement, h la capture dans les cas suivants : 

1° S'ils resistent a la visite dans les conditions de l'Article XII 
ci-apres ; 

2° S'ils transportent des objets de contrebande de guerre, dans 
les conditions de l'Articles VIII ci-apres ; 

3° S'ils pretent assistance & l'ennemi dans les conditions de 
l'Article IX ci-apres; 

4° S'ils tentent de violer un blocus dans les conditions de 
TArticle X ci-apres. 

1 Declaration du Congrfes de Paris du 10 avril 1856. Annexe I. 



CONTRABAND. 175 

27. Caractere neutre ou ennemi. — Sous reserve des dispositions 
le 1' Article XIII ci-apres, relativeinent au transfert de pavilion, le 
caractere d'nn navire est determine par le pavilion qu'il a le droit 
de porter. (Voir Annexe II.) 

Le caractere neutre ou ennemi das marchandises trouvees a 
bord d'un navire ennemi est determine par la nationalite de leur 
proprietaire. 

Si le caractere neutre de la marchandise trouvee a bord d'un 
navire ennemi n'est pas etabli, la marchandise est presumee 
ennemie. 

28. Le pavilion couvre la marchandise ennemie, a l'exception de 
la contrebande de guerre. Vous n'avez done point a examiner la 
propriete du chargement des navires neutres, mais seulement la 
nature de ce chargement. 

Article VIII. 

CONTREBANDE DE GUERRE SORT DES NAVIRES TRANSPORTANT DE LA 

CONTREBANDE. 

29. A moins de stipulation speciale des traites ou de decision 
particuliere du Gouvernement de la Republique, vous considererez 
de plein droit comme contrebande de guerre les objets et niate- 
riaux suivants, compris sous le nom de contrebande absolue, dont 
la destination hostile apparaitra comme il est dit plus loin : 

1° Les amies de toute nature, y compris les armes de chasse et 
les pieces detachees caracterisees ; 

2° Les projectiles, gargousses et cartouches de toute nature et 
les pieces detachees caracterisees ; 

3° Les poudres et explosif s specialement affectes a la guerre ; 

4° Les affuts, caissons, avant-trains, fourgons, forges de cam- 
pagne et les pieces detachees caracterisees ; 

5° Les effets d'habillement et d'equipement militaires caracteri- 
ses; 

6° Les harnachements militaires caracterises de toute nature ; 

7° Les animaux de selle, de trait et de bat utilisables pour la 
guerre ; 

8° Le materiel de campement et les pieces detachees carac- 
terisees ; 

9° Les plaques de blindage ; 

10° Les bailments et embarcations de guerre et les pieces de- 
tachees specialement caracterisees ; 

11° Les instruments et appareils exclusivement faits pour la 
fabrication xles munitions de guerre, pour la fabrication et la 
reparation des armes et du materiel militaire terrestre ou naval. 

30. Vous ne considererez pas comme contrebande de guerre les 
armes et les munitions exclusivement destinees a la defense du 



176 APPENDIX. 

batiinent, et en la quantite que peruiet la coutume, & moins qu'il 
n'en ait ete fait usage pour register a la visite. 

31. Le cas echeant, vous recevrez une liste complementaire 
d'objets et de materiaux exclusiveinent employes a la guerre, que 
le Gouvernement jugerait utile, au cours des hostilites, d'ajouter 
aux objets de contrebande absolue enurneres ci-dessus. 

32. lies articles enurneres ci-dessus sont de contrebande, s'il 
vous apparait qu'ils sont destines au territoire de I'ennenri ou a. 
un territoire occupe par lui ou k ses forces armees. Peu importe 
que le navire transporteur soit lui-m§me a destination d'un port 
neutre. 

33. La destination ennemie de la contrebande absolue est con- 
sideree comme defmitivement prouvee dans les cas suivants : 

1° Lorsqne la marchandise est documentee pour §tre debarquee 
dans un port de 1'ennemi ou pour etre livree a ses forces armees ; 

2° Lorsque, bien que la marchandise soit documentee pour un 
port neutre. le navire ne doit aborder qu'a des ports ennemis, ou 
lorsqu'il doit toucher a un port de 1'ennemi, ou rejoindre ses forces 
armees avant d'arriver au port neutre pour lequel la marchandise 
est documentee. 

34. Les papiers de bord font preuve complete de l'itineraire du 
navire transportant de la contrebande absolue, a moins que le 
navire ne soit rencontre ayant manifestement devie de la route 
qu'il devrait suivre d'apr&s ses papiers de bord et sans pouvoir 
justifier d'une cause suffisante de cette deviation. 

35. Vous considererez de plein droit comme contrebande de 
guerre les objets et materiaux suivants, qui, susceptibles de servir 
aux usages de la guerre comme a des usages paciflques, sont 
compris sous le nom de contrebande conditionelle, et dont la desti- 
nation hostile apparaitra comme il est dit plus loin, savoir : 

1° Les vivres ; 

2° Les fourrages et les graines propres a la nourriture des 
animaux ; 

3° Les vetements et les tissus d'habillement, les chaussures pro- 
pres a des uages militaires ; 

4° L"or et 1'argent monnaye et en lingots, les papiers repre- 
sentatifs de la monnaie ; 

5° Les vehicules de toute nature pouvant servir a la guerre, 
ainsi que les pieces d§tach§es; 

6° Les navires, bateaux et embarcations de tout genre, les docks 
flottants. parties de bassins, ainsi que les pieces detachees; 

7° Le materiel fixe ou roulant des chemins de fer, le materiel 
des telegraphes. radiotelegraphes ou telephones; 

S* Les aerostats et les appareils d'aviation, les pieces detachees 
caracterisees ainsi que les accessoires, objets et materiaux carac- 
terisr's comme devant servir a l'aerostation ou a l'aviation; 



CONTRABAND. 177 

9° Les combustibles et matieres lnbrifiantes ; 

10° Les poudres et les explosifs qui ne sont pas specialement 
affectes a la guerre; 

11° Les fils barbeles, ainsi que les instruments servant & les 
fixer ou a les couper; 

12° Les fers a cheval et le materiel de marechalerie ; 

13° Les objets de harnachenient et de sellerie ; 

14° Les jumelles, telescopes, chrononiStres et les divers instru- 
ments nautiques. 

36. Les cas echeant, vous recevrez une liste complementaire 
d'objets et materiaux susceptibles de servir aux usages de la 
guerre comme aux usages pacifiques, que le Gouvernement jugerait 
utile, au cours des hostilites, d'ajouter aux objets de contrebande 
conditionelle enumeres ci-dessus. 

37. Les articles enumeres ci-dessus sont de contrebande s'il 
\ous apparait qu'ils sont destines a l'usage des forces armees ou 
a des administrations de l'Etat ennemi, & moins, dans ce dernier 
cas, que les circonstances n'etablissent qu'en fait ces articles ne 
peuvent etre utilises pour la guerre en cours ; cette derniere 
reserve ne s'applique pas a Tor et a l'argent monnayes et en 
lingots, ni aux papier's repr£sentatifs de la monnaie. 

38. Vous considererez que les articles de contrebande condi- 
tionnelle ont la destination ci-dessus indiquee, si l'envoi est 
adresse aux autorit§s ennemies, ou a un commergant etabli en 
pays ennemi, et lorsqu'il est notoire que ce commergant fournit 
au Gouvernement ennemi des objets et materiaux de cette nature. 
II en est de meme si l'envoi est a destination d'une place fortifiee 
ennemie ou d'une autre place servant de base d'opdrations o ude 
ravitaillement aux forces armies ennemies. 

39. Si, sans en pouvoirs trouver la preuve complete, vous avez 
cependant des raisons sufflsantes de croire que les articles de 
contrebande condltionnelle, dont le decbargement doit avoir lieu 
en territoire ennemi ou occupe par l'ennemi, ont la destination 
hostile ci-dessus indiquee, vous pourrez saisir le navire porteur de 
cette contrebande. 

40. A defaut des presomptions ci-dessus, la destination est pr§- 
sumee innocente. 

41. Les articles dits " de contrebande conditionnelle " n'ont le 
caractere de contrebande que si le navire transporteur fait route 
vers le territoire de l'ennemi ou vers un territoire occupe" par lui 
ou vers ses forces armees, et s'il ne doit pas les decharger dans 
un port intermediaire neutre. 

42. Toutefois, si le territoire de l'ennemi n'a pas de frontiSre 
maritime, les" articles ci-dessus ont le caractere de contrebande par 
le seul fait de leur propre destination hostile, encore que le navire 
transporteur ait lui-m§me une destination neutre. 

19148—14 12 



178 APPENDIX. 

43. Les papiers de bord font preuve complete de l'itineraire du 
r.avire ainsi que du lieu de deehargement des marchandises, k 
moins que ce navire ne soit rencontre ayant nianifestement devie 
de la route qu'il devait suivre d'apres ses papiers de bord et sans 
pouvoir justifier d'une cause suffisante de cette deviation. 

44. Les objets et inateriaux qui ne sont pas compris dans les 
deux listes ci-dessus de contrebande absolue ou de contrebande 
conditionnelle, ou qui ne vous auraient pas ete notifies comme 
devant y etre ajoutes, ne sont pas contrebande de guerre. 

45. Ne sont jamais contrebande de guerre les articles suivants, 
savoir : 

1° Le coton brut, les laines, soies, jutes, lins, chanvres bruts, et 
les autres matieres premieres des industries textiles ainsi que 
leurs files ; 

2° Les noix et graines oleagineuses, le coprah; 

3° Les caoutchoucs, resines, gommes et laques, le houblon ; 

4° Les peaux brutes, les cornes, os et ivoires ; 

5° Les engrais naturels et artificiels, y compris les nitrates et 
les phosphates pouvant servir £ l'agriculture ; 

6° Les minerals ; 

7° Les terres, les argiles, la chaux, la craie, les pierres y compris 
les marbres, les briques, ardoises et tuiles; 

8° Les porcelaines et verreries ; 

9° Le papier et les matieres prepares pour sa fabrication ; 

10° Les savons, couleurs, y compris les matieres exclusivement 
destinees a les produire, et les vernis ; 

11° L'hypochlorite de chaux, les cendres de soude, la soude caus- 
tique, le sulfate de soude en pains, l'ammoniaque, le sulfate d'am- 
moniaque et le sulfate de cuivre; 

12° Les machines servant a l'agriculture, aux mines, aux indus- 
tries textiles et a l'imprimerie; 

13° Les pierres precieuses, les pierres fines, les perles. la nacre 
et les coraux ; 

14° Les horloges, pendules et montres, autres que les chro- 
nom§tres ; 

15° Les articles de mode et les objets de fantaisie; 

16° Les plumes de tout genre, les crins et soies; 

17° Les objets d'ameublement et d'ornement, les meubles et 
accessoires de bureau. 

46. Ne sont pas non plus considered comme contrebande de 
guerre : s 

1° Les objets et inateriaux servant exclusivement a soigner les 
malades et les blesses. Toutefois, en cas de necessity militaire iin- 
portante, vous pourrez les requisitionner, moyennant une indein- 
nite s'ils sont destines au territoire de l'ennemi ou a un territoire 
occupe par lui ou & ses forces armees ; 



CARRIAGE OF CONTRABAND. 179 

2° Les objets et materiaux destines a. l'usage <lu navire ou ils 
sont trouves, ainsi qu'a L'usage de l'equipage et des passagers de 

ce navire pendant la traversee. 

SORT DES XAVIRES TBANSPOBTANT DE LA CONTREBANDE. 

47. Vous ne saisirez pas un navire en raison d'nn transport de 
contrebande qu'il aurait anterieurement effectue et actnellement 
acheve. 

48. Le navire transportant des articles saisissables comme con- 
trebande peut etre saisi ou capture par vous pendant tout le cours 
de son voyage, nierne s'il a l'intention de toucher a un port d'escale 
avant d'atteindre la destination ennemie. 

49. Yous capturerez le navire transportant de la contrebande si 
cette contrebande forme, soit par sa valeur, soit par son poids, 
soit par son volume, soit par son fret, plus de la moitie de la 
cargaison. 

50. Yous vous bornerez a saisir le navire transportant de la 
contrebande si cette contrebande est en proportion inferieure a 
celle ci-dessus indiquee. 

51. Suivant les circonstances, vous pourrez autoriser a continuer 
sa route un navire arrete pour cause de contrebande et non sus- 
ceptible de confiscation a raison de la proportion de la contrebande. 
si le capitaine est pret a vous livrer cette contrebande. 

La remise de la contrebande sera mentionnee sur le livre de 
bord du navire arrete, et le capitaine de ce navire devra vous 
remettre copie certifiee conforme de tous papiers utiles. 

52. Yous aurez la faculte de detruire la contrebande qui vous 
sera ainsi livree. (Yoir Art. XXIX.) 

53. Si vous rencontrez en mer un navire naviguant dans l'igno- 
rance des hostilites ou de la declaration de contrebande applicable 
k son cliargement, vous pourrez neanmoins saisir ces articles de 
contrebande ; mais, la confiscation de ces articles, pouvant ulteri- 
eurement donner lieu a une indemnite, vous aurez soin de dresser 
un proces-verbal tres precis en nature, poids et valeur des inar- 
chandises ainsi saisies. Dans ce cas, le navire et le surplus de 
sa cargaison, tout en etant sujets a etre saisis, seront exempts de 
confiscation. II en sera de meme si le capitaine, apres avoir eu 
connaissance de Touverture des hostilites ou de la declaration de 
contrebande. n'a pu encore decharger les articles de contrebande. 

54. Le navire est repute connaitre Tetat de guerre ou la declara- 
tion de contrebande. lorsqu'il a quitte un port ennemi apres 
Touverture des hostilites ou lorsqu'il a quitte un port neutre apr£s 
que la notification de Touverture des hostilites ou de la declaration 
de contrebande a §te faite en temps utile a la Puissance dont 
releve ce port. 



180 APPENDIX. 

Article IX. 

ASSISTANCE HOSTILE. 

55. Vous capturerez tout navire neutre: 

1° S'il voyage specialement en vue du transport de passagers 
individuels incorpores dans la force armee de l'ennemi ou en vue 
de la transmission de nouvelles dans l'interet de l'ennemi ; 

2° S'il vous apparait que c'est a la connaissance soit du pro- 
prietaire, soit de celui qui a affrgte le navire en totalite, soit du 
capitaine, qu'il transporte un detachement militaire de l'ennemi 
ou une ou plusieurs personnes qui, pendant le voyage, pretent une 
assistance directe aux operations de l'ennemi. 

56. Dans les deux cas specifiees ci-dessus, le navire sera passible 
de confiscation et, d'une maniere generale, passible du traitement 
que subirait le navire neutre sujet & confiscation pour contrebande 
de guerre. 

57. Toutefois les dispositions du paragraplie 54, alinea 2°, ne 
s'appliquent pas si, lorsque le navire est rencontre en mer, il ignore 
les hostilites ou si le capitaine, apres avoir appris l'ouverture des 
hostilites, n'a pu encore debarquer les personnes transportees. 

58. Le navire est repute connaitre letat de guerre, lorsqu'il a 
quitte un port ennemi apres l'ouverture des hostilites ou un port 
neutre posterieurement & la notification en temps utile de l'ouver- 
ture des hostilites a la puissance dont releve ce port. 

59. Alors meme qu'il n'y aurait pas lieu de capturer le navire, 
vous pourrez faire prisonnier de guerre tout individu incorpore 
dans la force armee de l'ennemi et qui sera trouve a bord d'un 
navire de commerce neutre. 

Vous demanderez tout d'abord au capitaine du navire de vous 
remettre ces individus. En cas de refus de sa part, vous passerez 
outre et vous les ferez prisonniers de guerre. En cas de resistance 
de la part du personnel du navire, vous capturerez le navire. 

60. Le personnel religieux, medical et hospitalier ennemi trouve 
ii bord d'un navire de commerce neutre ne peut etre fait prisonnier 
de guerre; mais, avant de laisser libre ce personnel, vous vous 
assurerez avec soin de la reality de son caract§re. En cas de 
doute, vous pourrez le retenir dans la forme ci-dessus indiquee 
jusqu'a ce que la preuve de ce caractere soit etablie. 

61. Vous capturerez egalement tout navire neutre ; 
1° Lorsqu'il prend une part directe aux hostilites ; 

2° Lorsqu'il se trouve sous les ordres ou sous le controle d'un 
agent place a bord par le Gouvernement ennemi ; 

3° Lorsqu'il est affrete en totalite on en partie par le Gouverne- 
ment ennemi ; 

4° Lorsqu'il est actuellement et exclusivement affecte soit au 
transport de troupes ennemies, soit a la transmission de nouvelles 
dans l'interet de l'ennemi. 



BLOCKADE. 181 

62. Dans les quatre cas ci-dessus specifies, le navire sera passi- 
ble de confiscation et, d'une inaniere generate, passible du traite- 
ment qu'il subirait s'il etait navire de commerce ennemi. 

63. Vous remarquerez que le transport des depeches officielles 
ne peut §tre incrimine que s'il est fait a titre special ; dans le cas 
contraire, vous vous conformerez aux dispositions de l'Article 
XVI ci-apr^s. 

Article X. 

BLOCUS — ETABLISSEMENT D'UN BLOCUS. 

64. Le blocus doit etre limite aux ports et aux cotes de l'ennemi 
ou occupes par lui. 

65. Les forces bloquantes ne doivent pas barrer 1'accSs aux ports 
et aux cotes neutres. 

66. Conformement k la Declaration de Paris, le blocus, pour 
etre obligatoire, doit §tre effectif, c'est-a-dire maintenu par une 
force suffisante pour interdire reellement l'acces du littoral k 
l'ennemi. 

67. Le blocus, , pour etre obligatoire, doit etre declare con- 
formement au paragraphe 68 et notifie conformement aux para- 
graphes 69 et 77. 

68. Si, en l'absence d'une declaration de blocus faite par le 
Gouvernement lui-meme, vous etes appele a etablir un blocus de 
votre propre initiative, vous devez prealablement faire une decla- 
ration precisant : 

1° La date du commencement du blocus; 

2° Les limites geographiques du littoral bloque, expressement 
designees en latitude et longitude ; 
3° Le delai de sortie a accorder aux navires neutres. 

69. Dans tous les cas, l'§tablissement d'un blocus devra egale- 
ment faire l'objet d'une notification formelle aux autorites des 
points bloques. Cette notification, dont vous trouverez le modele k 
l'Annexe III, sera envoyee h ces autorites, en meme temps qu'au 
consul de l'une des Puissances neutres, au moyen d'un parlemen- 
taire. 

70. Le cas ecneant, vous feriez connaitre, par la voie la plus 
rapide, toute disposition prise de votre propre initiative pour 
l'etablissement d'un blocus, afin de me permettre de completer, 
dans le plus bref delai, votre notification aux autorites locales par 
une notification aux Puissances neutres par la voie diplomatique. 

71. II conviendra de remplir les memes formalites si le blocus 
vient a etre etendu a quelque nouveau point de la cote, ou est 
repris apr§s avoir ete leve. 

72. Le blocus n'est pas considere comme leve si, par suite de 
mauvais temps, les forces bloquantes se sont momentanement 
eloignees. 



182 APPENDIX. 

73. La levee volontaire du blocus, ainsi que toute restriction 
qui y serait apportee, doit etre notifiee dans la meme forme que 
ci-dessus. 

Violation de blocus. 

74. La violation d'un blocus ainsi etabli resulte aussi bien de la 
tentative de penetrer dans le lieu bloque que de celle d'en sortir 
aprds la notification du blocus, a moins, dans ce cas, que ce ne 
soit dans le delai fixe et expressenient mentionne dans la declara- 
tion de blocus, delai qui devra etre suffisant pour proteger la navi- 
gation et le commerce de bonne foi. * 

75. La saisissabilite d'un navire neutre pour violation de blocus 
est subordonnee a la connaissance reelle ou presumee du blocus. 

76. La connaissance du blocus est, sauf preuve contraire, pre- 
sumee lorsque le navire a quitte un port neutre porterieurement h 
la notification, en temps utile, du blocus a la Puissance dont relive 
ce port. 

77. Si le navire qui approcbe du port bloque n'a pas connu ou 
ne peut §tre presume avoir connu l'existence du blocus, la notifi- 
cation doit etre faite au navire meme par un officier de l'un des 
batiments de la force bloquante. Cette notification doit etre portee 
sur le livre de bord avec indication de la date et de l'heure ainsi 
que de la position geographique du navire a. ce moment. 

78. Tout navire qui force un blocus doit etre capture^ fut-il 
neutre, allie ou national, sous reserve, a l'encontre de ce dernier, 
de l'application des lois penales edict&es contre ceux qui entre- 
tiennent des intelligences avec l'ennemi. 

79. Toutefois aucune saisie ne peut etre pratiqu§e a. l'egard d'un 
navire qui, apres avoir force le blocus, a gagne" la haute mer et 
dont la chasse a &te abandonnee. 

80. Tout navire qui, apr§s avoir regu l'avertissement r§gle- 
mentaire, ne s'eloigne pas franchement et est surpris louvoyant 
autour de la cote bloquee, dans le rayon d'action de la force 
bloquante, devient suspect de fraude et peut etre capture. 

81. Un navire neutre, en cas de d£tresse constatee par une 
autorite des forces bloquantes, peut penetrer dans la localite 
bloquee et en sortir ulterieurement, a la condition de n'y avoir 
laisse ni pris aucun chargement. 

82. Vous pourrez accorder Ji des navires de guerre la permis- 
sion d'entrer dans un port bloque' et d'en sortir ulterieurement. 

83. Vo'us capturerez tout navire reconnu coupable de violation 
de blocus. Ce navire sera passible de confiscation. 

84. La violation du blocus est insuffisamment caracterisee pour 
autoriser la capture du navire, lorsque celui-ci est actuellement 
dirige vers un port non bloque, quelle que soit la destination 
ulterieure du navire ou de son chargement. 



VISIT AND SEARCH. 183 

Article XI. 

DROIT DE VISITE. 

85. Vous avez le droit de visiter tous les navires de commerce 
que vous rencontrerez. Vous ne visiterez les paquebots postaux 
qu'en cas de necessite, ainsi qu'il est dit & l'Article XVII. 

86. Toutefois, suivant les circonstances, notamment suivant les 
parages ou vous voUs trouverez, ou suivant l'eloignement du 
theatre des operations, il peut arriver que vous ayez des motifs 
de supposer que la visite ne peut entrainer aucune saisie. Dans 
ce cas, l'exercice du droit de visite peut n'etre qu'une vexation 
inutile dont il est preferable de s'abstenir. 

87. Les navires neutres sous convoi de leur pavilion sont, en 
principe, exempts de visite. Toutefois vous agirez & leur egard 
comme il est dit a Particle suivant. 

Article XII. 

PROCEDURE DE LA VISITE — SEMONCE — VISITE — PAPIERS DE BORD 

RESISTANCE A LA VISITE — CONVOI. 

88. Semonce. — Lorsque vous serez determine 1 & visiter un navire, 
vous l'avertirez l'abord en tirant un coup de canon de semonce a. 
poudre et en arborant votre pavilion. A ce signal, le navire est 
tenu aussi d'arborer ses couleurs et de s'arreter pour attendre 
votre visite. 

89. S'il continue sa route et cbercbe & fuir, vous le poursuivrez 
et l'arr^terez au besoin par la force. 

90. En cas de resistance armee de sa part, vous le capturerez 
sans autre examen. 

La tentative de fuite ne suffit pas a\ elle seule a. justifier la 
capture. 

91. D§s que la navire semonce s'est arrete, vous lui envoyez 
une embarcation. 

Aucune r&gle precise ne peut etre fixee au sujet de la distance a. 
laquelle doit s'arreter le croiseur pendant la visite. Vous agirez 
suivant les circonstances et 1'et.at de la mer. 

92. Visite. — Un officier en armes, accompagne de deux ou trois 
hommes au plus, monte a bord du navire & visiter. Si vous §tes 
seul officier a votre bord, la visite pourra §tre effectuee par un 
officier-marinier. • 

93. Avant tout, l'officier visiteur doit proceder a l'examen des 
pa piers de bord. 1 



1 Voir Album des papiers de bord. 



184 APPENDIX. 

94. Les principaux papiers de bord des na vires de commerce 
sont: 

1° L'acte constatant la nationalite ; 

2° Eventuelleinent l'acte de propriety (voir § 108 et suiv.) ; 
3° Le conge ; 

4° Le perniis de navigation ou certificat de navigabilite ; 
5° Le role d'equipage et la liste des passagers ; 
6° La patente de sante ; 
7° Le journal de bord ; 
8° Le manifeste de chargement ; 

9° La charte-partie (si le navire est affrete) et les connaisse- 
ments dtiment signes ; 
10° L'inventaire. 

95. L'examen de ces pieces vous renseignera sur la nationalite 
du navire, sur sa destination et sa route, ainsi que sur la nature 
et la destination apparente du chargement. 

96. Eventuellement, vous pourrez demander a vous faire pre- 
senter : 

Le journal des machines ; 

La police d'assurance du navire et celle des marchandises, si 
elles sont a bord; 

Le registre des telegrammes regus et envoy£s si le navire est 
muni de T. S. F. 

97. Si l'examen de ces pieces demontre d'une maniere certaine 
la neutralite du navire, sa destination inoffensive et le caract§re 
inoffensif de son chargement, l'offlcier visiteur constatera le re- 
sultat de sa visite sur le journal de bord dudit navire, et vous 
laisserez le navire continuer sa route. 

L'absence de l'une des pieces ci-dessus indiquees ne jnstifierait 
pas seule la capture, si d'ailleurs l'ensemble des autres pi§ces 
prouvait la neutralite du navire et la regularite de l'exp§dition. 

Papiers jet6s a la mer, supprimes ou distraits. 

98. Toutefois, s'il est constate qu'un ou plusieurs de ces pa- 
piers ont §te jetes k la mer, supprimes, distraits ou falsifies, le 
navire visite doit etre capture sans qu'il soit besoin d'examiner par 
qui ou pour quelle cause ils ont ete jetes a la mer, supprimes, 
distraits ou falsifies. 

99. Si l'examen des pieces vous laisse un doute quelconque ou 
vous confirme un soupgon : 

1° Sur la nationalite du navire : alors vous le capturerez ; 

2° Sur sa destination ou sur le caractere inoffensif de son 
chargement: alors vous pourrez proceder a la visite de la car- 
gaison. 

Cette visite s'effectue par les soins du capitaine et de l'^quipage 
du navire visite, sous les yeux de 1'officier visiteur, lequel ne doit 
y proceder par lui-meme qu'en cas de refus de ces derniers. 



RESISTANCE, CONVOY. 185 

100. Les papiers de bord font preuve complete de l'itineraire 
du navire ainsi que du lieu de dechargement des marchandises, k 
moins que ce navire ne soit rencontre ayant manifestement devie 
de la route qu'il devait suivre d'apres ses papiers de bord et sans 
pouvoir justifier d'une cause suffisante de cette deviation. 

101. Toutes ces operations de visite doivent etre faites avec la 
plus grande courtoisie et moderation, et, s'il s'agit de paquebots 
postaux, avec toute la celerite possible. (Voir § 85 et 126.) 

102. Resistance a la visite. — La resistance opposee par la force 
a\ l'exercice legitime des diverses operations de la visite rend im- 
mediatement le navire passible de capture et ulterieurement de 
confiscation. Le cbargement sera passible du meme traitement 
que subirait le chargement d'un navire ennemi ; les marchandises 
appartenant au capitaine ou au proprielaire du navire seront con- 
siderees comme marchandises ennemies. 

103. Gonvoi. — En ce qui concerne les navires sous convoi, le 
commandant du convoi vous donnera par ecrit, a, votre demande, 
sur le caractere des navires convoyes et sur leur chargement, 
toutes informations que la visite servirait a obtenir. 

194. Si vous avez lieu de soupgonner que la religion du com- 
mandant du convoi a ete surprise, vous lui communiquerez vos 
soupgons. C'est au commandant du convoi seul qu'il appartient, 
en ce cas, de proceder a une verification. Vous pourrez cependant 
accepter l'offre qu'il vous ferait d'assister a cette verification. II 
devra constater le resultat de cette visite par un proces-verbal 
dont une copie sera remise a l'un de vos officiers. Si des faits 
ainsi constates justifiaient, dans l'opinion du commandant du 
convoi, la saisie d'un ou de plusieurs navires, la protection du 
convoi devrait leur etre retiree, et vous procMeriez a cette saisie. 

105. Si des divergences s' eleven t entre vous et le commandant 
du convoi, notamment a, propos de la contrebande, vous pourrez 
seulement lui adresser une protestation ecrite. Vous m'en ren- 
drez compte immediatement, et la clifficulte sera reglee par la voie 
diplomatique. 

106. Le fait, pour un neutre, de se faire convoyer par un bati- 
ment de guerre ennemi, c'est-a-dire se placer sous sa protection, le 
rend suspect et forclos du droit de se plaindre s'il est atteint 
d'a varies ou meme d§truit dans le combat. 

107. Le fait, par un navire de commerce ennemi, de se faire 
convoyer par un batiment de guerre ennemi 1'expose a\ toutes vos 
attaques, directes et indirectes. 

Article III. 

CHANGEMENT DE NATIONALITE DES NAVIRES TRANSFERT DE PAVILLON. 

108. Lorsqu'il resulte de l'examen des pieces de bord que le 
navire est passe recemment sous pavilion neutre, il y a lieu de 



186 APPENDIX. 

proceder avec la plus grande attention et de s'inspirer des regies 
suivantes : 

109. Le transfert sous pavilion neutre d'un navire ennemi, 
effectue avant l'ouverture des hostilites, est valable a nioins qu'il 
ne soit etabli que ce transfert a ete effectue en vue d'eluder les 
consequences qu'entraine le caractere de navire ennemi. II y a 
neanmoins presoinption de nullite si Facte de transfert ne se 
trouve pas a bord, alors que le navire a perdu la nationality bel- 
ligerante nioins de soixante jours avant l'ouverture des hostilites; 
la preuve contraire est admise. 

110. II y a presomption absolue de validite d'un transfert 
effectue plus de trente jours avant l'ouverture des hostilites, s'il 
est complet, absolu, conforme a la legislation des pays interesses 
et s'il a cet effet que le control du navire et le benefice de son 
emploi ne restent pas entre les mgmes mains qu'avant le transfert. 
Toutefois, si le navire a perdu la nationalite belligerante moins 
de soixante jours avant l'ouverture des hostilites et si l'acte de 
transfert ne se trouve pas a bord, la saisie du navire ne pourra 
donner lieu a des dommages et interets. 

111. Si, d'aprSs ces considerations, vous estimez suffisante la 
presomption de nullite de Facte de transfert, vous capturerez le 
navire suspect. 

112. Le transfert sous pavilion neutre d'un navire ennemi, 
effectue apr§s l'ouverture des hostilites, est nul, a moins qu'il ne 
soit §tabli que ce transfert n'a pas et§ effectue en vue d'eluder les 
consequences qu'entraine le caractere de navire ennemi, par ex- 
ample par suite d'heritage. 

113. Toutefois il y a presomption absolue de nullite 1 : 

1° Si le transfert a ete effectue pendant que le navire est en 
voyage ou dans un port bloque ; 

2° S'il y a faculte de remere 1 ou de retour;' 

3° Si les conditions auxquelles est soumis le droit de pavilion, 
d'apr§s la legislation du pavilion arbore, n'ont pas ete observers. 

114. Ces regies ne sont, bien entendu, pas applicables lorsque la 
vente du navire ennemi a un sujet neutre a ete effectuee par les 
autorites franchises, a la suite d'une prise. 

Article XIV. 

CAPTURE SAISIE — FORMALIT^S DE LA CAPTURE. 1 

115. La visite est suivie de capture ou de saisie lorsqu'elle revele 
ou confirme soit le caractere ennemi du navire, soit une violation 
de blocus, soit le caractere de contrebande de son chargement. 

116. Si la visite ne determine pas la saisie du batinient, Fofficier 
qui en aura ete charge devra seulement la constater sur les papiers 

1 Voir egalement d6cret sur le service h bord des bailments de la marine 
militaire du 15 mai 1910, art. 368, 369, 407. 



CAPTURE. 187 

de bord. Si, au contraire, elle determine la saisie ou la capture, 
il devra etre procdde ainsi qu'il suit : 

1° S'eniparer de tous les papiers de bord et les niettre sous 
scelles apres en avoir dresse inventaire; 

2° Dresser un proces-verbal de capture ou de saisie portant in- 
ventaire sonmiaire du batiment (voir Annexes III, Fornaules H 
et I), dont un exemplaire sera remis au capitaine du navire cap- 
ture ou saisi; 

3° Constater l'etat du chargement, puis faire fernier les ecou- 
tilles de la cale, les coffres, les soutes et y apposer les scelles ; 

4° Dresser un etat des effets, argent, instruments nautiques, et 
autres objets appartenant au capitaine et a l'equipage. S'ils ne 
sont pas laisses a leur disposition, mention en sera faite au proces- 
verbal ; 

5° Mettre & bord un equipage pour la conduite de la prise et en 
donner le commandement a un officier ou & un officier-marinier, en 
lui remettant une lettre de conducteur de prise et vos instructions. 

117. Capture des corsaires ou des irii'ates. — En cas de prise d'un 
corsaire regulierement pourvu de lettres de marque par un Gou- 
vernement n'ayant pas adnere a la Declaration de Paris, vous pro 
cederez de la meme maniere. Le capitaine, les officiers et l'equi- 
page de ce corsaire seront traites comme il est dit au paragraphe 
146 pour les bailments de guerre. 

Le capitaine, les officiers et l'equipage de tout navire arme" en 
course par un Gouvernement signataire de la Declaration de 1856, 
etant passibles des peines prevues pour le crime de piraterie, 
devront etre considered non comme prisonniers de guerre, mais 
comme detenus, et remis aux autorites franchises les plus proches 
pour etre poursuivis conforrnement aux lo'is de la Republique. 

118. Capture des odtiments de guerre. — Dans le cas de capture 
d'un batiment de guerre, vous vous bornerez a le constater sur 
votre journal et vous pourvoirez k la conduite de la maniere la 
plus conforme a la securite des equipages auxquels vous la con- 
fierez. (D^cret du 15 mai 1910 sur le service a bord des b&ti- 
ments de la Flotte, art. 368, 369, 407.) 

Article XV. 

USAGE DE LA TELEGRAPHIE SANS FIL. 

119. Si les circonstances l'exigent et dans la mesure ou vous 
ie jugerez indispensable, vous pourrez notifier aux navires de 
commerce munis d'une installation de T. S. F. qui sejourneraient 
dans la zone de vos operations, ou meme qui la traverseraient, 
1'interdiction : 

De transmettre des nouvelles sur votre situation ou sur vos 
mouvements : 



188 APPENDIX. 

D'enregistrer des telegrammes clairs on chiffres provenant de 
votre batiinent ou des batiments de votre force navale; 

D'emettre des signanx de nature a troubler vos communica- 
tions. 

Vous fixerez alors par une declaration et une notification 
analogues a celles qui concern ent le blocus, les limites geographi- 
ques et, le cas echeant, les limites de temps ou d'beures entre 
lesquelles s'etendra le regime de vos interdictions. 

120. Si, malgre votre notification, les navires susvises transmet- 
tent des nouvelles interdites ou troublent systematiquement vos 
communications, vous agirez suivant la gravite et les consequences 
de leurs actes, soit comme il est prevu a l'article 4 de la Conven- 
tion X de La Haye pour l'application a la guerre maritime des 
principes de la Convention de Geneve, soit comme il est dit pour 
le deuxieme cas vise au paragrapbe 55 (assistance bostile). 

Vous pourrez done enjoindre a ces navires de s'eloigner bors 
des limites fixees dans votre declaration, leur imposer une direc- 
tion determinee, les detenir, meme les capturer et, dans tons les 
cas, saisir leurs appareils de T. S. F. 

121. Si la visite de ces navires vous revele simplement l'enre- 
gistrement de depecbes interdites, vous pourrez saisir leur registre 
de telegrammes, leur enjoindre de s'eloigner, leur fixer une direc- 
tion determinee, et, si vous avez des motifs suffisants de suspecter 
leur bonne foi, saisir leurs appareils de T. S. F. 

Article XVI. 

DE LA CORRESPONDANCE POSTALE. 1 

122. La correspondance postale des neutres ou des belligerants, 
quel que soit son caractere officiel ou prive, trouvee en mer sur un 
navire neutre ou eunemi, est inviolable. S'il y a saisie du navire, 
elle est expediee avec le moins de retard possible par le capteur. 

123. Les dispositions precedentes ne s'appliquent pas, en cas de 
violation de blocus, a la correspondance qui est a destination ou 
en provenance de port bloque. 

124. Elles ne sont egalement applicables qu'entre les puissances 
qui ont ratifie" la Convention de La Haye du 18 octobre 1907 
relative a certaines restrictions a l'exercice du droit de capture 
dans la guerre maritime, ou qui ont adhere a cette Convention, 
et seulement si les belligerants sont tons parties a cette Conven- 
tion. 

125. Dans le cas des paragrapbes 123 et 124, vous pourrez 
prendre connaissance des lettres officielles ou particulieres 
adressees aux autorites ennemies ou a des personnes residant sur 
le territoire de l'ennemi ou occupe par lui et trouv£es a bord des 



1 XI C Convention (lo In 2 P Conference de La TTayo du 18 octobre 1907, 



MAIL BOATS. 189 

bailments captures ; s'il en est qui presentent de l'interet, vous les 
adresserez sans delai au Ministre de la Marine, vous expedierez 
les autres a leur destination avec le moins de retard possible. 

Article XVII. 

PAQUEBOTS. 1 

126. L'inviolabilite de la correspondance postale ne soustrait 
pas les paquebots-poste neutres aux lois et coutumes de la guerre 
sur mer concernant les navires de commerce neutres en general. 
Toutefois la visite n'en doit etre effectuee qu'en cas de necessite, 
avec tous les menagements et toute la celerite possibles. (Voir 
Annexe I, Convention postale. franco-britannique du 30 aout 1890.) 

Article XVIII. 

PAVILLON DES PRISES. 

127. Tout navire capture navigue avec le pavilion et la flamine, 
insignes des batiments de guerre. 

Article XIX. 

ENVOI DES PRISES DANS LES PORTS FRANCAIS — CONDITIONS DE SEJOUR 
EVENTUEL DES PRISES DANS LES EAUX NEUTRES. 2 

128. Sauf le cas de force majeure indique" ci-dessous, les prises 
sont dirigees sur les ports de France ou des possessions fran- 
chises, ou appartenant a un Gouvernenient allie\ 

129. line prise ne peut etre amenee dans un port neutre que 
pour cause d'innavigabilite, de mauvais etat de la mer, de manque 
de combustible ou cle provisions. Elle doit repartir aussitot que 
la cause qui en a justifie l'entree a cesse. 

Le capteur se mettra en rapport avec le consul de France et se 
concertera avec lui sur la destination ulterieure de la prise. 

130. Si la prise, en mesure de sortir des eaux neutres, retardait 
son depart ou ne se conformait pas a l'ordre de partir immediate- 
ment qui lui aurait ete notifie par la Puissance neutre, cette der- 
niere serait dans son droit strict en usant des moyens dont elle 
dispose pour relacber la prise avec ses officiers et son Equipage, 
et interner l'gquipage mis a bord par le capteur. 

131. Vous pourrez d'ailleurs considerer comme port pour la 
mise sous sequestre des navires et des marchandises tout port 

1 XI e Convention de La Haye relative a. certaines restrictions a. l'exercice 
du droit de capture dans la guerre maritime. 

2 XIII e Convention de La Haye concernant les droits et les devoirs des 
puissances neutres en cas de guerre maritime. 



190 APPENDIX. 

occupe par nos forces, ou il pourra §tre procede aux actes d'ins- 
truction et d'administration prescrits par les lois et reglements 
de la Republique. 

132. Bien que, aux termes de l'article 23 de la XI Convention 
de La Haye, une Puissance neutre ait la faculte de permettre 
Faeces de ses ports et rades aux prises escortes ou non, 
lorsqu'elles y sont amenees pour etre laissees sous sequestre en 
attendant la decision du tribunal des prises, vous ne chercherez a 
user de cette autorisation que si les circonstances vous y obligent 
et qu'apres vous etre assure que ladite Puissance neutre per- 
mettra reellement l'acces de ses ports et rades a vos prises dans 
les conditions de l'article 23 precite. 

133. Si le port neutre dans lequel il se presente lui est interdit 
absoluinent, ou si sa presence n'y est toleree que pour un temps 
insuffisant, le capteur ou le conducteur d'une prise defere aux in- 
vitations qui lui sont adressees par le Gouvernement du pays ou 
il se trouve. II agit alors au mieux des interets dont il est 
charge, et rend compte sans delai au Ministre de la Marine du 
refus qu'il a eprouve. 

Article XX. 

PIECES A REMETTRE PAR LES CONDUCTEURS DE PRISES. 

134. Si le capteur n'escorte pas sa prise parce qu'il juge pou- 
voir l'expedier directenient, le conducteur de la prise doit, a son 
arrivee au port de destination, remettre a l'autorite maritime : 

1° Son rapport de traversee; 

2° Les pieces et documents de toute nature vises au para- 
graphe 116. 

Une copie certifiee du proc§s-verbal de capture et d'apposition 
des scelles restera entre les mains du capteur. 

II importe a tous les points de vue que le capteur n'omette 
aucune de ces formalites reglementaires (B. O. R., t. IV, p. 67). 

Article XXI. 

DU REGIME DES EQUIPAGES DES NAVIRES DE COMMERCE ENNEMIS 

CAPTURES. 1 

135. Lorsque vous aurez capture un navire de commerce ennemi, 
les hommes de son equipage, nationaux d'un Etat neutre, ne 
seront pas faits prissonniers de guerre. 

136. II en sera de meme du capitaine et des officiers, Sgalement 
nationaux d'un Etat neutre, s'ils promettent formellement par 
ecrit de ne pas servir sur un navire ennemi pendant la duree de 
la guerre. 



1 XI e Convention de La Haye, Chap. Ill, Formule R. 



TREATMENT OF SHIPS AND PASSENGERS. 191 

137. Le capitaine, les officiers et les membres de l'equipage, 
natiouaux de l'Etat enneini, ue seront pas faits prisonniers de 
guerre, a la condition qu'ils s'engagent, sous la foi d'une promesse 
forntelle ecrite, & ne prendre pendant la duree des hostilites aucun 
service ayant rapport avec les operations de la guerre. 

138. Vous remettrez aux interesses regu des promesses qu'ils 
auraient faites dans les termes des paragraphes 136 et 137. En 
outre, vouz aurez soin de me faire connaitre et de porter & la 
connaissance de l'ennemi, par toutes voies possibles, les nonis des 
individus laisses libres dans les conditions visees aux susdits 
paragraphes. 

139. Les dispositions ci-dessus ne s'appliquent pas aux navires 
qui prennent part aux hostilites. 

140. Dans le cas ou vous n'y verriez aucun danger, vous pourriez 
maintenir a leur bord le capitaine et tout ou partie de l'equipage 
du navire de commerce capture. 

141. Les individus qui n'auront pas conserve leur liberte dans 
les conditions des paragraphes 135 et 136 seront prisonniers de 
guerre. 

142. Toute personne trouvee a bord d'un navire de commerce 
ennemi est, sauf\ preuve contra ire, presumee de nationality en- 
nemie. 

Article XXII. 

DU REGIME DES PASSAGERS TROUVES A BORD DES NAVIRES CAPTURES. 

143. Les passagers sont libres et peuvent debarquer dans le pre- 
mier port ou le bailment aborde. 

144. Toutefois les hommes de 18 a 50 ans nationaux de l'Etat 
ennemi et qui ne tombent pas sous le coup des paragraphes 59, 60 
de l'Article IX seront traites comme il est dit ci-dessus a l'Article 
XXI, pour le capitaine, les officiers et les membres de l'equipage 
nationaux de l'Etat ennemi. 

Article XXIII. 

EXPEDITION DIRECTE DES PIECES ET DES PERSONNES. 

145. Dans des circonstances exceptionnelles, le capteur peut ex- 
pedier directement au port de prise, avec les pieces de procedure, 
les personnes (capitaine, officiers, ou membres de l'equipage du 
navire capture, au nombre de trois au moins) dont la presence est 
necessaire a l'instruction de la prise. 

Leur arrivee devra preceder celle de la prise elle-meme. 

Article XXIV. 

EQUIPAGES DES BATIMENTS DE GUERRE CAPTURES. 

146. Si le navire capture est un batiment de guerre, vous trans- 
borderez le capitaine, la majeure partie des officiers, une portion 



192 APPENDIX. 

de l'equipage, et vous conduirez ces prisonuiers dans un port fran- 
gais on allie, ou occupe par les forces arinees frangaises ou alliees. 
(Voir decret du 15 mai 1910 sur le service a bord des batiments 
de la marine militaire, art. 339, 368, 369, 406, 407.) 

Article XXV. 

PRISE rERDTJE PAR FORTUNE DE MER. 

147. Si une prise est perdue par fortune de nier, il importe de 
constater le fait avec le plus grand soin et d'en faire l'objet d'un 
rapport adresse sans delai au Ministre de la Marine. 

Article XXVI. 

REARMEMENT ET EMPLOI DES NAVIRES CAPTURES. 

148. Si l'interet public l'exige, yous pourrez rearmer les navires 
ennemis captures et les employer pour les besoins du service, apr§s 
en avoir, autant que possible, fait dresser un inventaire sommaire 
avec estimation. 

149. Vous pourrez egalement utiliser, pour le service de la flotte, 
les cargnisons des navires ennemis, apres en avoir fait dresser un 
inventaire estimatif detaille. 

150. Vous aurez egalement la faculte d'en agir ainsi pour les 
approvisionnements du navire, notamment pour les combustibles 
et les matieres grasses. 

151. Les proces-verbaux rediges en execution de ces disposi- 
tions devront etre joints au dossier de la prise; un double en 
sera adresse au Ministre de la Marine, et un autre au capitaine 
du navire capture. 

Article XXVII. 

INTERDICTION DE LA RANCjON. 

152. II vous est interdit de consentir un traite de rangon. 

ARTICLE XXVIII. 
DESTRUCTION DES PRISES ENNEMIES. 

153. Les prises doivent §tre amarinees, conduites dans un port 
national ou alli§, et non pas detruites. 

Par exception, vous etes autorise & detruire toute prise dont la 
conservation compromettrait votre propre securite ou le succes 
de vos operations, notamment si vous ne pouvez conserver la 
prise sans affaiblir voire equipage. 



DESTRUCTION. 193 

154. Avant la destruction, vous mettrez en stirete les personnes, 
quelles qu'elles soient, qui se trouvent a bord, ainsi que tous les 
papiers et documents utiles pour le jugement de la prise. 

155. En cas de combat provoqud par une resistance armee, 
ceux qui montent le navire suivent la fortune des armes. 

Article XXIX. 

DESTRUCTION DES PRISES NEUTRE S DESTRUCTION DES MARCHANDI3ES. 

156. Un navire neutre capture ne peut etre detruit par le cap- 
teur ; mais il doit etre conduit dans un port national ou allie, pour 
y etre statue ce que de droit sur la validite de la capture. 

157. Par exception, un navire neutre capture et dont la con- 
fiscation vous apparaitrait certaine peut §tre detruit, si sa con- 
servation et son convoi peuvent compromettre la security de 
votre batiment ou le succes des operations dans lesquelles vous 
etes engage. 

158. Avant la destruction,, les personnes qui se trouvent a bord 
devront etre mises en stirete, et tous les papiers de bord et autres 
pieces que les interesses estimeront utiles pour jugement sur 
la validite de la capture devront etre transbordes sur votre bati- 
ment. 

159. Je vous raxipelle que le capteur qui a detruit un navire 
neutre doit, prealab^ement k tout jugement sur la validite' de la 
capture, justifier en fait avoir agi en presence d'une necessite 
exceptionnelle dans le sens du paragraphe 157. 

160. Si le navire n'est pas sujet a confiscation ou s'il y a doute, 
vous aurez la faculte d'exiger la remise ou de proceder a la 
destruction des marcbandises confiscables trouvees a bord dudit 
navire, lorsque les circonstances justifieraient la destruction d'un 
navire passible de confiscation. Vous mentionnerez alors les 
objets livres ou detruits sur le livre de bord du navire arrets, et 
vous ferez remettre par le capitaine copie certifiee conforme de 
tous papiers utiles. Lorsque la remise ou la destruction a €t& 
effectuee et que les formalites ont ete remplies. le capitaine doit 
etre autorise a continuer sa route. 

JVoubli de ces formalites engage la responsabilit& du capteur. 

Article XXX. 

RECOUSSE. 

161. En cas de capture par l'ennemi d v un batiment national ou 
allie, vous devez vous efforcer d'en operer la recousse. 

Dans ce cas et dans celui ou vous reprendriez sur l'ennemi un 
batiment neutre, vous retiendrez le personnel militaire ennemi 

19148—14 IS 



194 APPENDIX. 

trouve a bord. et vous relacherez purement et simplement le 
navire. 

Pour le personnel ennenii Hon niiiitaire trouve a bord du inline 
navire, vous vous conformerez aux articles et 7 de la Convention 
XI de La Haye. 

Article XXXI 

APPLICATION DES PRINCIPES DE LA CONVENTION CONCERNANT LES 
LOIS ET COUTUMES DE LA GUERRE SUR TERRE ( IV e CONVENTION ET 
REGLEMENT ANNEXE DE LA 2 e CONFERENCE DE LA HAYE). 

162. Si vous etes conduit a operer on debarquernent et a pour- 
suivre vos operations k terre, vous observerez les prescriptions de 
la Convention IV de La Haye concernant les lois et coutumes de 
la guerre sur terre et du reglement annexe a ladite Convention. 

Article XXXII.. 

BOMBARDEMENT PAR DES FORCES NAVALES EN TEMPS DE GUERRE. 

163. Vous vous conformerez strictement aux dispositions de la 
IX e Convention de La Haye, du 18 octobre 1907, concernant le 
bombardement par des forces aa vales en temps de guerre. 

Article XXXIII.. 

POSE DES MINES SOUS-MARINES AUTOMATIQUES DE CONTACT. 

164. Vous vous conformerez egalement aux dispositions de la 
VHP Conference de La Haye, du 18 octobre 1907, relative a la 
pose des mines sous-marines automatiques de contact. 

Article XXXIV 

165. Les presenter instructions entreromc immediatement en 
vigueur, 

166. Sont et demeurent abrogees toutes des dispositions con- 
traires. 

Delcasse, 
Le Ministre de la Marine. 
Paris, le 19 decembre 1912. 



I ND EX . 



Page. 

Alleganean, case of 39 

Argentine Republic : 

Immunity of private property at sea , 122 

Limitation of armaments 85, 87 

Asphyxiating gases. (See Means of injuring the enemy.) 

Austria-Hungary : 

Immunity of private property at sea 124 

Marginal sea = 22 

Azuni, opinion on headland doctrine 40 

Barbarity. (See Means of injuring the enemy.) 

Barclay, Sir Thomas : 

Jurisdictional over marginal sea 27-28, 30 

Jurisdiction over straits 46 

Bays. (See Gulfs and bays.) 

Belgium : 

Immunity of private property . 123 

Marginal sea, 1901 22 

Bering Sea 18 

Brazil : 

Immunity of private property at sea 122 

Marginal sea, 1898 23 

Canals : 

Character 47 

Classes ■ 47 

Conclusion on 51, 53 

Holland on Suez Canal 49 

Interparliamentary Union on 48 

Panama 50 

Suez 49-50 

Capture, definition of 90 

Chili, limitation of armaments 85, 87 

Civil war without prior declaration 65 

Coast fishing vessels, exemption from capture 94-95 

Coast line, general trend of 30 

Colombia, immunity of private property 120 

Commencement of hostilities : 

American opinion of Hague Convention 55 

Form of declaration = :_ 65,69,72 

Hague rules, reasons for 70-72 

Italian declaration 64, 65 

(195) 



196 

Commencement of hostilities — Continued. Page. 

Period of grace before 69 

Recall of diplomat 65 

Regulations 54, 74 

Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 61-62 

South African War, 1899 60-61 

Spanish-American War, 1898 56, 60 

Turco-Italian War, 1911 62-65 

What constitutes 67-68 

Conversion of private vessels into public vessels: 

Conclusions 148, 153 

Hague Conference, 1907 149-150,153-154 

Institute of International Law on • 149-153 

On high sea 151 

Reconversion 150 

Days of grace 96-98,111 

Deceit 161,165 

Declaration of London 155-160 

Declaration of war (see Commencement of hostilities) : 

Form of 65, 69, 72, 74 

Power of Congress 56 

Denial of quarter 161-165 

Denmark : 

Immunity of private property 123 

Marginal sea 26 

Sound dues 43 

Straits 43 

Destruction of enemy vessel 161-165 

Disarmament. (See Limitation qf armaments.) 

Drago on headland doctrine 39 

Ekaterinoslav, case of 62 

Enemy vessels and their personnel : 

Cartel ships 91-92 

Classification of vessels 91 

Coast fishing vessels 94-95 

Conclusion 89-90, 111-112 

Correspondents 102 

Days of grace 96-98 

Destruction of 164-165 

Exemptions of private vessels from capture 92-93 

Exemptions of public vessels from capture 91, 93 

Exploring 91,92 

Flag 92,99 

French regulations of Napoleon " 99 

French regulations, 1912 100 

Hospital ships 91-92,107 

Institute of International Law on 98, 100-105 



197 

Enemy vessels and their personnel — Continued. Page. 

Passengers 91,100-104,112 

Personnel private vessels 90, 109, 112 

Prisoners of war 109 

Scientific 91 

Small boats in local trade 95, 96 

Treatment of private vessels 89, 91-93 

Treatment of public vessels 89, 91, 111 

Flag of truce 161-162 

France : 

Immunity of private property at sea 121, 123 

Instructions for application of laws of war, 1912 167-194 

Limitation of armaments 85 

Marginal sea, 1912— ; 23 

Gases. (See Means of injuring the enemy.) 

General trend of coast 30 

Germany, marginal sea 24 

Grange, case of 35 

Great Britain : 

Immunity of private property at sea 121-122 

Manual of Land Warfare 162 

Grotius on sea 13-14 

Gulfs and bays: 

American contention, 1909 38 

Azuni's opinion 40 

Chesapeake Bay 39 

Conclusions on 47, 52 

Drago's opinion 39 

Headland doctrine 37 

Institute of International Law on 41 

North Atlantic Fisheries decision 37 

Opinion of United States, 1800 36 

Prof. Westlake's opinion 40 

Hague Conference, 1899: 

Conversion of private ships 149,153 

Declaration of war 70-72 

Disarmament discussion 75, 88 

Enemy vessels and personnel 95-97, 105-109 

Mines 138-143 

Hague Convention, 1907: 

Conversion of private ships 148-149, 153-154 

Laws and customs of war on land 162 

Laying of automatic contact submarine mines 141-143 

Opening of hostilities 53 

Restriction on captures, maritime war 90, 108 

Rights and duties, maritime war 31-33, 46 

Use of terms in 32 



198 

Headland doctrine: Page. 

American contention 88 

Azuni's opinion 40 

Chesapeake Bay 39 

Institute of International Law 41 

North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration 37 

Opinion of Dr. Drago 39 

Russo-Japanese War 37 

Prof. Westlake's opinion 40 

Holland, Prof. : 

Manual of Prize Law : 20 

Opinion on Suez Canal 49 

Immunity of private property at sea : 

Attitude of States on 116-127 

Capture of 113-131 

Choate on 116-119 

Conclusion on 113, 127, 131 

Enemy ships 115-116, 127-129 

Hague conclusions on 127 

Hague Conferences and 113-114, 116-129 

Resume of Hague propositions 124-126 

Replies to United States proposition, 1907 120-124 

United States proposition, 1899 113-114 

United States proposition, 1907 116-120 

Vote at Hague, 1907 126-127 

Westlake on 129-130 

Injuring enemy. (See Methods of.) 

Innocent passage 46 

Institute of International Law : 

Conversion of private ships into ships of war 149-153 

Enemy vessels and personnel 98. 100-105 

Headland doctrine 41 

Marginal sea 27-30 

Means of injuring belligerent 163-164 

Mines 143-146 

Straits 45^6 

Instructions for application of international law in case 

of war 167-194 

International law publications, Naval War College: 

Situations, 1908 146 

Situations, 1910 54, 68, 96-98, 156, 159 

Situations, 1912 149-150,153 

Topics, 1905 114-116, 142, 146,164 

Topics, 1906 96-98 

International Naval Conference and conversion of private 

ships __. 149-150, 156-159 



199 

Page. 

[nter.parliamentary Union ou canals 48 

Italy, marginal sen. 1912 24 

Japan : 

Marginal sea. 1904 24 

On reconversion 150 

Jefferson on maritime jurisdiction 16-18 

Limitation of armaments: 

Argentine opinion, 1907 85,87 

British opinion, 1907 84-85 

Chilean opinion. 1907 85,87 

Committee report on, 1899 82-84 

Conclusion 75,88 

Discussion of _ 77-84 

France, 1907 — — 85 

Hague, 1899 77-84 

Hague, 1907 77 

Russian attitude, 1899 78-80 

Russian attitude., 1907 ' 85-86 

Russian proposals, 1899 75-84 

Spain, 1907 85 

Technical opinions, 1899 ,.__ 80-82 

United States, 1907 85 

Wish, 1899 77 

Wish, 1907 86 

Marginal sea. (See Sea, marginal) 

Martens on marginal sea 27 

McKinley, President, Spanish-American War 58 

Means of injuring the enemy : 

Asphyxiating and deleterious gases :__ 132,136-137,146 

Conclusions 132-133, 146-147 

Declaration of St. Petersburg, 1836 133-134,136 

Early attitude toward _ 133 

General rules 132,135 

Geneva Convention 134 

German attitude, 1907 139 

Hague Conference on mines 138-139 

Hague Convention, 1899—1 135-138,141-143 

Institute of International Law on 143-146 

Mahan on gases 137 

Mines 132-133, 138-147 

Poison, poisoned weapons 132,146 

Projectiles causing unnecessary suffering 132. 135-138, 147 

Torpedoes 132.138 



200 

Methods of injuring the enemy :: Page. 

Conclusions .. 161, 165 

Deceit 161, 165 

Denial of quarter 161-165 

Destruction of enemy vessels 164-165 

Flag of truce . 161-162 

French regulations, 1912 164-165 

Institute of International Law on 163-164 

Ruses of war 161 

Treachery 161 

Mexico, treaty of 1848 19 

Mines. (See Means of injuring the enemy.) 

Molloy, on sea 13 

Naval War College. (See International law publications.) 
Netherlands : 

Headland doctrine 37 

Immunity of private property at sea 122 

Neutral waters 21,32 

Neutrality, act of 1794 r 17 

Norway : 

Marginal sea 25-26 

v. Sweden Arbitration 30 

Olney, Richard, on marginal sea, 1896 29 

Opening of hostilities. (See Commencement of hostilities, 
Hague Conventions.) 

Panama Canal 50-51 

Personnel of enemy vessels,. (See Enemy vessels and their 

personnel. ) 
Poison. (See Means of injuring the enemy.) 
Private property at sea. (See Immunity of.) 

Prize, definition of 91 

Reconversion of ships of war 150 

Revenue purposes, jurisdiction for 18 

Roadsteads 1 42, 47, 52 

Ruses of war 161 

Russia : 

Disarmament proposition, 1899 75-84 

Disarmament proposition, 1907 85 

Marginal sea 25 

White Sea claims 25 

Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 : 

Bosphorus in 44 

Commencement of : 62 

Declaration, Japanese 61 

Headland doctrine, Netherlands 37 

Personnel of captured ships 110 



201 

Sea, marginal: Page. 

Belligerent waters ; 21 

British law, 1736 15 

Byukershoek 13 

Conclusion on 34 

Early control of 13 

Early ideas 12 

Effect of extension of : 33 

Grotius on 13-14 

Later ideas 16 

Molloy, on '. 13 

National regulations 22, 24 

Opinion of text-waters 20-21 

Selden. on 1 13,14 

United States attitude 16, 29 

Sea, marginal, Great Britain: 

Early doctrine : __- , 13,14 

Law of 1736 15 

North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration 35, 37-39 

Manual of Prize Law 20 

Sea, marginal, United States : 

Bering Sea 18 

Chesapeake Bay 39 

Gulf Stream limit 17, 33 

Jefferson's ideas _. 16-18 

Neutrality act 17 

North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration 35. 37-39 

Position in 1898 29 

Regulations proposed 52 

Revenue purposes 18 

Straits of Magellan ._ 43 

Sound dues 43 

Treaty provisions 19 

Seizure, definition of_ ^__^-l 90 

Selden, on sea 13-14 

South African War: 

British reply to ultimatum 61 

Ultimatum 60-61 

Spain : 

Declaration of war, 1898 53 

Limitation of armament 85 

Marginal sea 26 

Spanish-American War. 1898 : 

Blockade 58 

Correspondence 56-60 

Declarations : 56-60 



202 

Spanish-American War, 1898 — Continued. Page. 

Personnel of captured ships 110 

Resolution of United States Congress 56-60 

Spaight, J. M., on commencement of hostilities 67 

Straits: 

Bosphorus 44 

Claims to * 43 

Conclusions on 47 

Connecting inland waters 44 

Connecting open seas 42 

Effect of extension of shore jurisdiction ^ 42 

Institute of International Law on__ 45^6 

Jurisdiction over „ 44 

Magellan, treaty 43 

Sweden : 

Marginal sea 25-26 

v. Norway Arbitration 30 

Three-mile limit. (See Marginal seas.) 

Torpedoes (see Means of injuring the enemy) : 

Attitude toward 138 

Prohibitions as to 132 

Transfer of vessels from enemy to neutral flag: 

After opening of hostilities 158-159 

Before opening of hostilities 157-158 

Conclusion 155, 160 

Declaration of London, rules of 156-159 

In transitu 158 

Transformation of private vessels into public vessels. (See 
Conversion of.) 

Treachery 161 

United States: 

Bering Sea 18 

Chesapeake Bay 39 

Days of grace, attitude on 97 

Declaration of war 55-60 

Immunity of private property at sea 113-114, 

116-120, 130-131 

Limitation of armament, attitude on 85 

Marginal waters 16-18. 29. 30 

North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration 35-39 

Opening of hostilities, attitude on 55 

Panama Canal ■ 50-51 

Revenue law, 1797 _. IS 

Spnnish-American War, 1898 56-60 

Straits, attitude on 43-44 

Treaties on waters 19 

Treaty with Italy, 1871 93 



Ultimatum : Page. 

British reply to ultimatum, 1899 61 

Demanding satisfaction 66 

Reasoned 66 

South African War, 1899 60-61 

Turco-Italian War, 1911 62-64 

Turkish reply to ultimatum, 1911 64 

Vessels, enemy. (See Enemy vessels and their personnel.) 

Westlake. Prof. : 

On commencement of hostilities 70 

On headland doctrine 40 

On immunity of private property at sea 329 










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